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Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections
15-680
Ruling Below: Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D. Va.
2015)
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of twelve different House of Delegates districts in
Virginia, on the grounds that they were unlawfully racially gerrymandered, violating the Equal
Protection Amendment.
The District Court held that the use of the 55% black voting-age population floor did not satisfy
the requirement of racial predominance in the drawing of the district and did not trigger strict
scrutiny as a result. Thus, the holding stated that the plaintiffs failed to show that race was the
predominant factor in eleven of the twelve districts. The holding also stated that, although race
was the predominant factor in the twelfth district, it was narrowly tailored, designed to comply
with federal anti-discrimination law.
Question Presented: Whether the use of race must result in “actual conflict” with traditional
districting criteria for race to be considered predominant;
Whether the use of a black population voting floor should have amounted to racial predominance
and triggered strict scrutiny;
Whether the court below erred by disregarding the admitted use of race in drawing districts in
favor of examining circumstantial evidence;
Whether racial motivations must outweigh all other criteria considered in order for race to be
considered predominant;
Whether the use of race in drawing House District 75 was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.

Golden BETHUNE–HILL, Plaintiffs,
v.
VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants..
United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia
Decided on October 22, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
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ROBERT E. PAYNE, Senior District Judge:
This case challenges the constitutionality of
twelve Virginia House of Delegates districts
(the “Challenged Districts”) as racial
gerrymanders in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The case is ripe for decision following
a four-day bench trial at which the parties
presented oral testimony and offered
numerous exhibits. Our findings of fact are
based on our assessment of the record and are
grounded in our determinations respecting
the credibility of the witnesses.
Our conclusions of law address the several
legal issues presented by the parties. In
particular, we have determined that it is the
burden of the Plaintiffs to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that race was
the predominate factor motivating the
decision to place a significant number of
voters within or without a particular district
in that, as to each of those districts, Virginia's
General Assembly subordinated race-neutral
districting principles to racial considerations
when forming the district. Based on this legal
standard and the record, we have concluded
that, except as to House District 75, the
Plaintiffs have not carried that burden and
that race was not shown to have been the
predominant factor in the creation of eleven
of the twelve Challenged Districts.
We are satisfied that race was the
predominant factor in the creation of House
District 75. However, we have also
concluded that, in using race, the General
Assembly was pursuing a compelling state
interest, namely, actual compliance with
federal antidiscrimination law, and that, in
the process, the General Assembly used race
in a manner narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.

In the Memorandum Opinion that follows,
the Court will review the procedural
background of the case in Section I; provide
a brief overview of the law relating to racial
gerrymandering claims in Section II; and set
out its findings on the factual background of
the case in Section III. In Section IV, the
Court will articulate its understanding of the
relevant legal framework for evaluating
racial gerrymandering (or “racial sorting”)
claims, set out additional factual findings of
general applicability, and conduct a districtby-district analysis with district-specific
factual findings and district-specific
application of the relevant legal framework.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the wake of the 2010 census, the Virginia
General Assembly sought to redraw the
legislative districts for the Virginia House of
Delegates (“House”) and the Senate of
Virginia (“Senate”). The task of redistricting
is one that carries great political and legal
consequence. In a representative democracy,
such legislation shapes more than the abstract
boundaries of electoral districts; it shapes the
character, conduct, and culture of the
representatives themselves. On its face, the
legislation recites a singularly tedious list of
precincts and counties. But in application,
few pieces of legislation have a more
profound impact on the function of
government and whether it acts as “the
faithful echo of the voices of the people.”
The political significance of redistricting is
matched only by its legal complexity. Those
shepherding redistricting legislation must
traverse a precarious path between
constitutional and statutory demands that are
often in tension with one another and provide
opaque interpretive standards rather than
clear rules.
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As to the 2011 redistricting, Delegate Chris
Jones led this effort in the House. Delegate
Jones played an instrumental role in the 2001
redistricting process and drew upon that
experience to lead the 2011 redistricting
efforts. Because Virginia was a covered
jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) at the time the
redistricting legislation was prepared, and
was therefore subject to the requirements of
Section 5 of the VRA, it was necessary to
ensure that the plan did not result in a
“retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.” In an
attempt to comply with this statutory
command, Delegate Jones crafted a plan
containing twelve majority-minority House
Districts (“HDs” or “Districts”). These are
the Challenged Districts: HDs 63, 69, 70, 71,
74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95.

by the Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

On December 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a
Complaint against the Virginia State Board
of Elections, the Virginia Department of
Elections, and various members thereof in
their official capacities (“Defendants”),
alleging that the Challenged Districts were
racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from
implementing or conducting further elections
based on the Challenged Districts. The
Plaintiffs are twelve citizens of the United
States and the Commonwealth of Virginia
who are lawfully registered voters in the
Commonwealth and each of whom resides in
one of the twelve Challenged Districts. The
Plaintiffs requested that the case be heard by
a three-judge district court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2284(a) on the grounds that the
action “challeng[es] the constitutionality of
the apportionment of ... [a] statewide
legislative body.” That request was granted

Before proceeding to the facts of the case and
the substance of this litigation, a brief
overview of the constitutional and statutory
requirements
pertinent
to
racial
gerrymandering claims is appropriate. As
noted above, these commands often cut
counter to each other and require legislators
to balance competing considerations. Tracing
their evolution is therefore useful as a
predicate for the decision that follows.

The Virginia House of Delegates and the
Virginia House of Delegates Speaker
William Howell (“Intervenors”) moved to
intervene in the case. That motion was
granted.
A four-day bench trial began on July 7, 2015.
Because the Defendants are “administrative
agencies that implement elections” but “do
not draw the districts,” the Defendants
allowed the Intervenors to carry the burden of
litigation but joined the Intervenors'
arguments at the close of the case. For ease of
reference, the Defendants and Intervenors
will be referred to as the Intervenors.
II. BASIC OVERVIEW OF RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS

The Supreme Court has long observed that
the right to vote is “fundamental” because it
is “preservative of all rights.” In Reynolds v.
Sims, the Court recognized that “the right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise” and held that
the malapportionment of state legislative
bodies in derogation of the “one person, one
vote” principle violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Because legislation affecting the
right to vote “strike[s] at the heart of
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representative
government,”
the
“Constitution leaves no room for
classification of people in a way that
unnecessarily abridges this right,” and grants
every citizen “an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political
processes of his State's legislative bodies.”
The decision in Reynolds only required state
legislatures to comply with the equal
population standard, but its language would
come to stand for something more. The next
year, in Fortson v. Dorsey, the Court
suggested that a “constituency apportionment
scheme” may not “comport with the dictates
of the Equal Protection Clause” if it “would
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population.” With Fortson, the
Supreme Court first recognized that
redistricting legislation may offend Equal
Protection Clause principles when it
distinguishes between voters on a racial
basis.
Over time, the Supreme Court has come to
recognize two types of racial gerrymandering
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1)
claims of racial vote dilution, where the
redistricting legislation is “conceived or
operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further
racial discrimination by minimizing,
canceling out or diluting the voting strength
of racial elements in the voting population”;
and (2) claims of racial sorting, where the
redistricting legislation, “though race neutral
on its face, rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to separate
voters into different districts on the basis of
race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.”
A. Racial Vote Dilution
Fourteenth Amendment

and

the

The Supreme Court first struck down a
districting scheme for unconstitutional racial
vote dilution in White v. Regester. There, the
Court stated:
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce
evidence to support findings that the
political processes leading to
nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the
group in question—that its members
had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate
in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.
At the time, it was unclear whether such a
claim required a showing of discriminatory
intent or could be maintained based solely on
discriminatory effect.
Several years later, in City of Mobile v.
Bolden, the Court suggested in a plurality
opinion that both discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect were required to
establish a claim of unconstitutional racial
vote dilution. That holding was reaffirmed by
a majority of the Court in Rogers v. Lodge.
Writing for the majority, Justice White
confirmed that “a showing of discriminatory
intent has long been required in all types of
equal protection cases charging racial
discrimination.”
Therefore, in a constitutional racial vote
dilution case, the plaintiff must show that the
State has placed a burden upon the right to
vote by intentionally establishing or
maintaining devices or procedures that cause
minority citizens to have less opportunity
than other citizens to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice. This dilutes the minority voter's
ability to exercise the “full and effective”
right to vote.
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B. Racial Sorting and the Fourteenth
Amendment
The
other
strand
of
“racial
gerrymandering”—a racial sorting claim
such as the one presented in this case—is
“analytically distinct” from a vote dilution
claim. “Whereas a vote dilution claim alleges
that the State has enacted a ... purposeful
device ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities,’ ... the
essence of [a racial sorting claim] is that the
State has used race as a basis for separating
voters into districts.”
In Shaw I, the Supreme Court faced two
patently bizarre legislative districts. One
resembled a “Rorshach ink-blot test” or a
“bug splattered on a windshield,” while the
other was “even more unusually shaped”:
[The district] is approximately 160
miles long and, for much of its length,
no wider than the I–85 corridor. It
winds in snakelike fashion through
tobacco country, financial centers,
and manufacturing areas until it
gobbles in enough enclaves of black
neighborhoods. Northbound and
southbound
drivers
on
I–85
sometimes find themselves in
separate districts in one county, only
to “trade” districts when they enter
the next county. Of the 10 counties
through which District 12 passes, 5
are cut into 3 different districts; even
towns are divided. At one point the
district remains contiguous only
because it intersects at a single point
with two other districts before
crossing over them. One state
legislator has remarked that “if you
drove down the interstate with both
car doors open, you'd kill most of the
people in the district.”

Although the text of the legislation was
facially neutral, the Court found that “it
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to
segregate the races for purposes of voting,
without regard for traditional districting
principles.”
For that reason, rather than requiring the
plaintiffs
to
present
evidence
of
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory
effect, the Supreme Court treated the
legislation as tantamount to a suspect facial
classification and employed strict scrutiny.
In order to prove a racial sorting claim, a
plaintiff must show that the legislature
“subordinated”
traditional
race-neutral
districting principles in crafting the district's
boundaries:
The plaintiff's burden is to show,
either
through
circumstantial
evidence of a district's shape and
demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose,
that race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of
voters within or without a particular
district. To make this showing, a
plaintiff must prove that the
legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles,
including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, and respect
for
political
subdivisions
or
communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.
This threshold standard is “a demanding
one.” Indeed, the Plaintiffs must overcome a
presumption that the legislature acted
correctly and in good faith. Thus, the plaintiff
“must show that the State has relied on race
in substantial disregard of customary and
traditional districting practices.”
381

If the plaintiff makes the requisite showing,
the State must demonstrate that the
redistricting legislation is narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling state interest. In
redistricting cases where the State claims a
compelling interest in compliance with the
VRA, the legislature must show that it had a
“strong basis in evidence” to support its use
of race-based districting. In other words, the
legislature must have “good reasons to
believe” that its use of racial classifications
was “required” by the VRA, “even if a court
does not find that the actions were necessary
for statutory compliance” after the fact.
C. The Voting Rights Act
In addition to these constitutional
imperatives, redistricting legislation must
also comply with the VRA. “The Voting
Rights Act was designed by Congress to
banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting [.]” Enacted pursuant to Congress'
enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment, the VRA prohibits states from
adopting plans that would result in vote
dilution under Section 2 or—in covered
jurisdictions—retrogression under Section 5.
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits the
imposition of any electoral practice or
procedure that “results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to
vote on account of race or color....” A § 2
violation occurs when, based on the totality
of circumstances, the political process results
in minority “members hav[ing] less
opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their
choice.” By adopting the “discriminatory
effect” language from Regester and omitting
any requirement to prove discriminatory
intent as required by Lodge, Congress created
a statutory “results test” that could be brought
by plaintiffs who might be otherwise unable

to bring a claim of racial vote dilution under
the Equal Protection Clause.
In order to prove a § 2 violation, a plaintiff
must
satisfy
three
prerequisites:
compactness, political cohesiveness, and
bloc voting. “First, the minority group must
be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member
district.” “Second, the minority group must
be able to show that it is politically cohesive.”
“Third, the minority must be able to
demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the
absence of special circumstances, such as the
minority candidate running unopposed—
usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.” These final two factors are often
referred to collectively as “racial
polarization.” Once these prerequisites have
been satisfied, the court evaluates the
plaintiff's evidence based on the totality of
the circumstances. The totality of
circumstances must be considered with a
focus on whether the minority group in
question was denied “equal political
opportunity.”
With respect to redistricting legislation, § 2
establishes a “natural floor” based on the
State's demographics for the number of
districts wherein members of a minority
group must maintain an “equal political
opportunity” to “elect representatives of their
choice.” Where a minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a numerical majority in
a hypothetical district, § 2 requires the
creation of a district wherein members of that
group maintain the equal ability to elect
representatives of their choice. Proving this
hypothetical requires the plaintiffs to present
an alternative redistricting plan.
Section 5 of the VRA, on the other hand,
forbids voting changes with “any
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discriminatory purpose” as well as voting
changes that diminish the ability of citizens,
on account of race, color, or language
minority status, “to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.” Sections 2 and 5
“differ in structure, purpose, and application.
Section 5 applies only in certain jurisdictions
specified by Congress and ‘only to proposed
changes in voting procedures.’ ”

Therein lies the rub. To comply with federal
statutory command (the VRA), the State must
consider and account for race in drawing
legislative districts in order to craft a
compliant plan. However, to avoid violating
the federal constitution, the State must not
subordinate traditional, neutral principles to
racial considerations in drawing district
boundaries.

Section 5 was enacted as “a response to a
common practice in some jurisdictions of
staying one step ahead of the federal courts
by passing new discriminatory voting laws as
soon as the old ones had been struck down.”
By requiring that proposed changes be
approved in advance, Congress sought “ ‘to
shift the advantage of time and inertia from
the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,’ by
‘freezing election procedures in the covered
areas unless the changes can be shown to be
nondiscriminatory.’ ” The purpose of this
approach was to ensure that “no votingprocedure changes would be made that would
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.”

And, at the same time, the State must also
comply with the “one person, one vote”
constitutional requirement as specified in
Reynolds v. Sims. That, of course, is not a
traditional redistricting principle to be
weighed as part of the predominance inquiry,
as Alabama makes clear. But it is a federal
constitutional requirement that, of necessity,
is central to the redistricting process and that
is highly instrumental in the drawing of
district boundaries.

“Retrogression, by definition, requires a
comparison of a jurisdiction's new voting
plan with its existing plan. It also necessarily
implies that the jurisdiction's existing plan is
the benchmark against which the ‘effect’ of
voting changes is measured.” Unlike the
“natural floor” of § 2 ensuring equal ability
to elect, the retrogression standard of § 5
creates a “relative floor” based upon the
existing benchmark plan. Under § 5, the State
must ensure that the new plan does not “lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise” by
diminishing the ability of minority voters to
elect their preferred candidates of choice as
compared to the State's existing plan.

It is within the context of this legal
framework that the Virginia General
Assembly sought to design and enact a
compliant redistricting plan. And these
principles are central to the resolution of this
case.
Before proceeding to the facts of the case, the
Court feels it necessary to pause and
recognize that Delegate Jones, members of
the redistricting committee, and other
legislators involved in the crafting and
amendment of HB 5005 did not have the
benefit of either the Supreme Court's
guidance in the recent Alabama decision or
the guidance provided in the opinion entered
here today. Based on the evidence and
testimony provided in the record, the Court
believes that all of the legislators involved
proceeded in a good faith attempt to comply
with all relevant constitutional and statutory
demands, as they understood them at the
time.
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III. Factual Background
A. The 2011 Redistricting Process
The first steps in the redistricting process
began well before the United States Census
Bureau released its population and
demographic data. On August 23, 2010,
Delegate Mark Cole announced that the
redistricting subcommittee of the House of
Delegates Committee on Privileges and
Elections had scheduled a series of six public
hearings throughout the Commonwealth to
solicit input into the House redistricting
process. These public hearings were held
between September 8, 2010 and December
17, 2010. Following these hearings,
Governor McDonnell signed Executive
Order 31 on January 10, 2011, creating the
“Independent
Bipartisan
Advisory
Redistricting Commission” (“Governor's
Commission”) to develop plan proposals,
review public input, and analyze
recommendations from other stakeholders in
the voting public.
Redistricting began in earnest in February
2011 when the 2010 census data was released
via Public Law 94–171. On March 25, 2011,
the House Committee on Privileges and
Elections adopted a resolution setting out the
criteria that the committee would follow in
reviewing redistricting plans. The House
Committee established six criteria, which
were as follows:
I. Population Equality: The population of
legislative districts shall be determined solely
according to the enumeration established by
the 2010 federal census. The population of
each district shall be as nearly equal to the
population of every other district as
practicable. Population deviations in House
of Delegates districts should be within plusor-minus one percent.

II. Voting Rights Act: Districts shall be
drawn in accordance with the laws of the
United States and the Commonwealth of
Virginia including compliance with
protections
against
the unwarranted
retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic
minority voting strength. Nothing in these
guidelines shall be construed to require or
permit any districting policy or action that is
contrary to the United States Constitution or
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
III. Contiguity and Compactness: Districts
shall be comprised of contiguous territory
including adjoining insular territory.
Contiguity by water is sufficient. Districts
shall be contiguous and compact in
accordance with the Constitution of Virginia
as interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court
in the cases of Jamerson v. Womack.
IV. Single–Member Districts: All districts
shall be single-member districts.
V. Communities of Interest: Districts shall be
based on legislative consideration of the
varied factors that can create or contribute to
communities of interest. These factors may
include, among others, economic factors,
social factors, cultural factors, geographic
factors, governmental jurisdictions and
service delivery areas, political beliefs,
voting
trends,
and
incumbency
considerations....
Local
government
jurisdiction and precinct lines may reflect
communities of interest to be balanced, but
they are entitled to no greater weight as a
matter of state policy than other identifiable
communities of interest.
VI. Priority: All of the foregoing criteria shall
be considered in the districting process, but
population equality among districts and
compliance with federal and state
constitutional requirements and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 shall be given priority in
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the event of conflict among the criteria.
Where the application of any of the foregoing
criteria may cause a violation of applicable
federal or state law, there may be such
deviation from the criteria as is necessary, but
no more than is necessary, to avoid such
violation.
These criteria were substantially similar to
the criteria adopted by the committee in the
2001 redistricting cycle, with two exceptions.
First, the 2001 criteria had permitted a
population deviation of “plus-or-minus two
percent,” rather than one percent, which
Delegate Jones stated was altered to better
“approximate
the
one-person-one-vote
[standard] in the Virginia constitution.”
Second, the 2001 criteria were updated to
include a citation to the decision of the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Wilkins v. West
as part of the “Contiguity and Compactness”
criterion.
B. The 55% Black Voting Age Population
Floor
At the time the redistricting process began,
the twelve Challenged Districts had black
voting-age populations (“BVAP”) ranging
from 46.3% to 62.7%. Three of the districts
had BVAPs below 55%. All others were
above 55%. Several legislators believed that
the twelve “ability-to-elect” districts found in
the 2001 redistricting plan (or “Benchmark
Plan”) needed to contain a BVAP of at least
55% in the 2011 redistricting plan to avoid
“unwarranted retrogression” under Section 5
of the VRA and to comply with Criterion II
of their own redistricting rules.
The existence of a fixed racial threshold can
have profound consequences for the Court's
predominance and narrow tailoring inquiries
in a racial sorting claim, so a substantial
amount of time at trial was devoted to
questions related to this factual topic.

However, the most important question—
whether such a figure was used in drawing
the Challenged Districts—was not disputed.
Rather, the parties disputed whether the 55%
BVAP was an aspiration or a target or a rule.
In the end, it is not relevant whether the 55%
BVAP was a rule or a target because all the
parties agree—and the Court finds—that the
55% BVAP figure was used in structuring the
districts and in assessing whether the
redistricting plan satisfied constitutional
standards and the VRA, and whether the plan
would be precleared by the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”).
At trial, two additional questions regarding
the 55% figure dominated the discussion.
First, whether the BVAP figure included or
excluded those who identified themselves in
the census process as ethnically Hispanic and
racially black. And second, what the source
of the 55% BVAP figure was.
The parties hotly debated whether the
appropriate measure of BVAP used in the
redistricting process did or did not include
individuals who identified as racially black
and ethnically Hispanic in the census data.
The supposed importance of this dispute was
that, if black Hispanics were excluded from
the black population count, three of the
Enacted Plan's majority-minority districts
would actually contain a BVAP percentage
just shy of 55%. That, according to
Intervenors, would support a finding that
there was not a 55% BVAP floor in deciding
on the twelve Challenged Districts.
The record shows that delegates attempting
to comply with the 55% BVAP floor
submitted their proposed changes using data
that included black Hispanics in the BVAP
count. Although Delegate Jones claimed to
personally believe that the DOJ would use a
BVAP figure excluding black Hispanics, this
was not a distinction that he discussed with
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any other delegates, and he repeatedly
asserted on the House floor that all majorityminority districts in the proposed legislation
had a BVAP of 55% or higher. Moreover,
Delegate Jones “assumed” that Virginia, in
its preclearance submissions to the DOJ,
would represent that all 12 majority-minority
districts contained at least 55% BVAP. This
turned out to be the case.
At trial, Intervenors relied on a spreadsheet
prepared by the Division of Legislative
Services (“DLS”) in an attempt to show that
including Hispanics in the BVAP count
would be erroneous. The spreadsheet
contains rows of data by district and, in each
column, contains metrics such as total
population, population by race, racial
population by percentage, population by
ethnicity, and ethnic population by
percentage. After adding the racial and ethnic
population totals column by column, the
Intervenors dramatically revealed that the
number exceeded that of the district's total
population. But this exercise reflects an error
on the part of the Intervenors, not DLS.
Because ethnicity measures a different
variable than race, the racial and ethnic data
are not meant to be added in the first place. If
one removes the ethnicity column from the
count (on the assumption that Hispanic
individuals of any race are already counted in
their respective racial columns), then the total
population figure is corrected. That does not,
however, imply that Hispanics who are
racially black should be excluded from the
black population count because to do so
would undercount the number of black
individuals in the BVAP percentage.
The record shows that the ethnic data
provided by the census only has redistricting
implications in states that may need to craft
majority-Hispanic districts or majority“black-plus-Hispanic”
(or
“coalition”)
districts. In states such as Virginia, on the

other hand, black Hispanics would count
towards the total black population of a district
for retrogression purposes. That appears to be
consistent with the DOJ's (admittedly
confusing) guidance on this question: “If
there are significant numbers of responses
which report Latino and one or more minority
races (for example, Latinos who list their race
as Black/African American), those responses
will be allocated alternatively to the Latino
category and the minority race category.”
This “alternating” approach presumably
applies to situations where the district would
be majority-“black-plus-Hispanic,” in which
case counting black Hispanic individuals as
either black or Hispanic in alternating fashion
would avoid counting those individuals twice
in the same district. Thus, the Court finds that
the proper count includes black Hispanics
within the BVAP percentage of each
majority-minority district. This method of
counting results in a BVAP above 55% for all
twelve majority-minority districts, ranging
from 55.2% to 60.7%.
Regardless, this debate—like the first—
generated more heat than light. The actual
differences in BVAP percentages were
minute, and both parties eventually agreed
that the distinction was not one of great legal
significance.
Unlike the first two questions, the answer to
the third question—i.e., the source of the
55% rule—can carry great legal significance.
Testimony on this question is a muddle.
Delegate Dance testified that her
understanding came from Delegate Jones and
that the 55% figure was necessary in order to
achieve DOJ approval, but her speech from
the House floor appears to represent it as her
own understanding. Delegate McClellan
understood the committee's adopted criteria
to require “each of the majority-minority
districts ... to have a black voting-age
population of at least 55 percent,” and
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testified that she came to this understanding
“[t]hrough conversations with Delegate
Jones and with Legislative Services.”
Delegate
Tyler
testified
that
her
understanding came from Delegate Spruill,
and Delegate Armstrong testified that, “as far
as [he] could tell, the number was almost
pulled out of thin air.”
Delegate Jones initially testified that the
figure was drawn from the public hearings
held with the community. Although this
testimony is consistent with his prior
statements from the House floor, the trial
record does not support it. At trial, Delegate
Jones admitted that he had not read the
transcripts from every hearing and could not
recall a single instance of a member of the
public requesting a 55% BVAP level.
Moreover, most of these hearings were
transcribed and submitted as evidence. A
review of the public hearing transcripts from
the Fall of 2010 fails to reveal any mention of
the 55% figure.
Delegate Jones also claimed that the 55%
figure came from “Delegate Dance, and
Delegate Tyler, Delegate Spruill, and one or
two othe[r] ... African–American members of
the House.” This was then narrowed to
Delegates Dance, Tyler, and Spruill. After
further questioning, the 55% figure appears
to have come from feedback that Delegate
Spruill received from various groups in
Virginia and from concerns that Delegate
Tyler would be unable to hold her seat in HD
75 with a lower BVAP percentage. In
discussing Delegate McClellan's seat, by
contrast, Delegate Jones indicated that, while
“no one” was comfortable leaving the BVAP
percentage in HD 71 at 46%, “they felt that
we needed to have a performing majorityminority district, and from the members that
I spoke to, they felt that it needed to be north
of 50 percent minimum.”

Based on the foregoing testimony, and the
evidence set forth below, the Court finds—
based on the record presented—that the 55%
BVAP floor was based largely on concerns
pertaining to the re-election of Delegate
Tyler in HD 75 and on feedback received
from Delegate Spruill and, to a lesser extent,
Delegates Dance and Tyler. That figure was
then applied across the board to all twelve of
the Challenged Districts.
C. The Passage and Enactment of HB 5005
During the redistricting process, the General
Assembly initially considered three plans:
HB 5001, HB 5002, and HB 5003. HB 5001
was the plan designed and proposed by
Delegate Jones. HB 5002 and HB 5003, on
the other hand, were designed by university
students and proposed by other members of
the House of Delegates. According to
Delegate Jones, HB 5002 paired somewhere
between 40 and 48 incumbents, contained six
majority-minority districts, and had over a
9% population deviation. HB 5003, on the
other hand, paired somewhere between 32–
34 incumbents, contained nine or ten
majority-minority districts, and also did not
meet the population deviation criteria. The
Governor's Commission also designed two
plans that contained 13 and 14 majorityminority districts, respectively; however,
those plans were never formally introduced
or proposed.
Once the House had coalesced around HB
5001 and the plan was married with the
Senate's redistricting plan, the bill was ready
for passage and enactment. On April 12,
2011, the Virginia General Assembly passed
HB 5001. Based largely upon objections to
the Senate plan, then-Virginia Governor
Robert McDonnell vetoed HB 5001 three
days later. After relatively minor revisions to
the House plan and more substantial
revisions to the Senate plan, the legislature
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passed HB 5005, which was signed by the
Governor and enacted into law on April 29,
2011.
To comply with its obligations under the
VRA, the Commonwealth then submitted the
Enacted Plan (or “the Plan”) to the DOJ for
preclearance. The DOJ precleared the Plan on
June 17, 2011, and the first election under the
new districts was held on November 8, 2011.
IV. ANALYSIS
The questions raised in a racial sorting claim
are deceptive in their simplicity but profound
in their implications. Resting at the
crossroads of race, politics, and the
constitutional limits of federal power, the
claim raises vital questions about how we
identify as citizens and how we project that
identity in the halls of the legislature. The
Supreme Court has crafted an interpretive
standard for navigating this field: the
legislature
must
not
allow
racial
considerations to predominate over (i.e., to
subordinate) traditional redistricting criteria.
If this results from attempted compliance
with the VRA, the State must show a “strong
basis in evidence” that its use of race was
necessary to comply with a constitutional
reading of the statute.
What this standard provides in conceptual
grace, however, it lacks in practical guidance.
For legislators, it does little to signal when it
may be constitutionally permissible to cut
through a precinct or move a boundary line to
alter the demographic composition of a
district for purposes of complying with
similarly mandatory federal law. For
litigators, it provides an enticingly vague
standard and invites litigation that can drive
up the cost of conducting and defending the
State's redistricting endeavor. And for courts,
it provides an uncomfortable amount of
discretion in a field that the Supreme Court

has repeatedly admonished “represents a
serious intrusion on the most vital of local
functions.” By asking courts attempting to
identify predominance to engage in a
searching factual inquiry and comprehensive
balancing before applying strict scrutiny—
and to justify strict scrutiny—the test gives
the judicial branch the relatively broad power
to strike down or uphold legislative districts
without much guidance in how to do so,
notwithstanding exhortations to exercise
“extraordinary caution” to the contrary.
Therefore, to sharpen the judicial inquiry, to
ensure that the requisite burden is satisfied,
and to assess whether redistricting legislation
has successfully navigated the narrow
passage
between
constitutional
and
unconstitutional
redistricting,
it
is
appropriate to articulate how the Court
understands the predominance and strict
scrutiny inquiries are to proceed as a matter
of law. The statewide and district-by-district
evidence then will be assessed within that
framework.
A. The Racial Sorting Framework
The essence of the racial sorting analysis is
quite easy to articulate and comprehend.
First, courts examine whether racial
considerations
predominated
over—or
“subordinated”—traditional
redistricting
criteria. If a court so finds, then the court
applies strict scrutiny. Second, the court
examines whether the legislature had a strong
basis in evidence for believing federal law
required its use of race, assuming this is the
basis upon which the State seeks to justify its
decision.
But, as this case demonstrates, the devil is in
the details. The parties actually have
proposed conflicting rules regarding the
“subordination” test. And each believes that
the Supreme Court's recent Alabama decision
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reinforces its position. But both cannot be
right, and we think that neither is.
The Plaintiffs' case and our colleague's
dissent revolve chiefly around the evidence
that legislators employed a 55% BVAP floor
when crafting the Challenged Districts.
According to Plaintiffs' theory, “race
predominates if it is the most important
criterion.” In other words, subordination
“does not require open conflict with
‘traditional’ districting criteria.”
Thus, the Plaintiffs, like the dissent, propose
a per se rule: the drafters' use of the 55%
BVAP floor in districting is verboten and
automatically satisfies Miller's predominance
standard. This, the Plaintiffs argue, is the
central thrust of the Alabama case:
This case boils down to a very simple
proposition: May Virginia's General
Assembly utilize a fixed numerical
racial threshold in establishing
district lines.... The answer to this
question has been addressed and
definitively settled by the United
States Supreme Court in its recent
Alabama
decision
which
unambiguously condemned the use of
racial thresholds in redistricting[.]
Despite its tempting simplicity and visceral
appeal, the Court must reject this proposal.
Although the Alabama decision condemned
the use of unwritten racial thresholds, it did
not establish a per se predominance rule. In
Alabama, the Court accepted the lower
court's finding that legislators had employed
BVAP percentage floors in the challenged
districts. If the use of those thresholds
constituted predominance per se, then there
would have been little reason for the Supreme
Court to have remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether race
predominated.

Rather, the Court pointed out that “[t]here
[was] considerable evidence that this goal
had a direct and significant impact on the
drawing of at least some of [the district's]
boundaries.” “That [the State] expressly
adopted and applied a policy of prioritizing
mechanical racial targets above all other
districting criteria (save one-person, onevote) provides evidence that race motivated
the drawing of particular lines in multiple
districts in the State.”
The Alabama case could not be clearer that
use of racial BVAP floors constitutes
evidence—albeit significant evidence—of
predominance. But, we do not read Alabama
to hold that use of a BVAP floor satisfies the
Plaintiffs' predominance burden merely
because the floor was prioritized “above all
other districting criteria” in “importance.”
Rather, the significance of the racial floor is
its impact on the creation of the district. This
demands “actual conflict between traditional
redistricting criteria and race that leads to the
subordination of the former, rather than a
merely hypothetical conflict that per force
results in the conclusion that the traditional
criteria have been subordinated to race.”
To understand why this is so, one must
remember the origin of—and the rationale
for—the Shaw claim. The district boundaries
in Shaw were so outlandish that—despite any
express textual classification by race in the
statute—“it rationally [could] be viewed only
as an effort to segregate the races for
purposes of voting, without regard for
traditional districting principles.” In
response, the Court treated the legislation as
though it had employed a facial classification
and subjected the legislation to strict scrutiny
rather than requiring the plaintiffs to prove
both
discriminatory
purpose
and
discriminatory effect.
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In Shaw, the Court compared the districts to
racial “balkanization” and “political
apartheid” and cautioned that such districts
threaten
expressive
harm—i.e.,
the
stigmatization of individuals “by reason of
their membership in a racial group” and the
incitement of “racial hostility”—as well as
representative harm—i.e., the threat that
elected officials would begin to “believe that
their primary obligation is to represent only
the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as whole.”
Unlike in its racial and political vote dilution
cases, however, the Supreme Court did not
charge plaintiffs with producing evidence
that such discriminatory effects had, in fact,
come to pass. Such evidence is not necessary
in a racial sorting claim because “[e]xpress
racial classifications are immediately
suspect” and are subjected to strict scrutiny.
This is similarly true for the functional
equivalents of express racial classifications:
statutes “unexplainable on grounds other than
race” or statutes that are an “obvious pretext
for racial discrimination.”
No sooner had the ink dried on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Shaw, than it was faced
with a slightly different question. What if the
district's boundaries are not “bizarre” or
“irrational,” but still reflect a clear
manifestation of racial classification? In
Miller, the Court recognized that Shaw
represented an “analytically distinct” claim,
but decided that the litigation before it
“require[d] [the Court] further to consider the
requirements of the proof necessary to
sustain this equal protection challenge.”
Rather than abandoning the claim's
animating principles, the Court altered the
threshold showing and clarified that parties
bringing a racial sorting claim are “neither
confined in their proof to evidence regarding
the district's geometry and makeup nor

required to make a threshold showing of
bizarreness.”
The district challenged in Miller was not as
bizarre as those found in Shaw, but, “when its
shape [was] considered in conjunction with
its racial and population densities,” it became
“exceedingly obvious” that the district
employed “narrow land bridges” in “a
deliberate attempt to bring black populations
into the district.” There, the district's various
spindly appendages contained nearly 80% of
the district's total black population. These
facially evident deviations from neutral
districting conventions could only be
explained on the basis of race. Thus, districts
such as the one found in Miller still raise the
specter of expressive or representative harms
and still manifest, on the face of the law, the
lawmakers' clear intent to “us[e] race as a
basis for separating voters into districts.”
Moreover, these districts necessarily reflect
the kind of “very stereotypical assumptions
the Equal Protection Clause forbids;”
namely, the “demeaning notion that members
of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain
‘minority views' that must be different from
those of other citizens.”
However, when racial considerations do not
entail the compromise of neutral districting
norms, the basis for a racial sorting claim
evaporates. Traditional, neutral districting
principles reflect certain judgments about
voters, but these are the same judgments that
animate all geographic—as opposed to
proportional—representation systems: that
those who live near each other in the same
communities, counties, and cities have
something in common, something that
warrants their representation as a reasonably
defined geographical—rather than racial or
political—unit.
More importantly, holding that otherwise
reasonably neutral districts are subject to
390

strict scrutiny because of a merely theoretical
or latent conflict between race and traditional
districting criteria would unlash the Shaw
claim from the mooring of facial
classification jurisprudence. If this legal
equivalence is forfeited, it is unclear why the
“analytically distinct” nature of the claim
should not unravel entirely, forcing plaintiffs
to prove the expressive or representative
harms postulated in Shaw.
Admittedly, the issue presented in this case is
a difficult one. The Supreme Court reserved
from the very outset the question of whether
the intentional use of a 50% BVAP threshold
was sufficient to sustain a racial sorting
claim:
It is unnecessary for us to decide
whether or how a reapportionment
plan that, on its face, can be explained
in nonracial terms successfully could
be challenged. Thus, we express no
view as to whether “the intentional
creation
of
majority-minority
districts, without more,” always gives
rise to an equal protection claim.
Although the principal opinion in Bush v.
Vera attempted to put this question to rest,
Justice Kennedy expressed some doubts in
his concurring opinion:
I join the plurality opinion, but the
statements in ... the opinion that strict
scrutiny would not apply to all cases
of intentional creation of majorityminority districts require comment. I
do not consider these dicta to commit
me to any position on the question
whether race is predominant
whenever a State, in redistricting,
foreordains that one race be the
majority in a certain number of
districts or in a certain part of the
State.

Based on the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Alabama, the Court now appears to be
divided, or at least equivocal, on whether
BVAP thresholds alone are sufficient to
constitute predominance.
Although the unwritten use of a racial floor
by legislators may seem repugnant at first
blush, the interpretation of predominance
proposed by the Plaintiffs and the dissent has
quite serious repercussions. If the use of a
BVAP threshold—any BVAP threshold—is
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny in the
absence of a facial manifestation in the lines
themselves through the subordination of
traditional redistricting principles, then the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act—
as applied to redistricting—would be drawn
into question. More fundamentally, the
compatibility of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause might be
drawn into question. The Court does not
believe that the Constitution—or that
Supreme Court precedent—either requires or
permits the Plaintiffs' view of predominance
and, therefore, does not believe that the racial
sorting claim extends any further than its
original purpose: to strike down those
districts that, on their face, reflect racial
classifications.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not take umbrage
at the use of racial targets, so long as those
targets serve the ends of preserving minority
voters' ability to elect. Quoting from the
Alabama decision during their closing
statement, the Plaintiffs observed that, in
order to be narrowly tailored, the legislature
must ask “to what extent must we preserve
existing minority percentages in order to
maintain the minorities' present ability to
elect the candidate of its choice.” But, the
inquiry into whether the targets are
adequately justified only occurs after finding
race predominant. If targets themselves
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constitute subordination, then it is hard to see
how the Plaintiffs have not smuggled one
inquiry into the next. This would again
threaten the foundations of the VRA by
making all its redistricting applications
subject to strict scrutiny and set up a potential
conflict
between
the
Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and
the Fifteenth Amendment's Enforcement
Clause.
After this journey, we thus arrive back where
we started: Miller's predominance test. In
Miller, the Court described the Plaintiffs'
burden as follows:
The plaintiff's burden is to show,
either
through
circumstantial
evidence of a district's shape and
demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose,
that race was the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of
voters within or without a particular
district. To make this showing, a
plaintiff must prove that the
legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles,
including but not limited to
compactness, contiguity, and respect
for
political
subdivisions
or
communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.
Plaintiffs would prefer we stop reading
Miller at this exact punctuation mark. And,
under that formulation, they could plausibly
argue that they have proved racial
predominance merely upon proof that
legislators used a 55% BVAP floor. But the
very next sentence in Miller leads where this
Court must follow: “Where these or other
race-neutral considerations are the basis for
redistricting legislation, and are not
subordinated to race, a State can ‘defeat a

claim that a district has been gerrymandered
on racial lines.’ ” The Court's quotation of
Shaw in this instance rather clearly reflects its
intention:
[T]raditional districting principles
such as compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions ...
are important ... because they are
objective factors that may serve to
defeat a claim that a district has been
gerrymandered on racial lines .... Put
differently,
we
believe
that
reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter.
Therefore, we rely on the principal opinion in
Bush, which stated that the “neglect of
traditional districting criteria” is “necessary,
[but] not sufficient” for strict scrutiny to
apply.
Our dissenting colleague advocates a
different reading of predominance. The
dissent views the 55% BVAP floor as a “filter
through which all line-drawing decisions had
to pass” and argues that this “racial filter
necessarily ... rendered all traditional criteria
that otherwise would have been ‘raceneutral,’ tainted by and subordinated to race.”
According to the dissent, “a legislative
district necessarily is crafted ‘because of race
’ ” when such a filter is employed. The
dissent takes the view that the “application of
strict scrutiny in this suit was never a close
question” because when the legislators
“intentionally created [55% BVAP]
districts,” this “was sufficient to show that
race was a predominant factor in its
redistricting.” We respectfully decline to
adopt this reading of predominance.
First, the dissent's interpretation echoes the
view that was rejected by the principal
opinion in Bush v. Vera. In his separate Bush
concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote:
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In my view, [the intentional creation
of a 50% BVAP district] means that
the
legislature
affirmatively
undertakes to create a majorityminority district that would not have
existed but for the express use of
racial classifications—in other words,
that a majority-minority district is
created “because of,” and not merely
“in spite of,” racial demographics.
When that occurs, traditional raceneutral districting principles are
necessarily subordinated (and race
necessarily predominates), and the
legislature has classified persons on
the basis of race. The resulting
redistricting must be viewed as a
racial gerrymander.
Although Justice Thomas recognized that this
question was “expressly reserved” in Shaw I,
he believed that the Court had “effectively
resolved it in subsequent cases.”
Justice Thomas first pointed to the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, as evidence that “all
governmental racial classifications must be
strictly scrutinized.” But this presumes what
must in fact be proven: that the Virginia
legislature's facially neutral redistricting
legislation was the legal equivalent of a
facially racial classification. Predominance is
itself the arbiter of this legal equivalency.
In Adarand, the question was whether a
contracting clause providing “financial
incentive[s] to hire subcontractors controlled
by ‘socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals' ... violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.” In that case, federal law
required the use of the clause in most federal
agency contracts, and expressly “require[d]
the clause to state that ‘[t]he contractor shall
presume that socially and economically

disadvantaged individuals include Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and
other minorities[.]’ ”
The dissent retreads this path by citing to City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. As in
Adarand, the Croson Court was faced with a
city
ordinance
expressly
requiring
contractors to subcontract at least 30% of
their work on city contracts to “Minority
Business Enterprises” owned and controlled
by “[c]itizens of the United States who are
Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts.”
We have no doubt that strict scrutiny is
applied to all express racial classifications,
but neither Adarand nor Croson help light
our path to interpreting predominance.
Adarand itself explicitly disclaimed any
application to facially neutral legislation,
stating that “this case concerns only
classifications based explicitly on race, and
presents none of the additional difficulties
posed by laws that, although facially race
neutral, result in racially disproportionate
impact and are motivated by a racially
discriminatory purpose.”
Justice Thomas next pointed to Miller and
argued that the State's “concession that it
intentionally created [50% BVAP] districts
was sufficient to show that race was a
predominant, motivating factor in its
redistricting.” The dissent also relies upon
Miller to argue that strict scrutiny is
warranted when a legislature is “motivated
by,” rather than merely “conscious of,” race
in its districting. But this demands the
impossible. We cannot ask legislators to
accidentally wander into compliance with the
VRA, and Miller cannot be read to invoke
strict
scrutiny
whenever
legislators
intentionally create a district with a
predetermined BVAP floor.
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In Miller, there was considerable evidence
showing “that the General Assembly was
motivated by a predominant, overriding
desire to assign black populations to the
Eleventh District and thereby permit the
creation of a third majority-black district.” It
was the State's overriding assignment of
voters on the basis of race, rather than other
districting criteria, that made the third
majority-minority district constitutionally
offensive. If Miller stood for the proposition
that the intentional creation of a 50% BVAP
district alone constituted “predominance,”
then all three majority-minority districts
would have constituted racial gerrymanders.
Instead, the opinion focused on the Eleventh
District, which was a geographic
“monstrosity” and required the State to add
lengthy appendages, split precincts, and
abandon “all reasonable standards of
compactness and contiguity.”
The Miller decision does, of course,
recognize that “statutes are subject to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
not just when they contain express racial
classifications, but also when, though race
neutral on their face, they are motivated by a
racial purpose or object.” But it is Miller's
subordination test itself that mans the
floodgates to ensure that the predominance
exception to traditional facial classification
jurisprudence does not swamp the standing
rule that Equal Protection Clause claims
against facially neutral statutes usually
require plaintiffs to prove discriminatory
purpose and discriminatory effect.
Subordination in the enacted plan (rather than
subordination of hypothetical plans) is
required because a map that reflects neutral
conventions on its face eliminates the
assumption of expressive and representative
harm found in Shaw I without necessarily
imposing
any other
constitutionally

cognizable harms in its stead. The Supreme
Court recognized as much in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke.
In Bakke, the Supreme Court struck down a
higher education admissions program that
reserved a specific number of seats for
minority applicants. The problem with this
scheme was that it “prefer[red] the
designated minority groups at the expense of
other individuals who [were] totally
foreclosed from competition for the 16
special admissions seats[.]” As Justice
Powell wrote, “[w]hen a classification denies
an individual opportunities or benefits
enjoyed by others solely because of his race
or ethnic background, it must be regarded as
suspect.”
Justice Powell contrasted this holding with
the Supreme Court's holding the previous
year in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey
(UJO). In UJO, the State of New York had
redrawn its voting districts “to enhance the
electoral power of certain ‘nonwhite’ voters”
and “meet [the] objections of the [DOJ] under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act [.]” The
Supreme Court affirmed the plan. According
to Justice Powell, UJO was distinguishable
“as a case in which the remedy for an
administrative finding of discrimination
encompassed measures to improve the
previously disadvantaged group's ability to
participate, without excluding individuals
belonging to any other group from enjoyment
of the relevant opportunity—meaningful
participation in the electoral process.” When
a legislature crafts a plan that reflects
traditional, neutral, districting conventions
and does not intentionally dilute any group's
meaningful participation in the electoral
process, there is no constitutionally
cognizable offense to be found. The use of a
quota does not change this.
From this vantage, the second problem with
the dissent's reading comes into view: an
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interpretation of predominance that ignores
“discriminatory effect” and deploys strict
scrutiny when a neutral statute is adopted
“because of” race-based motives would allow
claims to proceed on “racial purpose” alone.
Such an interpretation raises vexatious
justiciability and balance of powers
questions.

be one step too far. Predominance requires
that racial considerations manifest in the
enacted plan itself through the actual
subordination of other districting criteria.
That determination cannot be made without
examining the respective roles of both race
and the other redistricting factors in the actual
plan before the Court.

A redistricting plan struck down “solely
because of the motivations of the men who
voted for it” regardless “of its facial content
or effect ... would presumably be valid as
soon as the legislature or relevant governing
body repassed it for different reasons.” That
is because the offense is not in the legislative
content of the enactment but only in the
mental content of the legislators. Although
divining the amalgamated motivations of an
entire legislature may be tolerable when a
showing of discriminatory effect further girds
the inquiry, a “purpose only” equal protection
claim would require courts to rest judgment
upon the thoughts of a coequal branch alone.
We decline to take that path. As Chief Justice
Burger once wrote,

For the foregoing reasons, we reject the
invitation to read the unwritten use of a 55%
BVAP floor as a per se satisfaction of the
predominance inquiry in a racial sorting
claim. Of course, evidence of such thresholds
is still significant when examining those
districts that exhibit deviations from
traditional, neutral districting principles.
Shaw II, for example, recognized that racial
deviations from neutral principles cannot be
saved by later resort to non-racial
explanations.

The seductive plausibility of single
steps in a chain of evolutionary
development of a legal rule is often
not perceived until a third, fourth, or
fifth ‘logical’ extension occurs. Each
step, when taken, appeared a
reasonable step in relation to that
which preceded it, although the
aggregate or end result is one that
would never have been seriously
considered in the first instance. This
kind of gestative propensity calls for
the ‘line drawing’ familiar in the
judicial, as in the legislative process:
‘thus far but not beyond.’
The dissent's interpretation might be a logical
step in the evolution of the equal protection
“predominance” test. But we think it would

According to the dissent, Shaw II compels a
finding of predominance whenever nonracial factors are only considered “consistent
with the racial objective.” But the district at
issue in Shaw II was “highly irregular and
geographically non-compact by any
objective standard that can be conceived.”
Simply put, the Shaw II Court was faced with
a situation wherein some “race-neutral”
goals—such as partisan balance—could still
be partially advanced despite the qualitative
predominance of race, but it was not faced
with a situation wherein racial districting
goals posed no conflict with neutral
districting criteria whatsoever.
Moreover, the author of Shaw II, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined the principal
opinion issued the same day in Bush v. Vera,
suggesting that these two opinions can—and
should—be read in harmony. The Bush
opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
explicitly rejected the interpretation that the
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dissent now attributes to his opinion in Shaw
II.
We adopt a reading consistent with Shaw II,
as evidenced by our finding of racial
predominance in HD 75. A State cannot
district predominantly on the basis of race
and then insulate such racial line drawing by
pointing to other non-racial goals advanced
by the racial sort.
Alabama, like its predecessors in the Shaw–
Miller line, holds that racial thresholds
constitute evidence, not dispositive proof, of
racial predominance. If the thresholds
employed by the legislators crafting the bill
do not manifest in the formation of the
enacted district, then there is no facial
classification equivalent upon which to rest
Shaw's “analytically distinct” framework.
If one strict predominance rule were not
enough, Intervenors advance a countertheory that they claim is derived from
Alabama. As the Intervenors stated during
their closing argument:
“[T]he question you must answer to
get to strict scrutiny ... is whether the
use of race resulted in any district
which violated Virginia law or
traditional redistricting criteria of the
state, or, as the state did here, their
specifically adopted criteria.”
Intervenors drew the Court's attention to a
passage in the Alabama decision where the
Court
“talk[ed]
about
[the
State]
transgressing its own state guidelines, its own
state criteria.” And so it did:
There is considerable evidence that
[the racial thresholds] had a direct and
significant impact on the drawing of
at least some of District 26's
boundaries .... Transgressing their

own redistrictinq guidelines, the
drafters split seven precincts between
the majority-black District 26 and the
majority-white District 25, with the
population in those precincts clearly
divided on racial lines.
But, as is clear from the cited passage, the
drafters' transgression of their own
redistricting guidelines—like their informal
use of a racial threshold—is evidence of
predominance, not dispositive proof. That is
because “subordination” is not the same as a
“violation” or “transgression.” Subordination
requires a balancing of degree to determine
whether non-racial criteria or racial criteria
predominated.
For example, it is difficult to understand what
a “transgression” of “compactness” would
even entail. Compactness, like temperature,
falls along a range, and there is no
professional consensus about what degree of
departure (from any of more than twenty
measures) is enough to say a district is “not
compact.”
More importantly, the “traditional” criteria
discussed in the Shaw–Miller cases are
informed by, but not defined by, state law.
Rendering the predominance inquiry subject
to state law would make the existence of a
federal constitutional claim dependent upon
an individual state's resolutions, statutes, or
constitution.
The determinative question is not whether a
State's
individualized
districting
requirements are “violated,” but whether
traditional, neutral districting criteria and
other districting criteria have been generally
“subordinated” to racial considerations on the
whole. A State's violation of, or departure
from, its own stated criteria can constitute
evidence in the predominance analysis, but
Alabama does not require that the State do so
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in order to make out a racial sorting claim.
Intervenors' proposed interpretation is,
accordingly, rejected.
1. Predominance Analysis
As common courtesy holds, one should not
shoot down a suggestion without offering an
approach
to
replace
it.
Although
“predominance,”
“subordination,”
“dilution,” and “retrogression” are all
standards not amenable to hard rules or safe
harbors, the Court does have an obligation to
the parties to explain its reasoning as clearly
and definitively as possible. Therefore, the
Court will walk through each of the steps of
the analytical framework that it has applied to
arrive at its conclusions with respect to the
Challenged Districts.
A racial sorting claim is “one area in which
appearances do matter.” Because a district
must exhibit “substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting
practices” in order to animate the racial
sorting doctrine's central concern with facial
classification, the Court will evaluate each
Challenged District for “subordination” in
three steps.
First, the Court will review the district on the
basis of its compliance with traditional,
neutral districting criteria, including, but not
limited to, compactness, contiguity, nesting,
and adherence to boundaries provided by
political subdivisions and natural geographic
features.
Second, the Court will examine those aspects
of the Challenged District that appear to
constitute “deviations” from neutral criteria.
These may be particular, isolated areas along
the district's boundary, or—on occasion—the
district itself may seem facially questionable.
Based on the evidence submitted and
testimony provided, the Court will examine

the record to ascertain the underlying
rationale for those deviations. In determining
the reasons for deviations from the traditional
neutral criteria, it will be necessary to
determine whether a deviation was caused in
part or entirely by the need to comply with
the one-person, one-vote precepts16 or by
political circumstances such as protection of
incumbents.
Third, the Court will weigh the totality of the
evidence and determine whether racial
considerations qualitatively subordinated all
other non-racial districting criteria.
a. Neutrality
A racial sorting claim requires the Court find
that the State subordinated traditional, neutral
criteria, and other non-racial districting
criteria to racial considerations. Traditional
districting principles include, inter alia,
compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivisions, and communities “defined by
actual shared interests.” These conventions
neutrally advance the values inherent in a
geographic—rather than proportional—
system of representation, such as
responsiveness, accountability, familiarity,
ease of access, ease of administration, and
political engagement.
The specific traditional criteria outlined in
Miller and Shaw are not constitutionally
required. Rather, these criteria are important
because they reflect the neutrality that is
central to a redistricting statute that complies
with the Equal Protection Clause.
Traditional, neutral
conventions are
important to evaluate in a racial
gerrymandering claim “because they are
objective factors that may serve to defeat a
claim that a district has been gerrymandered
on racial lines.”
Of course, states may continue to develop
new neutral districting principles, and a
397

State's consistent adherence thereto would
also be considered an objective factor to help
defeat a claim of gerrymandering. Existing
traditional districting conventions “evolved
over the years through the political process”
itself. What renders these guiding principles
important for redistricting purposes is that
they observe and advance neutral democratic
values.
The fact that a district deviates from neutral
criteria on its face does not, however, mean
that those deviations were racially motivated.
Other, non-racial districting criteria may also
be used to defeat a claim of racial
gerrymandering by demonstrating that the
district's deviations from neutral criteria are
attributable to race-neutral motives. Chief
among these are political and incumbency
considerations.
During the first stage of the predominance
inquiry, the Court examines whether the
redistricting legislation—on its face—raises
questions about the use of discriminatory,
individualized criteria (such as race, politics,
or incumbency) or whether it appears to be
predominantly explainable on the basis of
traditional, neutral, geographic criteria (such
as compactness, contiguity, or respect for
political subdivisions).
In reviewing the Challenged Districts, the
Court will consider neutral criteria in the
following manner:
i. Compactness
As Justice Stevens stated in Karcher v.
Daggett, “geographical compactness serves
independent values; it facilitates political
organization, electoral campaigning, and
constituent representation.” Although “noncompact” districts may sometimes be
necessary to serve these values—such as
when a “major transport corridor might ...

minimum[ize] travel time for a representative
to travel around the district”—“drastic
departures from compactness are a signal that
something may be amiss.”
Yet, compactness is surprisingly ethereal
given its seemingly universal acceptance as a
guiding principle for districting. All of the
expert testimony provided reveals one deep
conceptual dilemma: no one can agree what
it is or, as a result, how to measure it. There
are “at least 20” measures, not one of which
can claim any greater legitimacy than its
peers. The Reock test measures geographical
dispersion and therefore is sensitive to—and
its scoring punishes—elongated districts. The
Polsby–Popper test measures perimeter
dispersion and therefore is sensitive to—and
its scoring punishes—oddly shaped district
boundaries with large numbers of
indentations. Meanwhile, the Schwartzberg
test looks at “a normalized standard deviation
of the distance from every point to the center
of the district,” and the Boyce–Clark test
measures the “center of inertia” or “how far
is the farthest voter from the center of the
district.” One notable political scientist has
quipped that all of these measures are just
variants of “the intraocular test”: “people
look at distric[t] maps, they figure out which
districts they think look ugly, and then they
choose the compactness measure which
comports with their eyeball view of the
mapping.”
But compactness is not important for its own
sake. Rather, compactness is important
because it serves certain values of geographic
representation. Therefore, the “major
transportation corridor” district discussed by
Justice Stevens would fare poorly on the
Reock metric, but would serve its purposes in
a manner that might be reflected by another
measure (such as driving time). Meanwhile,
a district that adheres to highly irregular
county lines, or easily identifiable geographic
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features, might score poorly on the Polsby–
Popper test, but would enhance the values
served by those neutral criteria, as discussed
below. If the price of advancing these other
neutral criteria is compactness, then the cost
is not a judicial concern.
Nor does a district's “absolute” compactness
score matter so much as its “relative” score.
The Court's examination of a district's
compactness measure may be informed by
the average in the State (which is important
to take account of a State's inalterable
features), may be informed by the average in
the nation (which is important to take account
where a State's own averages may be far
above or far below the national average), and
may be informed by historical averages
(which is important to account for trends in
compactness over several districting cycles),
(noting it is “perfectly reasonable” to use
compactness measures “in comparing two
maps for the same state”). These are all
factors that courts must consider when
evaluating this criterion.
In short, the Court would be remiss to look at
compactness scores in a vacuum, but that
does not render them useless as evaluative
tools in the predominance inquiry. The key is
not “absolute” compactness, “relative”
compactness, or even a State's adherence to
its own constitutional or statutory
compactness definitions (although these may
be illuminating); rather, the key is whether
compactness deviations are attributable to
something meaningful, such as other neutral
criteria or a legitimate use of non-neutral
criteria. As Dr. Hofeller stated at trial,
echoing Justice Stevens' sage advice,
compactness is “more like a flag than a
conclusion.”
ii. Contiguity

Contiguity, like compactness, serves
important democratic purposes, binding
geographic communities together and
helping to enable effective representation. In
upholding a district under the Virginia
constitution's contiguity provision despite its
division by water, the Supreme Court of
Virginia reflected upon this raison d'être:
Although the record shows that travel
between [some] precincts and the
remainder of the district requires
travel through another district, there
is nothing in this record showing that
such access is unreasonable, unduly
burdensome, or adversely impacts the
ability of residents to secure
meaningful representation of their
interests or effective communication
with their elected representative.
As the Page court reminded, “contiguity and
other traditional districting principles are
‘important
not
because
they
are
constitutionally required,’ but rather ‘because
they are objective factors' courts may
consider in assessing racial gerrymandering
claims.”
A district split by water has not “violated”
contiguity for the purposes of a racial sorting
claim any more than a district connected by a
single point on land has “respected”
contiguity. As with compactness, contiguity
admits of degrees. Districts that are not
divided by water are more contiguous than
those that are, and districts that are at least
connected by a water crossing—such as a
bridge—are more contiguous than districts
that are not. Land contiguity is important not
because it is determinative, but because it
reflects the common understanding that
bodies of water may mark the natural divide
between communities of interest or constitute
barriers to the effective function of
democratic activities.
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Of course, deviations from land contiguity
may also reflect adherence to other neutral
districting criteria. Many cities lie across
rivers or around harbors and, indeed, are built
outward from the central focal point of the
community: the waterfront. In such cases, a
body of water that “divides” a community
may actually be the primary factor that unites
it. In other words, a “deviation” from
“contiguity” standards may be an attempt to
respect a distinct community of interest or
political subdivision. The subordination of
contiguity conventions is, like compactness,
simply a factor that the Court must consider
in conducting its predominance analysis.
iii. Political Subdivisions
A common and significant neutral districting
criterion is respect for political subdivisions,
such as counties or cities. “Subdivision
boundaries tend to remain stable over time.
Residents of political units such as
townships, cities, and counties often develop
a community of interest, particularly when
the subdivision plays an important role in the
provision of governmental services.”
Moreover, adherence to subdivision
boundaries can facilitate civic engagement,
enhance democratic accountability, and
increase administrative convenience. As
Justice Powell once wrote:
Most voters know what city and
county they live in, but fewer are
likely to know what [legislative]
district they live in if the districts split
counties and cities. If a voter knows
his [legislative] district, he is more
likely to know who his representative
is. This presumably would lead to
more informed voting. It also is likely
to lead to a representative who knows
the needs of his district and is more
responsive to them.

When a legislative district is “nothing more
than an artificial unit divorced from, and
indeed often in conflict with, the various
communities established in the State,”
legislators cannot represent their constituents
properly and voters cannot exercise the ballot
intelligently. A report produced by the
Governor's Commission distilled the
overarching themes that were repeatedly
voiced during its public forums from around
the Commonwealth. As the Commission
noted, “the splitting of municipal and county
jurisdictions drew the ire of citizens, who ...
pointed out the difficulties that citizens have
in knowing who to contact, who to hold
accountable, and who among several
legislators should coordinate or lead the
representation of local city and county
interests in the General Assembly.”
In evaluating whether neutral criteria were
subordinated, a legislature's adherence to city
and county boundaries provides an important
reference point for courts undertaking the
predominance analysis. Of course, the
legislature may, and often will, need to
deviate from political subdivision borders to
comply with federal- or state-mandated
population constraints. In such situations, the
Court will look to whether another neutral
criterion—such as compactness, geographic
boundaries,
precinct
boundaries,
or
communities of interest—helps to explain the
method of departure. In this manner, neutral
criteria can often form a “backstop” for one
another when one criterion cannot be fully
satisfied, thus ensuring that neutral criteria
are still predominating in the balance.
iv. Natural Geography
Geographic features, such as mountains
ranges or rivers, may also be used to provide
a neutral boundary during the districting
process. Oftentimes, these geographic
indicators mark the boundaries of distinct
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communities of interest or can provide a
point of reference for voters, candidates, and
representatives. In many cases, these natural
boundaries may already constitute the basis
for governmental subdivision lines.
Over time, artificial geography may also
come to play a similar role. Major
transportation thoroughfares may slowly
generate distinct communities of interest on
either side of the divide, or the marker may
be used as a useful reference point for voters,
candidates, and representatives seeking to
understand their own district's boundaries.
These are important factors to consider,
especially when adherence to traditional
subdivision lines is not possible.

be sufficient to show adherence to neutral
criteria. This is because VTDs can easily be
strung together into grotesque formations
having little regard for compactness,
contiguity, political subdivisions, or other
important neutral criteria advancing
democratic values. In short, a district could
avoid splitting any VTDs but remain highly
suspicious on its face.
For these same reasons, however, VTD splits
will often provide a flag for further *539
inquiry. The unexplained splitting of several
VTDs in a single district can call into
question the criteria guiding that district's
construction.
vii. Communities of Interest

v. Nesting
Nesting refers to the practice of putting two
or more districts of the lower chamber of the
state legislature wholly within each district of
the upper chamber. “By permitting voters
readily to identify their voting districts and
corresponding representatives, a nested plan
can be expected to foster voter participation.”
Nesting may result in a House district
boundary that appears inexplicable by neutral
criteria until the corresponding Senate district
is laid atop.
vi. Precincts
Precincts and Voting Tabulation Districts
(“VTDs”) are often the smallest objectively
identifiable geographic groupings that
legislators use to organize legislative
districts. They may occasionally correspond
to towns, neighborhoods, or other identifiable
communities of interest, but they are not
“governmental jurisdictions” in their own
right. In Virginia, VTDs generally
correspond to voting precincts.
Given their small size, compliance with
precinct or VTD boundaries alone will rarely

Among traditional, neutral districting
principles, the concept of respecting
“communities of interest” is the most
enigmatic. On the one hand, respect for such
communities is often considered the guiding
light of the other neutral principles. On the
other hand, defining some “communities of
interest” may involve straddling the fence
between neutral and discriminatory criteria.
For example, communities of interest may be
defined by relatively objective factors, such
as service delivery areas, media markets, or
major transit lines. Similarly, communities
may be somewhat objectively characterized
as rural, suburban, or urban. These can be
valid neutral criteria, assuming that
legislators actually have access to this
information and rely upon it.
The “communities of interest” criterion
becomes less neutral, however, when one
considers “cultural,” “social,” or “religious”
communities of interest. This tendency to
morph into a more individualized metric
explains the Miller Court's qualification that
traditional districting principles include
“respect for ... communities defined by actual
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shared interests.” To give effect to this
elusive delineation, it is important to have
demonstrable evidence of shared interest
when the boundaries cannot be explained on
an objective or neutral basis.
viii. State Criteria
For the reasons discussed above, a plaintiff
does not need to prove that a State “violated”
its own districting criteria in order to prove
predominance. A State's deviation from its
own constitutional, statutory, or adopted
criteria does, however, constitute evidence
that is probative of subordination.
b. Deviations
If the Challenged Districts, or significant
parts of the Challenged Districts, appear
inexplicable by reference to the consistent
application of traditional, neutral principles,
then the Court will examine the basis for
those departures. Deviations from neutral
criteria signal the presence of potential
subordination and lay the foundation for the
sorting claim; namely, that the districts
reflect racial classifications of individual
voters and do not constitute neutral,
geographic representative units.
The Supreme Court has cited several sources
of direct and circumstantial evidence that
courts can rely upon in identifying racial
deviations, including:
[S]tatements by legislators indicating
that race was a predominant factor in
redistricting; evidence that race or
percentage of race within a district
was the single redistricting criterion
that could not be compromised; ... use
of land bridges in a deliberate attempt
to
bring
African–American
population into a district; and creation
of districts that exhibit disregard for

city limits, local election precincts,
and voting tabulation districts.
Because traditional, neutral principles
advance fundamental democratic values and
neutral state interests, districts that
substantially disregard these principles can
“caus[e] a severe disruption of traditional
forms of political activity.” In Bush v. Vera,
Justice O'Connor described the impact that
such districts can have:
Campaigners seeking to visit their
constituents “had to carry a map to
identify the district lines, because so
often the borders would move from
block to block”; voters “did not know
the candidates running for office”
because they did not know which
district they lived in. In light of [the
State's] requirement that voting be
arranged by precinct, with each
precinct representing a community
that shares local, state, and federal
representatives, it also created
administrative headaches for local
election officials[.]
Such complaints have been echoed by local
election officials in Virginia who “end up
taking the brunt of complaints from voters
who can't understand why they can't vote in
their old precinct, why they can't find any of
their current office holders on the ballot, and
why they are in the same district as a relative
who lives nowhere near them[.]”
Of course, the presence of identifiable
deviations alone does not satisfy the
predominance
inquiry
because
“subordination”
requires
“substantial
disregard” for traditional, neutral districting
criteria. The substantiality of any identified
deviations—and whether it is sufficient to
support a finding of predominance—is
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examined when the Court weighs the
evidence as a whole in the final stage.
In reviewing the Challenged Districts, the
Court will consider evidence bearing on
legislators' bases for the deviations.
Deviations may be attributed to any number
of considerations, but legislators typically
rely upon the following: population equality,
race, political affiliation or preference, and
incumbency. The Court will evaluate these
bases for deviation in the following manner:
i. Population
“[A]n equal population goal ... is part of the
redistricting background, taken as a given,
when determining whether race, or other
factors, predominate in a legislator's
determination as to how equal population
objectives will be met.” Thus, achievement
of the population goal is not a traditional
redistricting factor that is considered in the
balancing that determines predominance.
However, the requirement to comply with
federally imposed population goals is
relevant to assessing why a district may
appear to deviate from neutral criteria. This is
particularly true where the census data shows
significant losses or gains of population in
certain geographic areas of a State.
The Court's analysis does not change just
because the State has decided to adopt a
lower percentage deviation threshold than
constitutionally required. In Alabama, the
legislature adopted “a more rigorous
deviation standard than our precedents have
found necessary under the Constitution.”
There, as here, it seems that “[c]ompliance
with these two goals”—BVAP targets and a
±1% population deviation rule—“posed
particular difficulties with respect to ... the
State's ... majority-minority districts[.]” But
“legislative efforts to create districts of
approximately equal population” more

stringent than the 5% deviation held
generally permissible in Brown v. Thomson,
cannot explain away deviations from neutral
principles. The predominance inquiry
examines the basis upon which voters were
sorted into appropriately apportioned
districts. Where apportionment by political
subdivision must be sacrificed to equal
population goals, for example, other neutral
principles such as compactness and precinct
boundaries can often pick up the slack. A
substantial deviation from neutral principles,
therefore, only admits of answer by other,
non-neutral criteria, such as race or political
affiliation.
ii. Racial Deviations
One explanation for a district's deviations
from neutral districting criteria may be
voters' race. The mere awareness or
consideration of race by legislators in their
districting decisions does not, on its own,
provide sufficient evidence to support a claim
of racial sorting under the Equal Protection
Clause. It takes more than consideration of
race to prove that race predominated over
traditional factors. Of course, if legislators'
use of race entailed the subordination of other
districting criteria, it must be adequately
justified under the strict scrutiny regime.
iii. Political Deviations
Another explanation for a district's deviations
from neutral districting criteria may be
voters' political opinions, affiliations, and
beliefs. As with race, the mere awareness or
consideration of voters' political affiliation
by legislators is both unavoidable and
constitutionally permissible. Accordingly,
districting on the basis of political affiliation
may be a legitimate criterion for the
legislature to consider.
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The Intervenors have raised the argument
that some of the Challenged Districts have
political, rather than racial, justifications.
iv. Incumbency Deviations
Yet another explanation for a district's
deviations from neutral districting criteria
may be incumbency considerations. In
Gaffney v. Cummings, the Supreme Court
observed that: “It would be idle, we think, to
contend that any political consideration taken
into account in fashioning a reapportionment
plan is sufficient to invalidate it....
Redistricting may pit incumbents against one
another or make very difficult the election of
the
most
experienced
legislator.”
Accordingly, a district's impact on an
incumbent may be a legitimate criterion for
the legislature to consider.
However, as with political deviations,
deviations from neutral districting principles
for incumbency purposes are not always
permissible. In Bush, the Court recognized
“incumbency protection, at least in the
limited form of ‘avoiding contests between
incumbent[s],’ as a legitimate state goal.”
This state interest “aim[s] at maintaining
existing relationships between incumbent
congressmen and their constituents and
preserv[es] the seniority the members of the
State's delegation have achieved in the
United States House of Representatives,” but
does not necessarily invade the province of
the voters. As the LULAC Court advised:
“[I]ncumbency protection can be a
legitimate factor in districting, but
experience teaches that incumbency
protection can take various forms, not
all of them in the interests of the
constituents.”
Here, the Intervenors allege that many of the
Challenged Districts' deviations have
“incumbency protection” justifications.

Some of these deviations reflect an interest in
drawing district lines between incumbents'
residences to avoiding pairing incumbents.
Other deviations, however, reveal an effort to
fence in the incumbent's preferred voters or
fence out the incumbent's detractors or
challengers. Whether this latter definition of
“incumbency protection” states a legitimate
government interest need not be decided here
because no one has presented that issue.
That said, we share the dissent's concern over
Intervenors' “implicit suggestion that
approval by incumbent legislators” can
somehow “rescue” a plan from a finding of
racial predominance. We fully agree that
“[t]he [VRA] and the Equal Protection
Clause are intended to protect the rights of the
individual voter, not to promote the selfinterest of incumbents in majority-minority
districts.” And, to be clear, the framework we
adopt today condones no such thing.
For example, if legislators attempt to “
‘pac[k]’ minority voters into a particular
majority-minority district for the purpose of
protecting the incumbent,” this would still
constitute racial sorting regardless of the
“goal” of incumbency protection. This is
precisely what we find occurred in HD 75,
and we hold that race predominated
accordingly.
On the other hand, if legislators attempt to
pack supporters into their districts or attempt
to remove detractors or challengers, then it
could hardly be said that race drove the
districting deviation. This does not imply that
such actions are immune from constitutional
challenge. Although the Supreme Court has
only sanctioned a state interest in
“incumbency pairing prevention,” the
Plaintiffs simply did not raise any challenge
to the Commonwealth's alleged interest in a
wider definition of “incumbency protection.”
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Thus, we are in no position to decide that
constitutional question.
Simply put, if incumbency interests
constitute the predominate criterion driving
the construction of the district, then a claim
of racial gerrymandering must fail. That,
however, does not imply that a claim of
political gerrymandering would face a similar
fate.
c. Weighing
The final step in the predominance inquiry of
a racial sorting claim involves the weighing
of the evidence in total to determine whether
the deviations attributable to race
“predominate” over all other districting
criteria employed by the legislature,
including both neutral criteria and deviations
attributable to non-racial motives. To
demonstrate predominance, the Plaintiffs
must show that the legislature “subordinated”
or exhibited “substantial disregard” for these
other criteria.
In making its predominance determination,
the Court “must be sensitive to the complex
interplay of forces that enter a legislature's
redistricting calculus” and “exercise
extraordinary
caution.”
“Federal-court
review of districting legislation represents a
serious intrusion on the most vital of local
functions,” and the Plaintiffs' burden is
understandably “a demanding one.”
Therefore, the redistricting enactments of a
legislature are entitled to a presumption of
correctness and good faith, and the burden is
upon the plaintiff to dislodge that
presumption.
It should be noted, however, that the
predominance
balancing
inquiry
is
qualitative rather than quantitative. In Miller,
for example, the challenged district
employed gangly arms at various points to
capture black population centers, but the

district's overall shape was not far from
routine. Looking at the complete picture,
however, the district court found that “[r]ace
was ... the predominant, overriding factor
explaining the General Assembly's decision
to attach to the [district] various appendages
containing
dense
majority-black
populations.”
In conducting the predominance balancing,
two particular issues warrant the Court's
careful attention.
i. Racial & Political Correlation
Occasionally, a deviation may appear equally
explainable by racial or political motivations.
Because the State is presumed to have acted
lawfully and in good faith, the plaintiff must
provide evidence that race—rather than
politics—represented the primary basis for
the classification. Evidence may include the
sources of data relied upon in drawing the
district, the use of fixed (or “aspirational”)
political or racial targets or floors, and
statements from legislators regarding the
relative priority of their racial and political
goals.
A political objective, however, does not
immunize the use of race as a basis for
classification because race cannot be used as
a proxy for political characteristics, even if
there is a proven correlation between race and
political preference in the state. This is
because “to the extent that race is used as a
proxy for political characteristics, a racial
stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in
operation.”
This is consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I).
The lesson of Cromartie I was that a political
classification would not be considered racial
simply because the Democratic voters
happened to be black. The lesson was not that
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a racial classification would be considered
political simply because black voters
happened to be Democrats.
In the latter scenario, the State still makes
decisions about individuals based on the
color of their skin. It is the act of using race
as a proxy that constitutes an offensive
stereotype. The fact that a stereotype might
have some basis in fact—or is relied upon to
achieve “non-racial” purposes—does not
render it any less offensive.
Evidence of a racial floor will also lend
support to the argument that race, rather than
politics, can be attributed for particular
deviations from neutral principles. Although
such a floor will not result in per se
predominance where a district is formed
predominantly on the basis of neutral criteria,
its use can buttress a plaintiff's argument that
race was the primary reason for a deviation
where race and politics would otherwise
seem equally plausible.
Lastly, statements about the relative priority
of districting goals may constitute evidence
to support a finding of racial predominance.
Taken alone, the parroting of federal
requirements or the acknowledgment that
certain
compliance
obligations
are
“mandatory” or “nonnegotiable” does not
lend any weight in the predominance balance.
If it did, the State would start the
predominance balancing at an immediate
disadvantage. However, if evidence is
provided that demonstrates legislators held a
false belief that certain artificial criteria—
such as fixed BVAP floor—were necessary
to comply with federal law, then statements
by those particular legislators regarding
compliance are relevant evidence in the
predominance inquiry.
ii. Core Retention

Core retention—or “respecting existing
district boundaries”—appears to be facially
neutral and serves neutral political values,
such as increased administrative ease,
electoral accountability, and enhanced voter
awareness and engagement. Unlike the other
neutral criteria identified above, however,
core retention holds a special place in the
predominance balance. That is because “core
preservation ... is not directly relevant to the
origin of the new district inhabitants.”
Moreover, core retention may be used to
insulate the original basis for the district
boundaries.
Thus, where district lines track a path similar
to their predecessor districts or where “core
retention” seems to predominate, courts
should also examine the underlying
justification for the original lines or original
district. Legislators' use of the core retention
principle should certainly receive some
degree of deference. But, the inquiry in a
racial sorting claim examines the basis upon
which voters were placed “within or without
a particular district.” “That's the way we've
always done it” may be a neutral response,
but it is not a meaningful answer.
The Court applied the foregoing principles
when weighing all of the evidence in the
record and in ascertaining whether voters
were sorted into a district predominantly on
the basis of their race.
2. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Having applied these precepts to the
evidence, we found that the Plaintiffs met
their burden to prove that race was
predominant in the formation of HD 75,
making it necessary to apply strict scrutiny as
to that district. To survive strict scrutiny, the
redistricting statute must be narrowly tailored
to a compelling state interest. In the
redistricting context, this familiar test takes
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on a somewhat different appearance, which
the Court will now examine.

choose between compliance with § 5
and compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause.

a. Compelling Interest
In prior cases, the Supreme Court has
assumed, without deciding, that compliance
with federal antidiscrimination laws can
constitute a compelling state interest. Various
members of the Court have also expressed
their separate views on the matter.
This already complex posture was rendered
even less certain by the recent decision in
Shelby County. There, the Supreme Court
struck down the coverage formula under
Section 4 of the VRA, but “issue[d] no
holding on § 5 itself[.]” The Supreme Court
did not help matters in Alabama when it
stated, “[W]e do not here decide whether,
given Shelby County v. Holder, continued
compliance with § 5 remains a compelling
interest [.]”
Here, the Intervenors claim compelling
interests founded on both Section 2 and
Section 5 of the VRA. To resolve whether
compliance with the VRA was a compelling
interest at the time of enactment, the Court
finds the rationale offered by Justice Scalia in
his LULAC opinion convincing. As to
Section 5, Justice Scalia wrote, in a passage
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito:
We
long
ago
upheld
the
constitutionality of § 5 as a proper
exercise of Congress's authority
under § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment
to
enforce
that
Amendment's prohibition on the
denial or abridgment of the right to
vote. If compliance with § 5 were not
a compelling state interest, then a
State could be placed in the
impossible position of having to

We find this reasoning persuasive, with the
proviso that the State's interest must be in
actual compliance with the standards
articulated in federal antidiscrimination law
as interpreted by the federal courts.
This distinction is an important one. In
Miller, the Supreme Court stipulated that
“compliance with federal antidiscrimination
laws cannot justify race-based districting
where the challenged district was not
reasonably necessary under a constitutional
reading and application of those laws.” That
fundamental limitation remains applicable. In
drafting redistricting legislation, the State
must pass a state law that complies with both
federal law and the federal constitution.
Thus, the goal of “actual compliance” is
clearly compelling. If the State achieves
actual compliance with the demands of a
federal statute, and the federal statute is itself
constitutional, then there can be little doubt
that the state law is similarly constitutional.
The State also has an interest in avoiding
preclearance denial under Section 5 (or
liability under Section 2). This goal of
“defensive compliance,” however, is not a
compelling interest. This is because
defensive compliance could often entail a
violation of constitutional law itself:
subordinating traditional, neutral criteria and
other
districting
criteria
to
racial
considerations.
But Section 5 does not require—and cannot
be read to require—states to subordinate
traditional, neutral districting principles to
race in the redistricting process. The DOJ's
own regulations state this explicitly.
Therefore, a state that finds itself engaging in
predominant racial sorting to fulfill an
interest in defensive compliance will begin to
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forfeit any credible interest in preventing
retrogression and may be said to have
adopted an interpretation of Section 5 that
would itself render Section 5 unconstitutional
as applied.
In sum, we hold that Virginia's interest in
actual compliance with the standards of
federal antidiscrimination law—as the
federal courts have interpreted them—was a
compelling interest at the time the 2011
redistricting plan was designed and enacted.
Apart from that question, the Court believes
that an interest that is compelling at a
redistricting plan's inception is capable of
sustaining the plan until the next districting
cycle. As the district court in Alabama stated,
“We evaluate the plans in the light of the
legal standard that governed the Legislature
when it acted, not based on a later decision of
the Supreme Court that exempted [the State]
from future coverage under section 5 of the
[VRA].” Because the legislature possessed a
compelling interest in actual compliance with
federal antidiscrimination laws as interpreted
by the federal courts at the time the plan was
enacted, and because redistricting plans are
inherently subject to periodic revision on a
reasonable, decennial basis, we conclude that
the compelling interest underlying the statute
at enactment remains a compelling interest
during its effective duration.
b. Narrow Tailoring
The next question in the analytical calculus is
whether the State's redistricting statute was
“narrowly tailored” to this compelling
interest. In particular, the question is whether
a State's “attempt” at actual compliance could
be viewed as “reasonably necessary under a
constitutional reading and application of
[federal antidiscrimination] laws.” In
Alabama, the Supreme Court explained that
narrow tailoring is satisfied if there is a
“strong basis in evidence” for the

predominant use of race in drawing a
challenged district.
The conceptual difficulty for the narrowtailoring inquiry is this: if a finding of
predominance means that race subordinated
other considerations, and a constitutional
reading of the antidiscrimination standards
does not require race to subordinate other
considerations,
then
how
can
an
unconstitutional reading of a federal statute
by the State be the interest that saves the
State's unconstitutional racial gerrymander?
The answer is this: if the disregard for nonracial criteria could have reasonably been
viewed as not substantial, and the State
shows a strong basis in evidence that its
deviations appeared necessary to ensure
actual compliance with the federal standard,
then the district could still have been
considered reasonably necessary under a
constitutional reading of the statute.
Therefore, as the finder of fact, we employ a
“preponderance” standard during the
predominance inquiry, but apply a
“sufficiency” standard during the narrow
tailoring inquiry. Justice Breyer's dissent in
Abrams v. Johnson makes this rationale clear:
This legal distinction—between
whether a plan really violates § 2 or
might well violate § 2—may seem
technical. But it is not. A legal rule
that permits legislatures to take
account of race only when § 2 really
requires them to do so is a rule that
shifts the power to redistrict from
legislatures to federal courts (for only
the latter can say what § 2 really
requires). A rule that rests upon a
reasonable view of the evidence (i.e.,
that permits the legislature to use race
if it has a “strong basis” for believing
it necessary to do so) is a rule that
leaves at least a modicum of
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discretionary
(race-related)
redistricting authority in the hands of
legislators.
In Abrams, a federal court was already
required to undertake the districting
endeavor, so Justice Breyer's dissent was
unavailing. Because the lower court decided
that it could not create a second majorityblack district without subordinating neutral
principles, it declined to do so. This does not
mean, however, that a court reviewing a
State's plan cannot accept the State's alternate
judgment, so long as the legislature had a
strong basis for believing its plan was
compliant.
Therefore, for predominance, the inquiry is
whether, as a matter of fact, the State
substantially disregarded non-racial criteria.
For narrow tailoring, the inquiry is whether
the State had good reason to believe that its
actions were required for actual compliance
with the non-dilution or non-retrogression
standard. Because substantial disregard of
non-racial criteria is not required under a
constitutional reading of either standard, this
inquiry necessarily entails also asking
whether the State had good reason to believe
that its own departure from non-racial criteria
was not substantial.
Because the standards of the racial sorting
claim and the standards of non-dilution and
non-retrogression often stand in tension, the
Court must recognize that the State is
attempting to “toil with the[se] twin
demands” and provide a fairway for the
State's objectively reasonable efforts. There
may be a variety of plans that reasonably
avoid dilution and retrogression and also
reasonably respect traditional, neutral
districting principles. If the legislature had a
strong basis in evidence for its districting
decision and reasonable individuals could
have come to a different conclusion, then the

court should accept that reasonable judgment
during the narrow tailoring stage.
Thus, the question a court must ask at the
narrow-tailoring stage is whether the
legislature has shown that it had “good
reasons” to believe—i.e., that it had a strong
basis in evidence for believing—that its
actions were reasonably necessary to achieve
actual
compliance
with
federal
antidiscrimination standards based on a
constitutional reading of those standards. Or,
could a reasonable legislator have come to
the conclusion that the challenged district
violated neither federal law nor any
constitutional limitations upon that federal
law.
This formulation also explains why the
Plaintiffs
and
Intervenors
proposed
seemingly different narrow tailoring
inquiries. Plaintiffs argue that the State “must
show that [it] had a ‘strong basis in evidence’
for believing that all of the Challenged
Districts needed to meet or exceed a
predetermined BVAP target to avoid
retrogression.” Pls.' Post–Trial Brief at 28.
Intervenors argued at trial that the narrow
tailoring question is “how much that district
violates the state's criteria.” Both of these
inquiries are necessary, but neither is
sufficient.
The narrow tailoring inquiry asks whether
“the legislature ha[d] a ‘strong basis in
evidence’ in support of the (race-based)
choice that it has made.”
This standard ... does not demand that
a State's actions actually be necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest
in order to be constitutionally valid.
And legislators may have a strong
basis in evidence to use racial
classifications in order to comply
with a statute when they have good
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reasons to believe such use is
required, even if a court does not find
that the actions were necessary for
statutory compliance.
With respect to Section 5, for example, this
inquiry into whether the “race-based choice”
had a “strong basis in evidence” reaches both
the standard of retrogression and—because a
constitutional interpretation of retrogression
does not require subordination—the standard
of subordination.
With respect to subordination, the Supreme
Court has noted that the extent of a State's
disregard of neutral criteria “is not irrelevant
to the narrow tailoring inquiry” when it
“exhibit[s] a level of racial manipulation that
exceeds what [the VRA] could justify.” In
other words, part of showing that a district is
narrowly tailored to an interest in actual
compliance with a constitutional reading of
the retrogression standard entails showing
that the district is one that a reasonable
legislator could believe entailed only
reasonable and minor deviations from neutral
districting conventions.
Nor is an inquiry into whether the State
possessed a “strong basis in evidence” that its
actions were necessary to “prevent
retrogression” limited to the BVAP
percentages in the Benchmark Plan's existing
majority-minority districts. When Congress
amended Section 5, it rejected the Supreme
Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, and
“adopted the views of the dissent.” The
dissent “made clear that courts should not
mechanically
rely
upon
numerical
percentages but should take account of all
significant circumstances.” Thus, there can
be no argument that retrogression “locks in”
the BVAP of each particular district.
The retrogression standard also does not
“lock in” a specific number of majority-

minority districts. This holds true not only as
a legal principle, but as a matter of logic.
Based on demographic changes within the
State, it simply may not be feasible to create
the same number of majority-minority
districts because performing Section 5
districts must also avoid unreasonable
deviations from neutral districting criteria.
A retrogression analysis must “take account
of all significant circumstances,” while
retaining Section 5's “anchoring reference to
electing a candidate of choice.” This mandate
is now part of the statute itself. “Clearly,
‘ability to elect’ is the statutory watchword.”
Therefore, once a court finds that race
predominated, the strong basis in evidence
standard asks not only whether the legislature
had good reasons for believing the BVAP
percentage employed in the district—as well
as the district itself—was necessary to avoid
retrogression, but also whether the district is
one that a reasonable legislator could believe
generally respected neutral districting
principles. As the Alabama Court reminded:
“The standards of § 5 are complex; they often
require evaluation of controverted claims
about voting behavior; the evidence may be
unclear; and, with respect to any particular
district, judges may disagree about the proper
outcome.” This applies to reasonable state
judgments about subordination as well. In the
context of redistricting, the “narrow
tailoring” inquiry permits the State to
overshoot the bull's-eye, so long as it hits the
target.
The foregoing legal framework for analyzing
a racial sorting claim provides the guidepost
for the statewide and district-by-district
findings that follow.
B. Evidence Of General Application To All
Districts
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“A racial gerrymandering claim ... applies to
the boundaries of individual districts” and
must be proven on a “district-by-district”
basis. However, the Plaintiffs provided some
evidence that applied across all districts.
Therefore, the Court will assess that evidence
before proceeding to its district-by-district
analysis.
In
like
fashion,
the
Commonwealth's evidence may apply across
districts. Our findings on the evidence are
based on our credibility determinations and
how particular evidence squares with the
record as a whole.
First, the Intervenors frequently discussed the
substantial population changes experienced
on both a statewide level and in the
Challenged Districts. That evidence has a
role to play in the predominance analysis, but
it is a limited one.
As the Supreme Court held in Alabama, “an
equal population goal is not one factor among
others to be weighed against the use of race
to determine whether race ‘predominates.’ ”
Instead, “it is part of the redistricting
background, taken as a given, when
determining whether race, or other factors,
predominate in a legislator's determination as
to how equal population objectives will be
met.”
Although the equal population goal is not a
traditional factor to be considered in the
balance in deciding predominance, its
“background” role is nonetheless important
in assessing why certain redistricting actions
were taken. For example, gains or losses in
population affect where in a State new
districts must be created or where old districts
cannot stand. That, in turn, is pertinent to
which neutral redistricting criteria can—or
cannot—be fully satisfied.
Second, for the reasons provided in the
factual discussion in Section III above, the
Court finds that a 55% BVAP floor was

employed by Delegate Jones and the other
legislators who had a hand in crafting the
Challenged Districts. Those delegates
believed this necessary to avoid retrogression
under federal law, and we do not doubt the
sincerity of their belief.
Third, the Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Stephen
Ansolabehere, testified about his analysis of
VTDs in the Commonwealth. In particular,
Dr. Ansolabehere used statistical models to
examine the movement of VTDs into and out
of the Challenged Districts and opined
whether, in his view, those movements were
predominantly “racial” or “political.”
With respect to Dr. Ansolabehere's analysis
regarding race and politics as “predictors” of
the likelihood of inclusion of VTDs in one of
the Challenged Districts, the Court has both
initial technical concerns and more
fundamental substantive concerns about the
method employed that cause us not to credit
his views as to the reasons for VTD
placement. First, even though Dr.
Ansolabehere's
analysis
provides
a
“regional” control to avoid examining VTDs
that could not have feasibly found their way
into the Challenged Districts, that does not
account for whether a VTD in that region
could be considered to “hop” over another
VTD in the region en route to the target
district
in
violation of contiguity
conventions.
More
fundamentally,
however,
Dr.
Ansolabehere's “race versus politics”
opinions miss the mark because they do not
consider the extent to which the boundaries
themselves are justifiable by neutral criteria
or any other motivation besides race or
political disposition. The models that he
employed do not, for example, consider
“economic factors, social factors, cultural
factors, geographic factors, governmental
jurisdictions and service delivery areas.” If a
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district is intentionally designed as a
performing district for Section 5 purposes,
there should be little surprise that the
movement of VTDs into or out of the district
is correlated—even to a statistically
significant
degree—with
the
racial
composition of the population. This does not
mean, however, that race “predominated” for
the purposes of a racial sorting claim.
The predominance question requires an
inquiry into whether the movement of VTDs
into and out of a district subordinated other
criteria in the process. Dr. Ansolabehere's
analysis, for the most part, just does not
provide any specific insights into this inquiry.
Dr. Ansolabehere's partial correlation
analysis, which holds other factors—
including party—steady can be considered in
determining whether a district's deviations
from neutral criteria may be more attributable
to race or politics, but it can only be
considered in assessing—not refuting—
testimony that provides non-racial reasons
for particular deviations from neutral
principles. Moreover, using Dr. Katz's
admittedly crude, but nonetheless reliable,
approximation for the limitation that VTDs
are not equally susceptible to being included
in every district, the statistical significance of
the racial justification disappears, at least
with respect to the question of whether race
or politics is a more significant predicator of
VTD placement. On balance, Dr.
Ansolabehere's analysis on the VTD issue is
not reliable proof on the predominance issue.
Lastly, the Court finds that some “statewide”
compactness information is useful as a point
of comparison for the district-by-district
analysis set out in Section IV.C. below. In the
Challenged Districts, the average Reock
score was .320, the average Polsby–Popper
Score was .192, and the average
Schwartzberg score was 2.365. In the Non–
Challenged Districts, the average Reock
score was .360, the average Polsby–Popper

Score was .243, and the average
Schwartzberg score was 2.128. Id. Under the
Reock and Polsby–Popper measures, higher
scores represent more compact districts.
Under the Schwartzberg measure, lower
scores represent more compact districts. Of
the 100 House districts, seven of the
Challenged Districts are in the “bottom
50”—with the lowest Reock scores—and
five of the Challenged Districts are in the “top
50”—with the highest Reock scores.
With these generally applicable findings in
mind, the Court now advances to the requisite
district-by-district analysis. In so doing, the
analysis is guided by the legal principles and
the framework outlined in Section IV.A.
above.
C. District–by–District Analysis
As with the generally applicable factual
findings above, our district-by-district
analysis itself is a factual one that we have
based on our examination of the record as a
whole and on our assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses.
1. District 63
HD 63 is found in the Dinwiddie–Greensville
area and was represented by then-Delegate
Rosalyn Dance during the 2011 redistricting
process. Under the Benchmark Plan, the
district contained all of Dinwiddie and
Petersburg City, and part of Chesterfield.
Under the Enacted Plan, the district now
contains all of Petersburg City and parts of
Chesterfield, Dinwiddie, Hopewell, and
Prince George. This increased the number of
county and city splits from 1 to 4 and
increased the number of split VTDs from 0 to
8. HD 63 has a core retention percentage of
80.2, and is contiguous by land.
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On its face, the district is unusually shaped.
After chopping Dinwiddie County in half, the
southern border of the district tends to follow
precinct boundaries from west to east until it
cuts through Dinwiddie precinct along
Interstate 85. After that, the district line
constricts, carving out a hook around New
Hope. After a brief return to a rather normal
configuration around Petersburg City, the
district narrows to avoid the Jefferson Park
area and the homes of Delegates Cox and
Ingram. It then continues in a narrow form
through Prince George, into various parts of
Hopewell, and terminates at the James River.
The district had Reock and Polsby–Popper
scores of .61 and .48 under the Benchmark
Plan and experienced a steep drop to scores
of .25 and .16 under the Enacted Plan. This
marks the largest Reock compactness
reduction of any district in the Enacted Plan.
The district's Schwartzberg score is 2.506.
The district's deviations from neutral
redistricting criteria begin with the splitting
of Dinwiddie County. This split appears to be
avowedly racial. Delegate Dance testified
that the southern half of Dinwiddie “went to
Delegate Tyler to try to get her number ... [o]f
African–American voters up to 55 percent.”
Within this deviation are two sub-deviations:
(1) the splitting of Dinwiddie precinct; and
(2) the hook that wraps around New Hope
precinct.
The Dinwiddie precinct is split along I–85,
but this is not listed among the redistricting
criteria, which undermines its explanatory
value as a districting criterion. Although
established transit corridors may split areas
into “communities of interest” over time,
there was no evidence that this precinct is
comprised of distinct communities on either
side of the highway. On the other hand, the
artificial border provided by I–85 may
provide a clear boundary to voters and

candidates alike that reside in Dinwiddie
precinct and wish to know their House
district. In the absence of any further
explanation by the Intervenors or the
Plaintiffs, however, the Court declines to
identify any particular rationale for this “subdeviation,” meaning that the Plaintiffs have
not carried their burden of attributing it to
race.
The other “sub-deviation”—the hook around
New Hope—is decidedly not racial. After
reviewing the evidence, the Court finds that
the purpose for this deviation was
“challenger prevention” and “incumbency
protection.” This deviation was negotiated
between Delegates Dance, Tyler, and Jones.
Delegate Jones testified that the cutout
accounted for “the bulk of the splits in [the
75th] district,” that New Hope was retained
in HD 63 because “a tremendous amount of
[Delegate Dance's] employees or constituents
had family” there, and that Delegate Dance
had “a potential primary opponent she
wanted to draw out of her district.” So, if it
looks like the hook is reaching for something,
that's because it is: a potential threat to the
incumbent.
Thus, at this point the record is that one
reason for the configuration of HD 63 was
racial and one reason was purely political.
The other component of HD 63's unusual
shape is its reach north and east from U.S.
460 to the James River in a way that runs
through both Prince George County and the
City of Hopewell. In so doing, this
component of HD 63 increases the number of
localities in the district from three to five, and
it also splits a number of VTDs. According to
Delegate Dance's testimony, “that's what it
took to get [Delegate Tyler] to the 55 percent
strength of African–American voters.” Not
only did this help satisfy the 55% threshold
in District 75, it also helped maintain a
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substantial African–American population in
District 63. Delegate Dance “picked up parts
of Prince George ... to get more African–
Americans ... [a]nd then ... picked up the
concentration of African–Americans in
Hopewell[.]”
However, the record shows that the eastern
border advanced other criteria, both neutral
and political. In order to unwind the water
crossing in the Benchmark HD 74, Delegate
Jones decided to move precincts in Hopewell
City out of HD 74 and into HD 63. Thus, HD
63's eastern configuration improved HD 74's
adherence to contiguity conventions.
Moreover, by placing these precincts in HD
63 rather than HD 62 or HD 64, the District's
eastern boundary avoids solving the water
crossing problem to the detriment of
Republican districts on either side. Thus, it
appears that this aspect of HD 63's unusual
shape can be explained on a neutral, racial,
and political basis.
It is the Plaintiffs' burden to show that the
racial considerations subordinated all other
criteria, including neutral criteria and other
non-racial criteria. The evidence provided
thus far is in equipoise, and the Plaintiffs
have not yet satisfied their burden on the
predominance issue.
Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of Dr.
Ansolabehere to complete their task. To
begin, Dr. Ansolabehere notes the drop in
compactness scores but, as discussed above,
that is more of a flag than a conclusion. If
compactness has been sacrificed to enhance
contiguity or serve political ends, then race
alone has not subordinated this criterion. Dr.
Ansolabehere
also
analyzed
VTD
movements but, as discussed above, that
analysis fails to account for other criteria that
may be shaping the district, such as
incumbency considerations or solving
contiguity issues in nearby districts. Finally,

Dr. Ansolabehere notes the number of VTD
splits. But the majority of splits are
attributable to incumbency considerations
rather than race. Moreover, some splits
appear to be attributable to Delegate Jones'
twin aims of solving the water crossing and
limiting population deviations to ±1%. In
sum, we find Dr. Ansolabehere's testimony
on each point to be unconvincing. Thus, his
evidence did not help the Plaintiffs in their
obligation to prove predominance and to
dislodge the presumption of lawful action to
which the General Assembly's redistricting
plan is entitled.
Based on the record, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to
prove that racial considerations subordinated
all other neutral and race-neutral districting
criteria in the formation of HD 63. And, on
the basis of the record, the Court holds, as a
matter of fact, that race did not predominate
in the drawing of HD 63.
2. District 75
HD 75 is found in the Dinwiddie–Greensville
area and was represented by Delegate Roslyn
Tyler during the 2011 redistricting process.
Under the Benchmark Plan, the district
contained all of Sussex County, Greensville,
and Emporia City and parts of Brunswick,
Franklin City, Isle of Wight, Lunenberg, and
Southampton. Under the Enacted Plan, the
district now contains all of Emporia City and
Greensville and parts of Brunswick,
Dinwiddie, Franklin City, Isle of Wight,
Lunenberg, Southampton, Surry, and Sussex.
This increased the number of county and city
splits from 5 to 8 and increased the number
of split VTDs from 4 to 13. HD 75 has a core
retention percentage of 78.64, and is
contiguous by land.
On its face, the district appears relatively
compact, despite its odd tendency to leak
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across county and city lines. The district had
Reock and Polsby–Popper scores of .42 and
.22 under the Benchmark Plan, which shifted
to scores of .41 and .19 under the Enacted
Plan. The district's Schwartzberg score is
2.282. Although the district's technical
compactness remained “about the same
between the two plans,” Delegate Tyler
testified that her district has “[v]ery irregular
borders” and is “not an easy district to
follow.”
A review of HD 75's boundaries suggests that
she is right. Although the district has a clear
southern border, that provides no solace
because her district borders North Carolina.
Unlike population equality and VRA
compliance, state borders are not just
mandatory; they admit no variation. As such,
state borders are a nullity in the
predominance balance. The only other
county boundaries seemingly respected are
those segments bordering Mecklenburg,
Nottoway, Prince George, and Suffolk
counties. Notable in this regard, is the
addition of the district's lower left corner,
which makes Brunswick County whole.
Delegate Dance testified that the creation of
HD 75 “gave us a little trouble to try to get to
the 55 percent.” To get to the 55% BVAP, the
district
“required
some
drastic
maneuvering[.]” Delegate Tyler herself
testified that she “was concerned about the
decrease in number of black people in my
district.”
Although the irregularity of the district
boundaries can be seen to buttress Delegate
Dance's testimony that HD 75 required
“drastic maneuvering” in order to comply
with the 55% BVAP floor, the Intervenors
have offered their own explanations for the
district's “very irregular borders.” Delegate
Jones testified that Dinwiddie County was
split because the district was in need of

population. That appears to be the case
because HD 75 was underpopulated. The
choice to go north, however, was “to try to
get [Delegate Tyler's] number ... [o]f
African–Americans voters up to 55 percent.”
Therefore, while underpopulation may help
explain the changes to the district, it cannot
be weighed against race in the predominance
analysis.
The district's irregular eastern and western
borders can be also attributed to race because,
according to Delegate Dance, moving
coherently to the “east [or] west would have
been Euro–Americans, and she needed some
African Americans to get to that 55 percent.”
Delegate Jones' testimony did not contradict
that assessment.
Delegate Jones testified that many of the
changes, such as swapping out the Wakefield
and Dendron precincts, splitting Franklin
City, and excluding the Berlin and Ivor
precincts were done on the basis of a
“member request” or because Delegate Tyler
did not receive many votes in those removed
precincts. Delegate Jones accepted these
changes even though adherence to political
subdivisions and compactness would be
subordinated in the process. But attributing
the changes to “member requests” or
performance concerns begs, rather than
answers, the relevant question: was the
request racial or political?
Like in HD 63, the evidence admits of both a
racial purpose and a political purpose. For
instance, Delegate Jones himself testified that
Delegate Tyler's request to swap Wakefield
and Dendron was based on “real concerns”
stemming from the fact that she “didn't break
51 percent” in a general election race “with a
Caucasian” and that she “won by less than
300 votes” in a “five-way race in a primary
with two Caucasians.” That bespeaks an
effort to both protect the incumbent and
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prevent retrogression. Similarly, Delegate
Jones testified: “[S]he was worried about too
low of a black voting-age population for her
to be able to be successful in an election.”
This too reflects an effort to protect the
incumbent while also preserving minority
voters' ability to elect their candidate of
choice.
Unlike in HD 63, however, here there is no
ambiguity about the basis upon which voters
were sorted. Intervenors' Post–Trial Brief
relies upon the overlapping racial and
political purposes to argue that race did not
“predominate.” According to the Intervenors,
Delegate Tyler's deposition testimony “made
crystal clear her view that ‘[w]hat I'm saying
is most of the time blacks vote Democratic,’
and that ‘in [her] mind, the purpose of
ensuring 55 percent BVAP was to help
Democrats be elected.’ ” But, attributing a
political purpose to—or justification for—the
55% BVAP floor does not somehow render it
a non-racial classification. Whether the
changes were made to comply with Section
5, enhance Democratic performance, or
protect the incumbent, the changes were still
made based on voters' skin color.
Weighing all the evidence and testimony
provided on the record, the Court finds that
racial considerations subordinated traditional
districting principles and other non-racial
districting criteria in the creation of HD 75.
The testimony from the three delegates
primarily responsible for shaping the district,
Delegates Jones, Tyler, and Dance, shows
that the overriding objective was to achieve a
55% BVAP in HD 75. Achieving a 55%
BVAP floor required “drastic maneuvering”
that is reflected on the face of the district and,
according to Delegate Jones, would not
otherwise have been undertaken due to the
impact on traditional county boundaries.
Delegate Tyler herself found the boundaries
“very irregular,” worried about her ability to

cover her district with ease, and was
“concern[ed] about the decrease in number of
black people in [her] district.”
Intervenors attempt to explain the boundary
deviations by ascribing a political purpose to
them. But that attempt is not successful. As
in Bush, the record shows that, in building
HD 75, race was used by Delegate Tyler
herself as a proxy for Democratic voters in an
effort to protect her own position as an
incumbent at the expense of traditional
districting principles. When a legislator sorts
voters by political affiliation or performance,
then the deviation from neutral principles is a
political one. But, when a legislator sorts
voters by race, for whatever purpose, then the
deviation is a racial one. As explained above,
the lesson of Cromartie was that a political
deviation would not be considered racial
simply because the Democratic voters
happened to be black. The lesson was not that
a racial deviation would be considered
political simply because the black voters
happened to be Democrats. That is using race
as a proxy for political affiliation, an
approach that is prohibited.
As to HD 75, the Plaintiffs have proved
(without reference to Dr. Ansolabehere's
testimony) that race was the predominate
criterion leading to the disregard of neutral
conventions in forming HD 75. Moreover, to
the extent that political interests were
considered and achieved, it appears that those
criteria were secondary to, and only satisfied
by, adherence to the 55% BVAP floor.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court
finds that race was the predominate criterion
driving the formation and configuration of
HD 75; and, therefore, the legislature's
decision is subject to strict scrutiny. To
survive strict scrutiny, the Intervenors must
show that the legislature had a “strong basis
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in evidence” for its racial districting
decisions.

in the benchmark plan and whether it
continues in the proposed plan[.]”

The Court finds that this burden has been
satisfied and that, accordingly, HD 75
survives the Plaintiffs' challenge. First,
Delegate Jones' determination that HD 75 (or
its environs) reflected an “ability-to-elect”
district
requiring
protection
against
retrogression
was
a
reasonable
determination. As Plaintiffs themselves point
out, HD 75 appeared to be a performing
ability-to-elect district before the State's
redistricting efforts. Therefore, retaining this
ability to elect reasonably can be viewed as
necessary to ensure actual compliance with
the federal non-retrogression standard.

Plaintiffs dispute the need for raising the
BVAP percentage in HD 75, arguing that the
district was already a performing Section 5
district for minority-preferred candidates
going into the 2011 redistricting. Here, that
argument only strengthens the Intervenors'
hand. Under the Benchmark Plan, BVAP in
HD 75 was 55.3%. Under the Enacted Plan,
BVAP in HD 75 was 55.4%. Considering the
intricacies of redistricting, the new HD 75
could effectively be considered to have the
“same” BVAP level as the old HD 75. And,
considering the evidence relied upon by
Delegate Jones, it appears abundantly clear
that he had “good reasons” for holding the
BVAP in HD 75 just above 55% to ensure
that the district remained a performing
Section 5 district for minority-preferred
candidates, as Plaintiffs' themselves suggest.

Next, as to HD 75, the 55% BVAP floor is
grounded in a “strong basis in evidence”
because the primary source of the 55%
BVAP threshold appears to have been an
analysis of HD 75 itself. For example,
Delegate Jones testified that he did not feel a
52% BVAP threshold across all districts
would be acceptable “based on ... the
functional analysis that I had done using the
Tyler primary, for example, and the Tyler
general election in 2005.” These were close
races, prompting “real concerns.” Delegate
Jones met with Delegate Tyler “probably half
a dozen times to configure her district as she
felt it needed to be configured for ... [minority
voters] to elect a candidate of their choice for
her district.”
Delegate Jones examined turnout rates in HD
75, an issue about which Delegate Tyler was
particularly concerned. In addition, Delegate
Jones considered the district's prison
population and relied upon his knowledge of
the district's electoral history. These are
precisely the kinds of evidence that
legislators are encouraged to use “[i]n
determining whether the ability to elect exists

Nor does the 55% floor appear unreasonable
when subjected to expert review. Plaintiffs'
own expert noted that HD 63 and 75 “exhibit
high rates of [racial] polarization because
large majorities of Whites vote in the
opposite way as large majorities of African
Americans.” Intervenors' expert agreed,
observing that the 2011 and 2013 elections
held in HD 75 were racially polarized. Dr.
Ansolabehere ultimately opined that a 55%
BVAP threshold was not necessary in HD 75,
but ex post statistical analyses cannot upset
the State's ex ante judgment so long as that
decision was “reasonably necessary” based
on strong evidence. In this case, it was so
based. Simply put, there were “good reasons”
to believe that a 55% BVAP threshold was
necessary to ensure that minority voting
influence did not retrogress in HD 75, and the
Court will not upset that reasonable
judgment.
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The Court finds that legislators had good
reason to believe that maintaining a 55%
BVAP level in HD 75 was necessary to
prevent actual retrogression (and not just to
attain preclearance), and that this was
achieved by reasonable deviations from
traditional redistricting criteria (judged by a
sufficiency standard). Because the State has
provided a “strong basis in evidence” for its
use of race-based districting in its
configuration of HD 75, the Court holds that
HD 75 passes constitutional muster under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

more compact “only by incorporating heavily
African–American communities at the
outskirts of the benchmark district.” Delegate
McClellan also testified at trial that HD 69
had to satisfy the 55% BVAP floor,
according to Delegate Jones. But all of this is
largely irrelevant. The question is whether
the Commonwealth's consideration of race or
a racial floor subordinated traditional, neutral
criteria. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence to
show subordination, relying instead on the
erroneous view that proof of a 55% BVAP
floor would be sufficient to carry their
burden. As explained previously, it is not.

3. District 69

With respect to potential deviations from
neutral criteria, it should be noted that HD 69
is not contiguous by land. However, the
district contains multiple river crossings, and
no evidence has been provided by the
Plaintiffs to show that the district improperly
combines two distinct communities of
interest rather than uniting one community of
interest. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not
provided any evidence that this split has
diminished representation for communities
on either side of the James. As such, there is
no
evidence
that
contiguity
was
“subordinated” to non-neutral criteria.

HD 6938 is found in the Richmond area and
was represented by Delegate Betsy *560 Carr
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted
Plan, the district contains parts of
Chesterfield and Richmond City. Although
the number of county and city splits remained
the same, redistricting increased the number
of split VTDs from 2 to 4. HD 69 has a core
retention percentage of 74.7.
On its face, the district appears to reflect a
large, compact swath of Richmond below the
Fan District and to the south of the James
River. The district had Reock and Polsby–
Popper scores of .37 and .20 under the
Benchmark Plan, which increased to scores
of .52 and .34 under the Enacted Plan. The
district's Schwartzberg score is 1.712. As
Delegate Jones testified, the changes from the
Benchmark Plan made the district more
“Richmond centric,” which appears on its
face to have enhanced the district's alignment
with a distinct political subdivision and
community of interest.
The Plaintiffs recognize that HD 69 has
become more compact and retained its
“core,” but argue that the district has become

In short, the Plaintiffs have failed to carry
their burden of proof with respect to HD 69,
and the Court holds, as a matter of fact, that
race did not predominate in the drawing of
HD 69.
4. District 70
HD 70 is found in the Richmond area and was
represented by Delegate Delores McQuinn
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted
Plan, the district contains parts of
Chesterfield, Henrico, and Richmond City.
Although the number of county and city splits
remained the same, redistricting increased
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the number of split VTDs from 2 to 3. HD 70
has a core retention percentage of 67.31.
On its face, the district appears coherent and
generally compact, perhaps with the
exception of the “turret” on top of the district.
HD 70 straddles the intersection of
Richmond City, Chesterfield County, and
Henrico County, with most of the boundaries
therein drawn on the basis of precinct and
VTD lines. The district had Reock and
Polsby–Popper scores of .47 and .14 under
the Benchmark Plan, which shifted to scores
of .40 and .19 under the Enacted Plan. In
other words, the district became slightly more
elongated, but also removed some of its more
convoluted and irregular boundaries in the
process. The district's Schwartzberg score is
2.290.
As the Plaintiffs contend, the redistricting
“pull[ed] the district substantially out of the
city of Richmond and pull[ed] it into the
Chesterfield area and deeper into Henrico
County.” Plaintiffs believe that this shows a
disregard for core retention, but this is
precisely the reason the Court cautioned
about “core retention” arguments above.
Redistricting, by its very nature, involves the
changing of districts. If a state completely
abandoned its prior map and started from
scratch, a hypothetical new “HD 70” might
bear no resemblance whatsoever to the
benchmark “HD 70,” but that would not—
taken alone—be suspicious. Moreover, such
a hypothetical would entail “removing” the
entire population of HD 70 and then “adding”
that entire number back. Again, nothing
about that would be inherently suspicious.
The question is whether the boundaries—or
the changes to the boundaries—are justifiable
by reference to traditional, neutral criteria.
Here, they are. Delegate Jones testified that
HD 70's overall configuration was altered to
better represent suburban interests—where

population had expanded—and to cede more
Richmond-centered population to HD 69 and
HD 71. The Plaintiffs' case supports that
point.
These
represent
objectively
identifiable communities of interest.
Plaintiffs also argue that HD 70 was not
under-populated before the redistricting
process, but “the General Assembly added
about 26,000 people and removed about
26,000 people in redrawing the district.” As
discussed above, if properly populated
districts were presumptively required to
remain untouched, then all the other districts
would need to wrap around them (in
substantial disregard of neutral principles) in
order to achieve population equality. Nor is
the substitution in population numbers
particularly shocking. If a properly populated
district must shift locations, then it will
necessarily “remove” a large amount of
people from its old location and “add” the
same amount from its new location. That
result seems rather obvious.
With respect to deviations, HD 70—like HD
69—is divided by the James, but contains a
river crossing. And—like HD 69—Plaintiffs
have offered no evidence to suggest that this
has had any effect on representation or local
communities of interest. As such, there is no
evidence that contiguity was “subordinated”
to non-neutral criteria.
The only facially odd deviation sits atop the
northern edge of the district. This “turret”
appears to deviate from districting norms,
especially insofar as it pokes across
Richmond City lines. However, Intervenors
offered a simple, non-racial explanation for
this deviation: Delegate McQuinn, the
incumbent, lives there. As Delegate Jones
testified: “[H]ad she not lived there, I could
have actually had all of the 71st District in the
city of Richmond because I could have taken
these couple of precincts and there wouldn't
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have been any going into the Radcliffe
precinct in Henrico County for 71.”
In weighing the evidence, the Court
recognizes that Delegate McClellan testified
that HD 70 was drawn to comply with the
55% BVAP floor, but the legislature's pursuit
of this goal is not the “predominate” criterion
employed unless it subordinates all others.
The Court finds that HD 70 is largely
explained by reference to traditional, neutral
districting criteria, and that the only deviation
therefrom is explainable on the basis of
“incumbent pairing prevention.” As a result,
this Court holds, as a matter of fact, that race
did not predominate in the drawing of HD 70.
5. District 71
HD 71 is found in the Richmond area and was
represented by Delegate Jennifer McClellan
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted
Plan, the district contains parts of Henrico
and Richmond City. Although the number of
county and city splits remained the same,
redistricting increased the number of split
VTDs from 1 to 3. HD 71 has a core retention
percentage of 78.31, and is contiguous by
land.
On its face, the district appears quite compact
and generally follows normal districting
conventions. The district had Reock and
Polsby–Popper scores of .24 and .19 under
the Benchmark Plan, which increased to
scores of .33 and .24 under the Enacted Plan.
The district's Schwartzberg score is 2.045.
The district remains bounded to the south by
the James River—a natural geographic
boundary—and became “more Richmond
centric” with the 2011 redistricting thanks to
the removal of Summit Court, Hilliard, and
Stratford Hall precincts from its western
edge.

The district itself includes the Fan, moves
east through Richmond's downtown, and
continues up to Church Hill. The district
contains the majority of the North Side, and
contains one precinct in eastern Henrico
County.
The only facially evident deviations are along
HD 71's eastern border. Here, the district's
one Henrico precinct and the 701, 702, and
706 VTDs seem to form a set of “horns” on
the eastern side of the district.
In examining these deviations, it should first
be noted that the northern-most horn adheres
to the boundaries of Ratcliffe precinct,
whereas the two other horns appear to adhere
to the boundaries of VTDs 701, 702, and 706.
Plaintiffs have argued that VTDs 701 and 702
were included because they were “heavily
African American” and “very densely
populated.” The Plaintiffs have not discussed
whether Ratcliffe was added to capture black
voters. Although Delegate McClellan
testified that the 55% BVAP rule affected the
districting decisions as to HD 71, the
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the
decision subordinated neutral criteria in the
process.
Plaintiffs have not satisfied that burden.
Delegate Jones offered a far more convincing
reason for HD 71's eastern horns. As
discussed above, Delegate McQuinn lives
right on the border of VTDs 703 and 705.
“[H]ad [Delegate McQuinn] not lived [in
Richmond], I could have actually had all of
the 71st District in the city of Richmond
because I could have taken these couple of
precincts and there wouldn't have been any
going into the Radcliffe precinct in Henrico
County for 71.”
Plaintiffs also noted the split of VTD 505,
which was previously wholly within HD 71.
Although a VTD split constitutes a deviation
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from neutral principles, the decision to split
505 advanced other neutral principles, such
as compactness. Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that this split “subordinated”
such neutral principles.
Delegate McClellan also spoke extensively
about the removal of precinct 207 from her
district, which split the Fan neighborhood.
Precinct 207 had “highly democratic voter
turnout,” and Delegate McClellan had “quite
a base there[.]”
But this split does not appear to substantially
disregard neutral principles on its face. A
local resident might wonder why the Fan
straddled two House districts, but any
observer of the map would see that precinct
207 was removed and replaced with precinct
204, making the district more compact.
Nor does that swap appear obviously racial.
As Delegate McClellan testified, precinct
204 is “demographically similar to 207
racially.” Delegate McClellan testified that
she couldn't keep “any portion of 207”
because it would “push the [BVAP] below 55
percent,” but if the 55% BVAP goal could be
achieved without subordinating neutral
principles on the whole, it does not matter
what Delegate McClellan's personal
preferences were.
And here, her personal preferences appeared
in conflict with those of another legislator:
Delegate Loupassi. According to Delegate
Jones, Delegate Loupassi used to be on the
Richmond City Council and his former ward
abutted precinct 207 where he had strong
support, so he “wanted that precinct in his
district.” Delegate McClellan argued that
adding precinct 207 to Delegate Loupassi's
district “didn't help him” because he is a
Republican, but Delegate Jones testified that
Delegate Loupassi has “a broad base of
support from the democratic side of the aisle”

and had a personal “community of
interest”—rather than partisan—connection
to the area.
There is a difference between pruning the
edges of the political thicket and striding
headlong into it. By verifying a district's
overall compliance with neutral criteria that
do not discriminate between citizens based
on their race or other individualized
characteristics, the Court fulfills its
constitutional duty to ascertain whether state
legislation violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court should not, however,
become embroiled in a credibility dispute
between two legislators, especially when
resolving that “factual” issue is unnecessary
to find that neutral criteria predominated in
the drawing of the district boundaries. HD 71
does not substantially disregard traditional,
neutral districting principles, and that is
sufficient for the Court to find that these
principles were not subordinated to race. The
existence of a 55% BVAP floor does not
disturb that fact.40 Therefore, the Court
holds, as a matter of fact, that race did not
predominate in the drawing of HD 71.
6. District 74
HD 74 is found in the Richmond area and was
represented by Delegate Joseph Morrissey
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
the Benchmark Plan, the district contained all
of Charles City and parts of Henrico,
Hopewell City, and Richmond City (as well
as part of Prince George containing no
population). Under the Enacted Plan, the
district now contains all of Charles City and
parts of Henrico and Richmond City. This
decreased the number of county and city
splits from 4 to 2, with the number of split
VTDs remaining the same. HD 74 has a core
retention percentage of 80.08, and is
contiguous by land.
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On its face, the ax-shaped district arouses
some suspicion. The “blade” of the ax
encompasses all of Charles City, but the
eastern “handle” is curious. The district had
Reock and Polsby–Popper scores of .16 and
.10 under the Benchmark Plan, which
remained almost identical—with scores of
.16 and .12–under the Enacted Plan. The
district's Schwartzberg score is 2 .839. These
low scores reflect the district's substantially
elongated shape.
Despite its elongation, however, the district is
not as unreasonable as it first appears. The
north edge of the handle tracks the Henrico
county line, while the lower edge is almost
entirely retained within Henrico County. In
fact, Delegate Jones' revision permitting the
upper edge to track Henrico county lines “put
some more good Republican precincts in
there that the gentleman in the 97th did not
want to lose[.]” The district has also
improved on neutral metrics over the last
three districting cycles. In particular, the
2011 plan removed the water crossing
discussed in Wilkins v. West.
The Intervenors also noted that the BVAP
percentage in the district had been lowered
substantially from the Benchmark Plan. But
the fact that the BVAP percentage dropped
does not, taken alone, indicate that race was
not the predominate criterion influencing the
district's construction. As the Plaintiffs
observe, much of the black population ceded
from HD 74 went to other Challenged
Districts, such as HD 63 and HD 71. Unlike
in a racial vote dilution claim, a racial
predominance inquiry does not necessarily
concern itself with whether the BVAP went
up or down. A district formed primarily to
eject black voters would employ the same
racial classification as a district formed
primarily to include black voters.

In the end, however, the primary objection to
this district amounts to a criticism that the
district is too long. But predominance is not
merely a beauty contest centered on Reockstyle compactness. Although this district
certainly does not earn high marks in a
qualitative predominance analysis, the
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that
neutral
criteria
were
substantially
disregarded in the formation of HD 74. The
district contains all of Charles City and, for
most of its length, has readily identifiable
boundaries. Moreover, the shifting of black
population into HD 63 and HD 71 largely
improved HD 74's compliance with neutral
criteria, such as contiguity and compactness.
Moreover, the district has retained roughly
the same long shape since 1991. Core
retention alone cannot be used to save an
otherwise offensive district, but it is worth
holding in the balance if the familiarity of the
boundaries has “allow[ed for the]
development
of
relationships
and
communities of interest relative to election of
delegates.”
On the whole, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have failed to meet the
predominance inquiry's “demanding burden”
to show that racial considerations
subordinated both neutral criteria and other
race-neutral explanations in the formation of
HD 74. Therefore, the Court holds, as a
matter of fact, that race did not predominate
in the drawing of HD 74.
7. District 77
HD 77 is found in the Portsmouth area and
was represented by Delegate Lionel Spruill
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted
Plan, the district contains parts of
Chesapeake and Suffolk. The number of
county and city splits remained the same, and
the number of split VTDs decreased from 4
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to 3. HD 77 has a core retention percentage
of 74.4.
At first glance, this jagged and elongated
district is suspect. However, upon closer
inspection, the top-right corner of the district
hews to strange county lines, while many
curious features on the lower side of the
district track natural water boundaries and
precincts that are themselves rather jagged
and elongated. The district had Reock and
Polsby–Popper scores of .18 and .17 under
the Benchmark Plan, which shifted to scores
of .19 and .15 under the Enacted Plan. The
district's Schwartzberg score is 2.542. With
respect to neutral criteria, it appears that
compliance therewith could still result in an
inherently oddly-shaped district, but the
record lacks guidance in this regard.
The record is similarly unclear and
incomplete respecting deviations from
traditional criteria. The district's large
western chunk is admittedly attributable to a
single precinct, but that does not answer why
that whole half of the district is thrust so far
into HD 76 as to nearly sever it in half. As
Delegate Jones observed, the 76th and 77th
districts share the most geographical
boundary area on the map.
Based on the alternative districting plans
referenced by the Plaintiffs, it appears that it
was possible to create the same number of
performing districts in this region without
resorting to this westward leap. So was this
deviation necessary to reach the 55% BVAP
floor (in which case, race might
predominate), or was this deviation
motivated by a desire to remove Democrat
performing precincts from Delegate Jones'
district (in which case politics might
predominate)? Or, is this overall structure
attributable to the “knock-on” effects of
avoiding pairing incumbents in this region? If
so, incumbency considerations might

predominate, political performance might
predominate, or racial considerations might
predominate. These are all questions that
Plaintiffs bore the burden of answering. The
Court is not in a position to guess based on
the skimpy evidence submitted.
But, the record does show that the district's
already-strange 2001 design was somewhat
ameliorated in HB 5005 by moving the
“Airport District” precinct from HD 77 to HD
76, and “reuniting” the “old city of South
Norfolk” at Delegate Spruill's request, which
allowed segments of the new district to more
closely track county boundaries and water
boundaries. These changes also served
political ends. The Airport District is
primarily Republican, so this transfer helped
Delegate Jones, whereas the “old city of
South Norfolk” surrounds Delegate Spruill's
residence, which was seen as politically
advantageous for him as well, Although the
neighborhoods added around Delegate
Spruill also contained meaningful black
populations, Tanglewood, Oaklette, Norfolk
Highlands, Indian River, and Johnson Park
were all majority-white precincts.
The Court also observes that the district is not
contiguous by land and does not appear to
possess a water crossing within its bounds,
but Plaintiffs have offered no substantive
evidence on whether this deviation relates in
any way to the attainment of the district's
BVAP level, which is 58.8% in the Executed
Plan.
Based on the testimony, evidence, and
arguments, the Court cannot ascertain from
the record whether race, politics, or other
criteria predominated in the formation of HD
77. Frankly, if the presumption of correctness
and good faith has any meaning, it is
applicable in this instance. The Plaintiffs
simply point to the threshold's attainment of
the 55% BVAP floor, evidence of racial
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correlation, and a low compactness score to
prove that race predominated. There is no
evidence-based explanation to show how, if
at all, the racial floor impacted the boundaries
of HD 77 or why voters were placed there in
the redistricting process. The Plaintiffs
cannot hand the Court a stone and expect
back a sculpture.
It is at least as likely that politics and
traditional districting factors account for the
configuration and composition of HD 77 as it
is that race was responsible. Because the
Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence as
to the ways in which racial considerations
might have had a “direct and significant
impact” on the District's formation, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the
burden of proof required to show that race
predominated in the construction of HD 77.
8. District 80
HD 80 is found in the Portsmouth area and
was represented by Delegate Matthew James
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
the Benchmark Plan, the district contained
parts of Chesapeake, Norfolk, and
Portsmouth. Under the Enacted Plan, the
district now contains parts of Chesapeake,
Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Suffolk. This
increased the number of county and city splits
from 3 to 4 but decreased the number of split
VTDs from 2 to 1. HD 80 has a core retention
percentage of 59.94.
At trial, Intervenors stated, “I think it's fair to
say honestly that this district looks a little
irregular.” But “a little irregular” is “a little
bit of an understatement.” The district is quite
unusually configured. The district had Reock
and Polsby–Popper scores of .39 and .26
under the Benchmark Plan, which
experienced a substantial drop to scores of
.26 and .11 under the Enacted Plan. The

district's Schwartzberg score is 3.054—the
highest of all the Challenged Districts.
Because the district makes little rational
sense as a geographical unit, the Court will
move directly to ascertaining the
predominant purpose of the deviations. To
begin, it is hard to identify what is now a
“deviation” because it is hard to identify what
is now the core of the district. The district is
split by water twice without any apparent
crossing enabling residents to stay within the
district on either occasion.
The Plaintiffs correctly note that HD 80's
western border “winds its way around low
BVAP precincts like Silverwood (14.9%),
Churchland (8.3%), and Fellowship (14.2%)
to capture high BVAP precincts such as
Yeates (56.3%) and Taylor Road (48.8%).”
Considering the district's attainment of the
BVAP floor, this is the kind of detailed
explanation that might lead the Court to find
that racial considerations subordinated all
others. In this case, however, the Plaintiffs'
racial explanation must contend with other
“dominant and controlling” considerations:
incumbency protection as well as geographic
features and a naval base.
In addition to the constraints imposed by the
James River, the Atlantic Ocean, and the
Norfolk naval base, the district needed to
retain the residence of Delegate James while
avoiding the residences of Delegate Johnny
Joannou (HD 79) and then-Delegate Kenneth
Alexander (HD 89). The general—and
relatively simple—problem was “a loss of
population” in the area and the need to move
district boundaries “from the oceanfront back
... western to Suffolk” to capture population.
This problem became far more complex,
however, because Delegates Alexander,
Joannou, and Jones all live in relatively close
proximity. To avoid pairing incumbents, the
westward shift of the districts had to wrap
424

around the residences of the incumbents,
resulting in the distortion found here. Thus,
the map needed to “roll the population around
... to make sure Delegate Joannou had a
sufficient number of residents in his district”
and narrow the neck of the district before
leaping further out westward to avoid
Delegate Joannou while capturing Delegate
James.
That explanation addresses why neutral
criteria were subordinated, but it does not
provide the basis upon which voters were
sorted into the corresponding districts.
“Incumbent pairing prevention” may have
resulted in “population rolls,” but an equal
population goal itself is not part of the
predominance balance.
“Incumbency protection,” on the other hand,
does provide an explanation for the
amalgamation of precincts selected for HD
80. As the Intervenors explained:
Although HD80 could have been
drawn to take territory from HD76—
represented by Delegate Jones—the
precincts there were Republican
strongholds, and neither Jones nor
HD80's representative, Democrat
Matthew James, wanted that trade.
Drawing HD80 into the former
territory of HD79 gave those
Democratic-leaning precincts to
James, and not Jones. This
arrangement made HD80 less
compact than it would have been had
it taken territory from Jones, but it
was politically preferable. HD80 was
also drawn to protect other
incumbents, Johnny Joannou (HD79)
and Kenneth Alexander (HD89), who
resided near the borders they shared
with HD80, making it impossible for
HD80 to take territory to the north

and northeast
incumbents.

without

pairing

Based on this record, it appears just as likely
that precincts were selected for being highly
Democratic and avoided for being highly
Republican, as it is that precincts were
selected for being highly African–American
and avoided for being highly Caucasian.
And, just because “the most loyal Democrats
happen to be black Democrats” does not
mean that a political gerrymander is thereby
transformed into a racial gerrymander.
On the whole, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have not carried the burden of
demonstrating that racial considerations
subordinated neutral districting criteria and
other non-racial districting criteria, including
incumbent
pairing
prevention
and
incumbency protection. Although the
existence of the BVAP floor itself weighs in
favor of a racial predominance finding, the
Court finds, as a matter of fact, that—
qualitatively—the
“dominant
and
controlling” factor dictating the construction
of HD 80 was incumbency protection, and
that race did not predominate in the drawing
of HD 80.
9. District 89
HD 89 is found in the Norfolk area and was
represented by then-Delegate Kenneth
Alexander during the 2011 redistricting
process. Under both the Benchmark Plan and
the Enacted Plan, the district is contained
wholly within Norfolk. There were no county
or city splits and the number of split VTDs
remained the same under both plans. HD 89
has a core retention percentage of 76.86.
On its face, the district appears reasonably
compact and generally follows precinct lines
within Norfolk. The district had Reock and
Polsby–Popper scores of .58 and .31 under
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the Benchmark Plan, which dropped to scores
of .40 and .20 under the Enacted Plan. The
district's Schwartzberg score is 2 .263.
Although the district is not contiguous by
land, it does contain water crossings within
the district. One of these crossings is largely
to blame for the district's relative drop in
compactness. The added precinct—
Berkley—contains a high BVAP percentage,
but is also relatively close to Delegate
Alexander's residence.
In addition, the district added a small “pipe”
to its northernmost border, which includes a
funeral home owned by Delegate Alexander.
As Delegate Jones explained, Virginia state
legislators are “part-time citizen legislators,”
many of whom regularly interact with their
constituents in their professional capacities.
As such, having a business within the district
enables incumbents to more readily engage
with their constituents.
Weighing all evidence, it appears that a
couple of small deviations possibly could be
attributable either to racial or to incumbency
considerations, but the district's composition
is predominantly attributable to traditional,
neutral principles. Therefore, the Court holds
that the Plaintiffs did not carry the burden of
proving that race predominated in the
drawing of HD 89.
10. District 90
HD 90 is found in the Norfolk area and was
represented by Delegate Algie Howell, Jr.
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
the Benchmark Plan, the district contained
parts of Chesapeake, Norfolk, and Virginia
Beach. Under the Enacted Plan, the district
now contains parts of Norfolk and Virginia
Beach. This decreased the number of county
and city splits from 3 to 2 and the number of

split VTDs remained the same. HD 90 has a
core retention percentage of 63.21.
On its face, the district appears to represent a
reasonably compact geographic unit. The
district had Reock and Polsby–Popper scores
of .35 and .24 under the Benchmark Plan,
which shifted to scores of .46 and .20 under
the Enacted Plan. Ints.' Ex. 15 at 15, Table 9.
The district's Schwartzberg score is 2.221.
Apart from the district's two extensions into
Virginia Beach and lack of land contiguity,
HD 90 seems to largely comply with
traditional, neutral districting conventions.
Even these “deviations,” however, must be
viewed in context. Specifically, the 2011
redistricting plan improved the district's
compliance with the “political subdivisions”
criterion by removing a segment from
Chesapeake. And, the southern appendage
that reaches into Virginia Beach tracks the
county line on its western border. Moreover,
one of the district's jumps across water
connects parts of Norfolk. As such, this landcontiguity failure simultaneously serves to
unite a political subdivision and community
of interest.
On the record submitted, neutral criteria
appear to predominate. Even if the southern
appendage reaching into Virginia Beach were
enough for the district as a whole to exhibit a
“substantial disregard” for neutral principles,
it hardly appears that this offending piece of
land could be viewed as racially driven. In
fact, that segment of Virginia Beach contains
some of the lowest BVAP percentages in the
entire district. Therefore, the Court holds that
the Plaintiffs did not carry the burden to
prove that race predominated in the drawing
of HD 90, notwithstanding that it satisfies the
55% BVAP floor.
11. District 92
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HD 92 is found in the Hampton area and was
represented by Delegate Jeion Ward during
the 2011 redistricting process. Under both the
Benchmark Plan and the Enacted Plan, the
district is contained wholly within Hampton.
The district contains no county or city splits,
and redistricting lowered the number of split
VTDs in the district from 3 to 0. HD 92 has a
core retention percentage of 77.27.
On the whole, the Court finds it hard to
imagine a better example of a district that
complies with traditional, neutral districting
principles. The district had Reock and
Polsby–Popper scores of .28 and .15 under
the Benchmark Plan, which increased to
scores of .34 and .26 under the Enacted Plan.
The district's Schwartzberg score is 1.970.
As a result of the 2011 redistricting process,
the district became more compact, reunified
downtown Hampton, and eliminated all
precinct splits. Moreover, most of the
district's southern border is marked by the
waterfront and much of the district's western
border now follows the Hampton boundary,
making it easily identifiable to voters.
Although the district is not contiguous by
land, it contains water crossings to allow
voters to travel between parts of the district
without traversing other districts. The Court
holds, as a matter of fact, that traditional,
neutral criteria—not race—predominated in
the construction of HD 92.
12. District 95
HD 95 is found in the Hampton area and was
represented by Delegate Mamye BaCote
during the 2011 redistricting process. Under
both the Benchmark Plan and the Enacted
Plan, the district contains parts of Hampton
and Newport News. Although the number of
county and city splits remained the same,
redistricting increased the number of split
VTDs from 1 to 6. HD 95 has a core retention

percentage of 62.15, and is contiguous by
land.
Their proximity notwithstanding, HD 92 and
HD 95 share little in common. From bottom
to top, the district begins by encompassing
the full width of Newport News but soon
departs from any observable neutral criteria.
As the district moves northwest, a sliver
attributable to the River precinct extends into
HD 94 before the district works its way
entirely over into Hampton City. There it
remains for a period before extending briefly
back into Newport News via the South
Morrison precinct. After retreating back into
Hampton City the district then hits water and
York County, which it weaves around before
running up through the middle of Newport
News in a narrow spike. If there is any
reasonably neutral explanation for the route
followed, this Court was not informed. The
district had Reock and Polsby–Popper scores
of .43 and .28 under the Benchmark Plan,
which dropped to scores of .14 and .14 under
the Enacted Plan. This rendered HD 95 the
least compact district on the map under the
Reock metric. The district's Schwartzberg
score is 2.657.
Rather than attempting to explain the district
through neutral criteria, the Intervenors
themselves
acknowledge
that
the
construction of the district was “significantly
political.” According to Delegate Jones, the
district's movement north follows heavily
Democratic precincts and then narrowly
jumps through two Republican precincts in
order to capture another strongly Democratic
voting area at its northernmost tip. Moreover,
the district's eastward “zig” followed by its
westward “zag” managed to avoid including
the residence of Delegate Robin Abbott in
HD 95. This avoided pairing female
Democratic incumbents and, in conjunction
with the partisan maneuvering above, placed
Delegate Abbott in a more heavily
427

Republican swing seat. As Intervenors
explained: “HD95 was crafted carefully to
avoid taking HD94's Republican precincts
and instead take Democratic-leaning
population left behind by HD93 and reach
into precincts surrounded by HD93 to dilute
Democratic voting strength in that area.”
The Court finds that explanation persuasive.
Where there is a correlation between race and
party, the burden is upon the Plaintiffs to
dislodge the evidence showing that voters
were sorted predominantly on the basis
political preference rather than race. Delegate
Jones had access to political performance
data as well as racial data. As the Intervenors
asked during closing argument: “[I]f race was
the principal factor, why [did the legislature]
pass by all these areas which have more black
voters [in the southern part of the peninsula
and] go up there [to the northern tip of the
district]? ... We don't hear any analysis from
the other side on that point. There's no
contradictory testimony.” On the evidence
submitted, political advantage (based on
partisan performance data) has been shown to
have been the dominant and controlling
consideration
guiding
the
district's
unorthodox boundaries. As a result, the Court
holds, as a matter of fact, that race did not
predominate in the construction of HD 95.

Today, despite the Supreme Court's clear
warning against the mechanical use of racial
targets in redistricting, this court upholds the
Virginia General Assembly's application of a
one-size-fits-all racial quota to twelve highly
dissimilar legislative districts. This quota was
used to assign voters to districts based on the
color of their skin without the constitutional
protection afforded by strict scrutiny.
I recognize that the legislature in this case did
not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's
decision in Alabama, and I do not doubt that
individual legislators acted in good faith in
the redistricting process. Nevertheless, the
resulting legislative enactment has affected
Virginia citizens' fundamental right to vote,
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, I would invalidate Virginia's
2011 redistricting plan.
I.
Redistricting decisions are almost always
made with a “consciousness of race,” and
such awareness does not necessarily result in
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
However, when a legislature is “motivated”
by racial considerations, this inherently
suspect system of racial classification must
satisfy the rigorous requirements of strict
scrutiny.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds
that each of the twelve Challenged Districts
withstands constitutional scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, and judgment will
be entered for the Defendants and the
Intervenor–Defendants.
It is so ORDERED.
…
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit
Judge, dissenting:

A plaintiff asserting a race-based equal
protection claim in a redistricting case has the
burden of proving “that race was the
predominant
factor
motivating
the
legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a
particular district.” Under this predominance
test, a plaintiff must show that “the
legislature subordinated traditional raceneutral districting principles ... to racial
considerations.” When a legislature has
“relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting
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principles,” such traditional principles have
been subordinated to race.
Strict scrutiny is required when race was the
predominant factor that categorically was
accorded priority over race-neutral districting
factors. As the Supreme Court has explained,
traditional factors have been subordinated to
race when “[r]ace was the criterion that, in
the State's view, could not be compromised,”
and when traditional, race-neutral criteria
were considered “only after the race-based
decision had been made.” Thus, while a
redistricting plan may reflect certain
traditional districting criteria, that plan
nevertheless remains subject to strict scrutiny
when those criteria have been subordinated to
a process that has sorted voters primarily by
race.
Contrary to the majority's view, this
predominance inquiry does not require that
the use of race in drawing district boundaries
be in “conflict” with traditional districting
criteria. In fact, the race of a voter often
correlates
with
other
districting
considerations, including partisan preference,
incumbency protection, and communities of
interest. The conclusion logically follows,
therefore, that racial sorting frequently will
not be in “conflict” with these and other
districting criteria.
Because such districting criteria can be used
to mask racial sorting, courts must carefully
examine the evidence under the test for
predominance articulated in Miller and Shaw
II. Under that test, race necessarily
predominates when the legislature has
subordinated traditional districting criteria to
racial goals, such as when race is the single
immutable criterion and other factors are
considered only when consistent with the
racial objective.

This case presents a textbook example of
racial predominance, in which a uniform
racial quota was the only criterion employed
in the redistricting process that could not be
compromised. This one-size-fits-all quota
automatically made racial sorting a priority
over any other districting factor. Although a
legislature is entitled to a presumption of
good faith, this presumption must yield when
the evidence shows that citizens have been
assigned to legislative districts primarily
based on their race. For this reason, I disagree
with the majority's conclusion that a uniform
racial quota merely is “evidence” of
predominance, and instead would hold that
the existence of such a widely applied quota
establishes predominance as a matter of law.
A.
I first observe that while the parties have
engaged in a semantical debate whether the
55% BVAP threshold was an “aspirational
target” or a “rule,” the evidence presented at
trial clearly established that the legislature
employed the 55% BVAP figure as a fixed,
non-negotiable quota. Three individual
delegates
testified
regarding
their
understanding of the mandatory nature of the
quota. And, despite Delegate Jones' trial
testimony that the 55% BVAP figure was
merely an “aspirational ... rule of thumb,” he
promoted the plan during the House of
Delegates floor debates as having achieved a
55% minimum BVAP for all majorityminority districts. The legislators' subjective
understanding that the 55% figure operated
as a mandatory floor further was
corroborated by the fact that, in the 2011
plan, the BVAP in most of the twelve
challenged districts converged toward 55%
while each district satisfied the 55% BVAP
floor.
B.

II.
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The “disregard of individual rights” is the
“fatal
flaw”
in
such
race-based
classifications. By assigning voters to certain
districts based on the color of their skin,
states risk “engag[ing] in the offensive and
demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, think
alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”
Quotas
are
especially
pernicious
embodiments of racial stereotypes, because
they threaten citizens' “‘personal rights' to be
treated with equal dignity and respect.”
Here, the plan contravened the rights of
individual voters by applying a one-size-fitsall racial quota for black voters in twelve
highly dissimilar districts, without regard to
the characteristics of the voters or of their
communities. The 55% quota thus is a classic
example of race-based stereotyping and
unequal treatment prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court's skepticism of racial
quotas is long-standing. However, the Court
has yet to decide whether use of a one-sizefits-all racial quota in a legislative
redistricting plan or, in particular, use of such
a quota well exceeding 50%, establishes
predominance as a matter of law under
Miller.
The Court recently has cautioned against
“prioritizing mechanical racial targets above
all other districting criteria” in redistricting.
Although the Court in Alabama did not
decide whether the use of a racial quota well
exceeding 50%, of itself, can establish
predominance, the Court made clear that such
“mechanical racial targets” are highly
suspicious. After issuing this admonishment
and identifying several errors in the district
court's analysis, the Court ultimately
remanded the case to the district court to
reconsider the question of predominance.

The uniform racial quota employed in the
present case is more suspicious on its face
than the racial thresholds at issue in Alabama.
The legislature in Alabama sought to
maintain preexisting racial percentages
specific to each district with the aim of
avoiding retrogression under Section 5. In
contrast, the racial quota used in the present
case was applied indiscriminately to all
twelve districts irrespective of the particular
characteristics of those districts. The Virginia
plan's one-size-fits-all quota thus raises even
more serious concerns that the legislature's
districting decisions were driven primarily by
race.
In view of the Virginia legislature's
application of a single racial quota to
numerous districts in the case before us, this
court is not presented with the question
whether a particular fixed BVAP percentage
would trigger strict scrutiny if applied to a
single district. Nor is this court asked to
decide whether strict scrutiny is required
every time a legislature intentionally creates
a majority-minority district.
Instead, the more narrow question before this
court is whether strict scrutiny is required
when a uniform racial quota of 55% has been
applied by a legislature in drawing twelve
legislative districts that are highly dissimilar
in character. Here, because traditional
districting criteria were considered solely
insofar as they did not interfere with this 55%
minimum floor, the quota operated as a filter
through which all line-drawing decisions had
to pass. Such a racial filter necessarily had a
discriminatory effect on the configuration of
the districts, because it rendered all
traditional criteria that otherwise would have
been “race-neutral” tainted by and
subordinated to race. Under these
circumstances, although a legislature may
take into account traditional districting
criteria, race-neutral application of those
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criteria becomes impossible and all decisions
necessarily are affected by race. Therefore, I
would hold that the plaintiffs have
established as a matter of law under Miller
that race predominated in the legislative
drawing of each of the challenged districts,
and I would apply strict scrutiny in
examining the constitutionality of those
districts.

Equal Protection Clause. Rather, as stated
above, the constitutional harm results from
individual voters being sorted into districts
based on the color of their skin. By requiring
that use of race actually “conflict” with
traditional redistricting criteria, the majority's
predominance test often will fail to identify
constitutionally suspect racial sorting.
IV.

III.
In stark contrast, the majority's predominance
analysis accepts the use of this facially
suspicious racial quota. In doing so, the
majority places an unwarranted burden on the
plaintiffs to show that the quota had
identifiable effects on the drawing of
particular district lines. The majority thus
effectively would require the plaintiffs to
present an alternative legislative map
showing how lines could have been drawn
differently without imposing the 55% quota.
Such an onerous burden, however, far
exceeds the required showing for establishing
predominance.
Additionally, under the majority's test, visual
inspection of a district would be fatal to an
equal protection claim if the district's
boundaries appear to be consistent with
traditional criteria, irrespective of direct
evidence that the line-drawing was racially
motivated at the outset. Thus, as a result of
the majority's analysis, and its requirement
that the use of race be in actual “conflict”
with traditional districting criteria, future
plaintiffs asserting a racial sorting claim will
be restricted to challenging districts that
manifest extreme line-drawing unexplainable
on race-neutral grounds, like the district at
issue in Shaw I.
As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
however, a district that is bizarre in shape is
not the constitutional harm prohibited by the

In reviewing a redistricting plan, courts
typically examine whether a plan complies
with traditional districting factors, such as
compactness and contiguity, when evaluating
whether there is evidence of racially
motivated decision making. When a
legislative district is bizarre in shape, that fact
“may be persuasive circumstantial evidence
that race for its own sake, and not other
districting principles, was the legislature's
dominant and controlling rationale in
drawing its district lines.” Here, however, the
majority relies on shape and other traditional
districting factors to uphold the 2011 plan,
even in the face of the overwhelming, direct
evidence of racial motivation evidenced by
the use of a one-size-fits-all racial quota.
The majority's analysis is not aided by
Cromartie II and Bush. In Cromartie II, the
Court described the predominance inquiry as
requiring plaintiffs to show that a district's
boundaries were drawn “because of race
rather than because of” other districting
criteria. However, a legislative district
necessarily is crafted “because of race” when
a racial quota is the single filter through
which all line-drawing decisions are made.
Similarly, the principal opinion in Bush
explained that “[s]ignificant deviations from
traditional districting principles ... cause
constitutional harm insofar as they convey
the message that political identity is, or
should be, predominantly racial.” The import
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of this language is obvious. The harm caused
by racial stereotyping is apparent when racial
sorting manifests itself in odd district
boundaries that are visible to any observer.
But the incidence of constitutional harm is
not limited to the presence of a district that is
odd in shape. In the present case, the
legislature's use of a racial quota resulted in
constitutional
harm,
because
that
methodology “convey[ed] the message that
political identity is, or should be,
predominantly racial.”
I also disagree with the intervenors' implicit
suggestion that approval by incumbent
legislators in the challenged districts
somehow rescues the plan from a finding of
racial predominance. The Voting Rights Act
(VRA) and the Equal Protection Clause are
intended to protect the rights of the individual
voter, not to promote the self-interest of
incumbents in majority-minority districts. To
the contrary, immunizing incumbents from
challenge could entrench them in
overwhelmingly safe districts and undermine
the representatives' accountability to their
constituents. One can easily imagine how
such entrenchment could harm minority
voters by discouraging challengers from
running and by preventing voters from
electing a new candidate who better
represents their interests. “Packing” minority
voters into a particular majority-minority
district for the purpose of protecting the
incumbent also can reduce minority voters'
ability to influence elections in nearby
districts.
A true predominance analysis also is not
affected by the fact that, at the time of the
2010 census, nine of the twelve challenged
districts already had a BVAP of 55% or
higher. Even assuming that such figures
could protect the configuration of those nine
districts in the 2011 plan, the three remaining
districts still would be subject to strict

scrutiny. Moreover, given the significant
population deficits in most of the challenged
districts, our inquiry must focus on “which
voters the legislature decide[d] to choose”
when moving voters between districts in
order to achieve population equality. Here,
the legislature's decision to move certain
voters in order to maintain a preexisting 55%
BVAP floor in the new plan is still a
“mechanically numerical” method of
redistricting that is subject to strict scrutiny.
I therefore conclude that the majority's
approach effectively and improperly places
on plaintiffs asserting racial predominance in
redistricting a burden never assigned by the
Supreme Court. Under the majority's
analysis, plaintiffs now will be required to
show circumstantial evidence of racial
motivation through “actual conflict” with
traditional districting criteria, when such
plaintiffs already have presented dispositive
direct evidence that the legislature assigned
race a priority over all other districting
factors.
V.
Even upon applying its heightened
predominance standard, the majority
concludes that race was the predominant
factor in the drawing of District 75. I would
hold that, under the majority's test, the same
conclusion of predominance holds true for
neighboring District 63 as well.
As a result of the “drastic maneuvering”
required to reach a 55% BVAP in District 75,
portions of a county previously in District 63
were shifted into District 75, a move that the
majority agrees was “avowedly racial.” The
plan compensated for this loss of BVAP in
District 63 by adding to the district new areas
with high BVAP concentrations. Due to the
changes in the 2011 plan, District 63
experienced a startling reduction in
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compactness and an increase in the number
of split cities, counties, and VTDs. This and
other evidence showed that implementation
of the 55% racial quota had a marked impact
on the configuration of both Districts 63 and
75.
VI.
I further conclude that none of the challenged
districts can survive the test of strict scrutiny,
because the legislature's use of the 55% quota
was not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest in any of the
challenged districts. Evidence of narrow
tailoring in this case is practically nonexistent.
Assuming that compliance with the VRA is a
compelling state interest, attempts at such
compliance “cannot justify race-based
districting where the challenged district was
not reasonably necessary under a
constitutional reading and application” of
federal law. Thus, narrow tailoring requires
that the legislature have a “strong basis in
evidence” for its race-based decision, that is,
“good reasons to believe” that the chosen
racial classification was required to comply
with the VRA.
In the present case, the intervenors presented
virtually no evidence supporting the need for
application of a 55% BVAP in any of the
challenged districts. In fact, Delegate Jones
even had difficulty articulating the original
source of the 55% figure.
The only evidence suggestive of any tailoring
involved District 75. Delegate Jones testified
that he conducted a “functional analysis” of
Delegate Tyler's primary and general election
results in 2005, and considered the significant
prison population in that district, which
together supported the imposition of a 55%
racial floor. However, Jones' statements were

merely general and conclusory in nature and,
therefore, fell far short of demonstrating a
“strong basis in evidence” for the application
of a racial quota. Not only did the 2005
elections occur six years prior to the 2011
redistricting, but Tyler ran unopposed in the
two elections since, casting significant doubt
on Jones' contention that District 75 was so
competitive that a minority-preferred
candidate required at least a 55% BVAP to be
re-elected from 2011 onward. And, critically,
Jones failed to provide any explanation of
how his “functional” review led him to
conclude that a 55% BVAP was required in
District 75 to ensure compliance with the
VRA.
The evidence supporting the use of the 55%
racial quota in the remaining challenged
districts was even weaker. The House of
Delegates did not conduct an analysis
regarding the extent of racially polarized
voting in any of these districts. Although
Delegate Jones stated that he was aware of
low registration rates among black voters, he
also admitted that he did not review voter
registration figures when drawing the plan.
Nor did he examine minority turnout rates in
most of the challenged districts, or consider
state Senate districts, congressional maps, or
other maps that had been pre-cleared or
rejected by the Department of Justice. And,
in attempting to justify imposition of the 55%
BVAP quota in District 63, Jones stated that
he “t[hought] there was a primary” in which
Delegate Dance ran as an independent, which
results he reviewed, but he did not specify
how those results led him to select a 55%
BVAP threshold in District 63. Such
unsubstantiated and general comments
plainly do not constitute the strong basis in
evidence required to satisfy strict scrutiny.
Finally, I do not think that the outcome of this
case, in favor of either party, is dependent on
any of the expert testimony. However, I
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pause to note that I find the testimony offered
by Dr. Katz to be singularly unpersuasive on
the issue of narrow tailoring. Dr. Katz
admitted that he provided only a “crude”
analysis of the likelihood that a candidate
preferred by minority voters would be
elected. According to Dr. Katz, this “crude”
method demonstrated that a 55% BVAP
correlates with an 80% chance of electing a
black candidate.

political process and to elect representatives
of their choice,” and that minority voters
retain their existing ability to elect their
preferred candidates.
For these reasons, I would find that the record
utterly fails to show that the legislature had a
“strong basis in evidence” for using the 55%
racial quota in any of the challenged districts.
Accordingly, I would hold that all the
districts fail the test of strict scrutiny.

Dr. Katz' crude analysis exhibits two glaring
flaws. First, it underrepresents the likelihood
that the preferred candidate of minority
voters would be elected by evaluating only
the likely success of black candidates, when
minority voters had elected non-minority
delegates in certain of the challenged
districts. Second, and more fundamentally,
Dr. Katz' analysis is flawed because the VRA
does not guarantee the success of a candidate
of a particular race in a given election.
Rather, the VRA ensures that minority voters
do not “have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the

VII.
The promise of the Equal Protection Clause
is the guarantee of true equality under the
law, enforced by our courts for the protection
of our citizens irrespective of the power of
any governmental entity. The Virginia
legislature's use of the racial quota in this
case violated this core constitutional
principle in the absence of a strong basis in
evidence supporting its race-based decision.
Thus, I would invalidate Virginia's 2011
redistricting plan. I respectfully dissent.
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“Supreme Court will weigh in on whether Va. districts are racially
gerrymandered”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes and Laura Vozzella
June 6, 2016

The Supreme Court announced Monday it
will take its second look at whether
Virginia’s Republican political leaders
gerrymandered the state’s electoral maps in
order to diminish the power of African
American voters.
Last month, the justices upheld a plan
imposed by a lower court that redrew some of
the commonwealth’s congressional districts
and created the possibility of electing a
second black U.S. House member.
On Monday, the court said it would review a
different court’s rejection of a challenge that
said Republican leaders reduced the strength
of minority voters by packing them into a
dozen House of Delegates districts.
A three-judge panel had voted 2 to 1 that the
districts were constitutional and that race had
not been the primary consideration in
drawing them.
The case will be considered in the new term
that begins in October, and if the Supreme
Court orders any changes in the districts, they
would presumably take place in advance of
the 2017 elections.
The Supreme Court is increasingly being
asked to consider cases of alleged racial

gerrymandering. Unlike the usual process
involved in selecting which cases it will
review, federal law leaves the court little
discretion in deciding whether to review
redistricting challenges.
Last year, the court sent back Alabama’s
legislative redistricting plan, saying
legislators had failed to find the legal sweet
spot between districts drawn with enough
minority voters that they can elect
representatives of their choice but not with so
many minority voters that surrounding
districts are intentionally made safe for white
Republicans.
The Virginia cases were brought by Marc E.
Elias and funded by the National Democratic
Redistricting Trust. Elias is general counsel
to Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign
and worked on the campaign of now-Gov.
Terry McAuliffe (D).
Virginia House Speaker William J. Howell
(R-Stafford) said the three-judge panel in the
current case “plainly laid out the
constitutionality of Virginia’s House of
Delegates redistricting plan and we are
confident that upon review the Supreme
Court will affirm the lower court ruling.”
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Supporters of the plan noted that every
member of the Legislative Black Caucus
voted for it when it was drawn in 2011.
But support from black incumbents does not
guarantee that the maps were fair, said Brian
Cannon,
executive
director
of
OneVirginia2021, a nonprofit group pushing
for nonpartisan redistricting.
“It’s not about the black legislators. It’s about
the black voters, whether African American
voters have been illegally packed into
districts,” Cannon said. “This leaves a
number of communities split. It wrings out
competition from elections, and it only serves
as an incumbent-protection racket.”
He added: “The Supreme Court has a chance
to uphold good-government redistricting
criteria in this case because what they’re
faced with is a scenario in which the political
process subverted all other good-government
criteria in favor of politics.”
Richmond braced for a stalemate over
redistricting in 2011, the first time since
Reconstruction that political map-making
had been undertaken by a divided legislature.
But the GOP-led House and Democratic-led
Senate struck an informal deal: Republicans
in the House agreed to accept Senate lines
drawn by Democrats, and Democrats in the
Senate agreed to accept House lines drawn by
Republicans.
Some Democrats complained at the time that
the GOP could have drawn two additional
-majority-minority districts but chose not to.
Many black legislators spoke in favor of the
plan, saying that their views had been taken
into account.

The deal sailed through the House on an 86to-8 vote. Most of the resistance came from
Republicans in the closely divided Senate,
where the map was passed on a straight partyline vote of 22 to 18. Senate Republicans said
at the time that the Democratic plan divided
up too many counties and cities and
contained districts that varied too widely in
population.
More recently, House Democrats have begun
complaining about the lines.
“We have a state that is essentially a 50-50,
Republican-Democratic state and two-thirds
of the House is controlled by the
Republicans,” said House Minority Leader
David J. Toscano (D-Charlottesville). “That
only makes sense in terms of lines that are
drawn to protect the incumbent Republican
majority.”
That may not mean much to the justices. The
court has shown a high tolerance for partisan
gerrymandering aimed at protecting
incumbents. But the Constitution forbids
gerrymandering that relies too heavily on
race, because it harms the political clout of
minorities.
The lawsuit singled out 12 legislative
districts for such criticism. But two of the
three judges examining the plan said
challengers had failed to prove that race was
the predominant factor in drawing 11 of
them.
Dissenting Judge Barbara Milano Keenan
disagreed, saying the state’s leaders applied a
“one-size-fits-all racial quota” to the
otherwise dissimilar districts.
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In the congressional case decided last month,
the Supreme Court did not reach the question
of whether Virginia lawmakers had
intentionally packed minority voters in a way
that diminished their strength. Instead, the
court found that the Republican congressmen
challenging the lower court’s decision did not
have the legal standing to bring the suit.
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“How racial gerrymandering deprives black people of political power”
Washington Post
Kim Soffen
June 9, 2016

Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court
expanded the meaning of one of the most
important civil rights laws in U.S. history —
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Among other
things, the court prohibited a then-common
practice among some states of spreading
minorities across voting districts, leaving
them too few in number in any given district
to elect their preferred candidates. The
practice became known as "racial
gerrymandering."
The court’s solution required that states
create majority-minority districts — districts
in which the majority of the voting-age
population belonged to a single minority.
With voting that occurred largely along racial
lines, these districts allowed minority voters
to elect their candidates of choice.
But a fascinating development occurred in
the years since. These districts, rather than
giving African Americans more political
power, might have actually started to deprive
them of it. Majority-minority districts, by
concentrating the minority vote in certain
districts, have the unintended consequence of
diluting their influence elsewhere. Experts
say some Republican legislatures have
capitalized on this new reality, redistricting in
their political favor under the guise of
majority-minority districts.

“Typically the goal in [packing minorities
into a district] is not to reduce minority
representation in the adjacent districts; it’s to
reduce Democrats’ representation in those
districts," said Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a
professor at the University of Chicago Law
School. "They’ve been arguably using the
racial demographics as a way to enact a
Republican gerrymander.”
The issue has gained new prominence thanks
to Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of
Elections, a case the Supreme Court agreed
on Monday to hear. Virginia’s Republicanheld state legislature drew its majorityminority districts to be 55 percent black.
Golden Bethune-Hill, among other Virginian
voters, sued the state’s Board of Elections,
arguing that they used race as a primary
factor in drawing district lines for the House
of Delegates, which is unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment.
The state contends the redistricting process
occurred fairly and legally, with bipartisan
support. Republicans have generally
defended their redistricting practices as
following a legal practice of drawing districts
in politically favorable ways — just as
Democrat-controlled legislatures do.
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Constitutional issues aside, what’s the
practical consequence of the standard
practice of "packing" districts with at least 50
percent African Americans? There are
dozens of majority-minority congressional
districts across the country, and many more
state-level districts. They’re concentrated in
the South, but can be found in states like New
York and Ohio as well.
Consider an example: Imagine the minorityfavored candidate can win an election in a
district if at least 30 percent of voters are
minorities. What harm is done by the
legislators packing the district up to 50
percent minority voters?
Much like political gerrymandering, it limits
black influence in surrounding districts. It
would require the creation of, for instance, a
50 percent and a 10 percent black district,
rather than two 30 percent black districts. In
other words, the requirement would give
black voters one representative of their
choice rather than two.
And even if it doesn’t decrease the number of
representatives the black voters can elect, it
can decrease their influence in whitedominated districts. As shown in the graphic
below, in a hypothetical state with five
districts, packing the minority voters in at 50
percent levels rather than 30 percent leads
them to lose influence in two other districts,
leaving them overwhelmingly white.
In both scenarios, the minority is numerous
enough to control the election in two districts.
What differs is whether they have a political
voice elsewhere in the state, which is
ultimately necessary to pass state-wide
legislation in their favor.

You might be thinking that, if only 30 percent
of a district's voters are black, it will be hard
for African Americans to elect their preferred
candidate. But that's increasingly not the
case. The reason: the decline of racially
polarized voting. Minority and white voting
patterns used to be starkly divergent, but
now, more whites vote for the minorityfavored candidate, especially in primaries.
This change came about as racial divisions,
beginning with the decline of segregation and
explicit racism, have faded (though
obviously not disappeared), and the interests
of politically like-minded blacks and whites
have aligned. As a result, fewer minority
voters are required for a district to elect their
favored candidate.
One 2002 paper found that from the 1960s to
the 1980s, districts needed to be more than 50
— some in the South as much as 65 —
percent African American for their favored
candidate to win the election. But today,
experts place the figure between 40 and 45
percent. Stephanopoulos says it’s “certainly
below 50 percent” across the country.
In majority-minority districts, minority
voters are, by definition, packed beyond that
threshold. Ultimately, this is detrimental to
the minorities. David Canon, a professor of
political science at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison said, “If you have too
high a percent African Americans in a House
district, it does dilute the overall
representation
of African
American
interests.”
Since the minority electorate leans liberal,
packing minorities has the same effect as
packing Democrats, causing the district map
to favor Republicans in the same way it
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favors whites. This key correlation has made
majority-minority districts popular among
Republican-held state legislatures beyond
Virginia.
The partisanship is especially clear when
seeing how the district lines change censusto-census. Stephanopoulos said Republican
legislatures take districts "that were already
electing minority representatives and pack
more minority voters into them," and
Democratic legislatures tend to "unpack ...
minority districts." In Arizona, which has a
Republican legislature but districting is done
by an independent commission, "there was
much less packing of minority voters than
there was in the other states."

States across the country, particularly in the
South where legislatures tend to lean
Republican and the Department of Justice
historically had stronger control over voting
rights, draw these districts. Though the court
is more concerned with the inappropriate use
of racial classifications rather than the
deprivation of minority political power, its
ruling could have implications for
legislatures across the country.
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in its
next term beginning in October.
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“Court reopens race and death penalty issues”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
June 6, 2016

[Excerpt; Some references to other cases
have been omitted.]
Returning to ongoing disputes over the role
of race in criminal punishment and in
politics, the Supreme Court on Monday
added new cases for decisions at its next
Term — one involving the death penalty in
Texas, the other involving the drawing of
new maps for election of members of
Virginia’s state legislature.
[…]
The other race case that the Court agreed on
Monday to review, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia
State Board of Elections, brings the question
of racial gerrymandering in redistricting
plans back to the Court for the second time
this Term — and in the second case involving
Virginia.
The other case, Wittman v.
Personhubballah, involved congressional
redistricting; it ultimately ended last month,
when the Justices found that none of the
challengers had a real legal stake in the case
and dismissed it.
The new case focused on a plan that the
Virginia legislature drew up in 2011,
following a federal census, for the one
hundred seats in its lower chamber, the
House of Delegates. The challenge in federal
court to the plan focused on twelve districts

that were assigned a majority population of
minorities. The claim was that each of those
districts was the result of racial
gerrymandering — in particular, the
legislature’s decision to start with the
premise that those districts should have at
least a fifty-five-percent minority population.
The Supreme Court has ruled several times
that it is unconstitutional to draw up
districting maps if race was the “predominant
factor” in drafting the boundaries and
deciding who should or should not be
included in given districts. In the House of
Delegates case, a three-judge federal district
court ruled that race was, in fact, the
predominant factor in a single district, but
even that one was not unconstitutional
because it had been done to avoid violating
federal civil rights law.
The challengers apparently enhanced their
chances of getting their complaint heard by
the Supreme Court by pointing out, in a later
filing, that the decision in their case
conflicted directly with a federal court’s
ruling finding racial gerrymandering in the
creation of two congressional districts in
North Carolina.
The Supreme Court issued a major ruling on
the racial gerrymandering issue last Term, in
the case of Alabama Legislative Black
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Caucus v. Alabama. Apparently, however,
the Court is not yet satisfied that the decision
went far enough to clarify its views on that
subject.

Each of the three newly granted cases will
come up for hearing and decision in the
Court’s next Term, starting in October.

[…]
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“Virginia House districts upheld”
Daily Press
Travis Fain
October 22, 2015

A three judge panel dismissed a lawsuit
Thursday challenging 12 districts in the
Virginia House of Delegates, rejecting
arguments that Republican legislators used
racial politics to draw the lines.
The districts, including two on the Peninsula,
will stay as they are, though an appeal is
likely.
The decisions was 2-1. U.S. District Court
judges Robert Payne and Gerald Bruce Lee
said race was the predominant reason for
drawing just one of the 12 districts – District
75 in Sussex County – and that the legislature
had a good reason to rely on race there.
In the other districts, the two judges said GOP
leaders managed to "traverse a precarious
path between constitutional and statutory
demands that are often in tension with one
another."
4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Barbara
Milano Keenan disagreed, saying the General
Assembly used a "one-size fits all racial
quote" to draw districts in "a textbook
example of racial predominance."
Plaintiffs had accused the assembly's GOP
majority of packing black voters into districts
to dilute their voting strength elsewhere,

strengthening the party's on the House of
Delegates. Republicans testified that partisan
concerns, and incumbent protection, drove
much of their thinking.
Plaintiffs failed to prove that racial concerns
were predominant, the majority wrote.
The packing argument was successful in a
separate challenge to Virginia's 3rd
Congressional District, which is being
redrawn now under a court order. Payne was
the only judge to serve on both cases, and he
disagreed with the majority's 3rd District
decision.
Marc Elias, whose firm brought this case, the
3rd District case and another still-pending
case targeting Virginia's voter ID laws, said
his team is reviewing the Thursday decision,
but expects to appeal. Golden Bethune-Hill,
a well-known local activist and retired
Riverside Health System executive, is the
lead plaintiff in the case, and it bears her
name.
The majority opinion runs 155 pages and
delves deep into redistricting history and
theory, as well as American racial politics.
Keenan's dissent adds another 21 pages.
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The majority opinion describes each district's
borders in turn, saying it's "hard to imagine a
better example of a district that complies with
traditional, neutral districting principles"
than the 92nd District held by Del. Jeion
Ward," D-Hampton.
Not so with Del. Mamye BaCote's 95th
District, which runs through parts of Newport
News and Hampton.
"If there is any reasonably neutral
explanation for the route followed, this court
was not informed," the judges wrote.
House Appropriations Chairman S. Chris
Jones, the Suffolk Republican who
spearheaded the 2011 redistricting, testified
that the 95th's lines were drawn to avoid two
heavily Republican precincts, gather in
Democrats and avoid then Del. Robin
Abbott's home.
That helped keep Abbott out of the
legislature.
This is the sort of allowed political
gerrymandering that proves the need for
broad redistricting reform, according to some
groups, including OneVirginia2021, which
re-upped its call for change following
Thursday's decision. The majority noted that
Elias and his team didn't argue against
political gerrymanders, though, and indicated
there might be room to litigate the matter.
"Simply put, if incumbency interests
constitute the predominate criterion driving
the construction of the district, then a claim
of racial gerrymandering must fail," the
judges wrote. "That, however, does not imply
that a claim of political gerrymandering
would face a similar fate."

The judges also complained of the vague and
often competing requirements mapmakers
face, saying that the "conceptual grace" of
Supreme Court standards lack in "practical
guidance."
"For litigators, it provides an enticingly
vague standard and invites litigation that can
drive up the cost of conducting and defending
the state's redistricting endeavor," they wrote.
In a statement released late Thursday,
Speaker of the House William Howell said
the case "unnecessarily cost Virginia
taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars."
"The lawsuit came despite the fact that the
House districts were adopted with bipartisan
support, including the support of a majority
of the African American members in the
House of Delegates at the time, and approved
by President Obama's Department of
Justice," Howell said in his statement.
There are a number of legal challenges
ongoing in Virginia and other states ahead of
the 2016 presidential elections. Even the 3rd
District case here may not be fully
adjudicated. Republican congressman are
trying for a second time to block a redraw at
the U.S. Supreme Court. The court hasn't
taken the case, but called late last month for
new briefs on the matter.
A separate case here, challenging House
districts not at issue in the racial gerrymander
case, is pending in the state courts system.
That case doesn't deal with race, but a state
constitutional requirement that districts be
compact.
It
was
brought
by
OneVirginia2021.
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A different judge will hear that case, but
Thursday's opinion contains logic that could
come to bear. Payne and Lee described
compactness as "surprisingly ethereal given
its seemingly universal acceptance as a
guiding principle for districting."

"All of the expert testimony provided reveals
one deep conceptual dilemma: no one can
agree what it is or, as a result, how to measure
it," they wrote. "There are at least 20
measures, not one of which can claim any
greater legitimacy than its peers."
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McCrory v. Harris
15-1262
Ruling Below: Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-CV-949, 2016 WL 482052 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 5,
2016)
Voters challenged the constitutionality of two congressional districts in North Carolina, on the
grounds that they were racially gerrymandered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court held that race was indeed the primary factor in the redistricting, and that this
resulted in the redistricting criteria used by the state legislature violating the Equal Protection
Clause.
Question Presented: (1) Whether the court below erred in presuming racial predominance from
North Carolina's reasonable reliance on this Court's holding in Bartlett v. Strickland that a district
created to ensure that African Americans have an equal opportunity to elect their preferred
candidate of choice complies with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) if it contains a numerical
majority of African Americans; (2) whether the court below erred in applying a standard of
review that required the State to demonstrate its construction of North Carolina Congressional
District 1 was “actually necessary” under the VRA instead of simply showing it had “good
reasons” to believe the district, as created, was needed to foreclose future vote dilution claims;
(3) whether the court below erred in relieving plaintiffs of their burden to prove “race rather than
politics” predominated with proof of an alternative plan that achieves the legislature's political
goals, is comparably consistent with traditional redistricting principles, and brings about greater
racial balance than the challenged districts; (4) whether, regardless of any other error, the threejudge court's finding of racial gerrymandering violations was based on clearly erroneous factfinding; (5) whether the court below erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' claims as being barred
by claim preclusion or issue preclusion; and (6) whether, in the interests of judicial comity and
federalism, the Court should order full briefing and oral argument to resolve the split between the
court below and the North Carolina Supreme Court which reached the opposite result in a case
raising identical claims
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David HARRIS, Christine Bowser, and Samuel Love, Plaintiffs,
v.
Patrick MCCRORY, in his capacity as Governor of North Carolina, North Carolina State
Board of Elections, and Joshua Howard, in his capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina
State Board of Elections, Defendants.
United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Decided on February 5, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Roger L. Gregory, United States Circuit
Judge
Circuit Judge Roger L. Gregory wrote the
majority opinion, in which District Judge
Max O. Cogburn, Jr., joined and filed a
separate concurrence. District Judge William
L. Osteen, Jr., joined in part and filed a
dissent as to Part II.A.2:
“[T]he Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment ... desired to place clear limits
on the States' use of race as a criterion for
legislative action, and to have the federal
courts enforce those limitations.” For good
reason. Racial classifications are, after all,
“antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment,
whose ‘central purpose’ was ‘to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official
sources in the States.’ ”
The “disregard of individual rights” is the
“fatal
flaw”
in
such
race-based
classifications. By assigning voters to certain
districts based on the color of their skin,
states risk “engag[ing] in the offensive and
demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, ‘think
alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’
” Quotas are especially pernicious
embodiments of racial stereotypes because
they threaten citizens' “ ‘personal rights' to be
treated with equal dignity and respect.”

Laws that classify citizens based on race are
constitutionally suspect and therefore subject
to strict scrutiny; racially gerrymandered
districting schemes are no different, even
when adopted for benign purposes. This does
not mean that race can never play a role in
redistricting. Legislatures are almost always
cognizant of race when drawing district lines,
and simply being aware of race poses no
constitutional violation. Only when race is
the “dominant and controlling” consideration
in drawing district lines does strict scrutiny
apply.
This case challenges the constitutionality of
two North Carolina congressional districts as
racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, this case concerns
North Carolina's Congressional District 1
(“CD 1”) and Congressional District 12 (“CD
12”) as they stood after the 2011 redistricting.
The plaintiffs contend that the congressional
map adopted by the North Carolina General
Assembly in 2011 violates the Fourteenth
Amendment: race was the predominant
consideration with respect to both districts,
and the General Assembly did not narrowly
tailor the districts to serve a compelling
interest. The Court agrees.
After careful consideration of all evidence
presented during a three-day bench trial, the
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parties' findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the parties' arguments, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs have shown that race predominated
in both CD 1 and CD 12 and that the
defendants have failed to establish that its
race-based redistricting satisfies strict
scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court holds that
the general assembly's 2011 Congressional
Redistricting Plan is unconstitutional as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Having found that the 2011 Congressional
Redistricting Plan violates the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court will require that
new congressional districts be drawn
forthwith to remedy the unconstitutional
districts.
Before turning to a description of the history
of the litigation and an analysis of the issues
it presents, the Court notes that it makes no
finding as to whether individual legislators
acted in good faith in the redistricting
process, as no such finding is required.
Nevertheless, the resulting legislative
enactment has affected North Carolina
citizens' fundamental right to vote, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
I.
A.
The North Carolina Constitution requires
decennial redistricting of the North Carolina
Senate and North Carolina House of
Representatives, subject to several specific
requirements. The general assembly is
directed to revise the districts and apportion
representatives and senators among those
districts. Similarly, consistent with the
requirements of the Constitution of the
United States, the general assembly
establishes North Carolina's districts for the

U.S. House of Representatives after every
decennial census.
Redistricting legislation must comply with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).
“The Voting Rights Act was designed by
Congress to banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting ....” Enacted
pursuant to Congress's enforcement powers
under the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA
prohibits states from adopting plans that
would result in vote dilution under section 2,
52 U.S.C. § 10301, or in covered
jurisdictions, retrogression under section 5,
52 U.S.C. § 10304.
Section 2(a) of the VRA prohibits the
imposition of any electoral practice or
procedure that “results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to
vote on account of race or color.” A section 2
violation occurs when, based on the totality
of circumstances, the political process results
in minority “members hav[ing] less
opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their
choice.”
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits a state or
political subdivision subject to section 4 of
the VRA from enforcing “any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1964,” unless it has obtained
a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia that such
change “does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color”
or has submitted the proposed change to the
U.S. attorney general and the attorney
general has not objected to it. By requiring
that proposed changes be approved in
advance, Congress sought “ ‘to shift the
advantage of time and inertia from the
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perpetrators of the evil to its victim,’ by
‘freezing election procedures in the covered
areas unless the changes can be shown to be
nondiscriminatory.’ ” The purpose of this
approach was to ensure that “no votingprocedure changes would be made that would
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.” Section
5, therefore, prohibits a covered jurisdiction
from adopting any change that “has the
purpose of or will have the effect of
diminishing the ability of [the minority
group] ... to elect their preferred candidates of
choice.”
In November 1964, several counties in North
Carolina met the criteria to be classified as a
“covered jurisdiction” under section 5. As
such, North Carolina was required to submit
any changes to its election or voting laws to
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for
federal preapproval, a process called
“preclearance.” To obtain preclearance,
North Carolina had to demonstrate that a
proposed change had neither the purpose nor
effect “of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color.”
The legal landscape changed dramatically in
2012, when the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the coverage formula used to
determine which states are subject to the
section 5 preclearance requirement. As a
result of the invalidation of the coverage
formula under section 4, North Carolina is no
longer obligated to comply with the
preclearance requirements of section 5.
B.
For decades, African-Americans enjoyed
tremendous success in electing their
preferred candidates in former versions of
CD 1 and CD 12 regardless of whether those
districts contained a majority black voting
age population (“BVAP”)—that is the

percentage of persons of voting age who
identify as African–American.
The general assembly first drew CD 1 in an
iteration of its present form in 1992. Between
1997 and 2011, the BVAP fell below 50
percent. The BVAP stood at 46.54 percent,
for example, for the plan in place from 1997
to 2001. After the 2000 census, the general
assembly enacted the 2001 Congressional
Redistricting Plan (now referred to as the
“benchmark” or “benchmark plan”) that
redrew CD 1, modestly increasing the BVAP
to 47.76 percent.
The BVAP of former CD 12 mirrored that of
former CD 1. Initially in 1991, to comply
with the DOJ's then-existing “maximization”
policy—requiring majority-minority districts
wherever possible—CD 12 was drawn with a
BVAP greater than 50 percent. After years of
litigation and the U.S. Supreme Court's
repudiation of the maximization policy, the
general assembly redrew the district in 1997
with a BVAP of 32.56 percent. The general
assembly thus determined that the VRA did
not require drawing CD 12 as a majority
African-American district. The 2001
benchmark version of CD 12 reflected a
BVAP of 42.31 percent.
Despite the fact that African-Americans did
not make up a majority of the voting-age
population in these earlier versions of CD 1
or CD 12, African-American preferred
candidates easily and repeatedly won
reelection under those plans. Representative
Eva Clayton prevailed in CD 1 in 1998 and
2000, for instance, winning 62 percent and 66
percent of the vote, respectively. Indeed,
African-American preferred candidates
prevailed with remarkable consistency,
winning at least 59 percent of the vote in each
of the five general elections under the version
of CD 1 created in 2001. Representative G.K.
Butterfield has represented that district since
2004. Meanwhile, in CD 12, Congressman
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Mel Watt won every general election in CD
12 between 1992 and 2012. He never
received less than 55.95 percent of the vote,
gathering at least 64 percent in each election
under the version of CD 12 in effect during
the 2000s.
No lawsuit was ever filed to challenge the
benchmark 2001 version of CD 1 or CD 12
on VRA grounds.
C.
Following the census conducted April 1,
2010, leaders of the North Carolina House of
Representatives and Senate independently
appointed redistricting committees. Each
committee
was
responsible
for
recommending a plan applicable to its own
chamber, while the two committees jointly
were charged with preparing a redistricting
plan for the U.S. House of Representatives
North Carolina districts. Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis were appointed chairs
of the Senate and House Redistricting
Committees, respectively, on January 27 and
February 15, 2011.
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis
were responsible for developing a proposed
congressional map. In Representative
Lewis's words, he and Senator Rucho were
“intimately involved” in the crafting of these
maps.
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis
engaged private redistricting counsel and a
political consultant. Specifically, Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis engaged the
law firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, P.C. (“Ogletree”) as their private
redistricting counsel. In December 2010,
Ogletree engaged Dr. Thomas Hofeller, who
served as redistricting coordinator for the
Republican National Committee for the
1990, 2000, and 2010 redistricting cycles, to
design and draw the 2011 Congressional

Redistricting Plan under the direction of
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis. Dr.
Hofeller was the “principal architect” of the
2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan (as
well as the state senate and house plans).
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis
were the sole sources of instruction for Dr.
Hofeller regarding the design and
construction of congressional maps. All such
instructions were provided to Dr. Hofeller
orally – there is no written record of the
precise instructions Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis gave to Dr. Hofeller.
Dr. Hofeller never received instructions from
any legislator other than Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis, never conferred with
Congressmen Butterfield or Watt, and never
conferred with the Legislative Black Caucus
(or any of its individual members) with
respect to the preparation of the
congressional maps. Representative Lewis
did not make Dr. Hofeller available to answer
questions for the members of the North
Carolina Senate and House Redistricting
Committees.
Throughout June and July 2011, Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis released a
series of public statements describing, among
other things, the criteria that they had
instructed Dr. Hofeller to follow in drawing
the proposed congressional map. As Senator
Rucho explained at the July 21, 2011, joint
meeting of the Senate and House
Redistricting Committees, those statements
“clearly delineated” the “entire criteria” that
were established and “what areas we were
looking at that were going to be in
compliance with what the Justice Department
expected us to do as part of our submission.”
In their June 17, 2011, public statement,
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis
highlighted one criterion in their redistricting
plan:
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In creating new majority African
American districts, we are obligated
to follow ... the decisions by the North
Carolina Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Bartlett. Under the
Strickland decisions, districts created
to comply with section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, must be created
with a “Black Voting Age
Population” (“BVAP”), as reported
by the Census, at the level of at least
50% plus one. Thus, in constructing
VRA majority black districts, the
Chairs recommend that, where
possible, these districts be drawn at a
level equal to at least 50% plus one
“BVAP.”
On July 1, 2011, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis made public their first
proposed congressional plan, entitled
“Rucho-Lewis Congress,” and issued a
public statement. The plan was drawn by Dr.
Hofeller and contained two majority-BVAP
districts, namely CD 1 and CD 12. With
regard to proposed CD 1, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis stated that they had
included a piece of Wake County (an urban
county in which the state capital, Raleigh, is
located) because the benchmark CD 1 was
underpopulated by 97,500 people. Senator
Rucho and Representative then added:
Because African Americans represent
a high percentage of the population
added to the First District from Wake
County, we have also been able to reestablish Congressmen Butterfield's
district as a true majority black
district under the Strickland case.
With regard to CD 12, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis noted that although the
2001 benchmark district was “not a Section 2
majority black district,” there “is one county

in the Twelfth District that is covered by
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
(Guilford).” Therefore, “[b]ecause of the
presence of Guilford County in the Twelfth
District, we have drawn our proposed
Twelfth District at a black voting age level
that is above the percentage of black voting
age population found in the current Twelfth
District.”
On July 28, 2011, the general assembly
enacted the congressional and legislative
plans, which Dr. Hofeller had drawn at the
direction
of
Senator
Rucho
and
Representative Lewis. The number of
majority-BVAP districts in the 2011
Congressional Redistricting Plan increased
from zero to two when compared to the
benchmark 2001 Congressional Redistricting
Plan. The BVAP in CD 1 increased from
47.76 percent to 52.65 percent, and in CD 12
the BVAP increased from 43.77 percent to
50.66 percent.
Following the passage of the 2011
Congressional Redistricting Plan, the general
assembly, on September 2, 2011, submitted
the plan to the DOJ for preclearance under
section 5 of the VRA. On November 1, 2011,
the DOJ precleared the 2011 Congressional
Redistricting Plan.
D.
1.
Two sets of plaintiffs challenged the 2011
Congressional Redistricting Plan in state
court for illegal racial gerrymandering. A
three-judge panel consolidated the two cases.
The state court held a two-day bench trial on
June 5 and 6, 2013. On July 8, 2013, the court
issued a decision denying the Plaintiffs'
pending motion for summary judgment and
entering judgment for the defendants. Id. The
court acknowledged that the general
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assembly used race as the predominant factor
in drawing CD 1. Nonetheless, applying strict
scrutiny, the court concluded that North
Carolina had a compelling interest in
avoiding liability under the VRA, and that the
districts had been narrowly tailored to avoid
that liability. With regard to CD 12, the court
held that race was not the driving factor in its
creation, and therefore examined and upheld
it under rational-basis review.
The state court plaintiffs appealed, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's judgment. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, granted certiorari, vacated
the decision, and remanded the case to the
North Carolina Supreme Court for further
consideration in light of Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus v. Alabama. On December 18,
2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reaffirmed the trial court's judgment.
2.
Plaintiffs David Harris and Christine Bowser
are U.S. citizens registered to vote in CD 1 or
CD 12, respectively. Neither was a plaintiff
in the state-court litigation.
Plaintiffs brought this action on October 24,
2013, alleging, among other things, that
North Carolina used the VRA's section 5
preclearance requirements as a pretext to
pack African–American voters into North
Carolina's Congressional Districts 1 and 12
and reduce those voters' influence in other
districts.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
North Carolina's Congressional Districts 1
and 12, as drawn in the 2011 Congressional
Redistricting Plan, was a racial gerrymander
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also
sought to permanently enjoin the defendants
from giving effect to the boundaries of the
First and Twelfth Congressional Districts,

including barring the defendants from
conducting elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives based on the 2011-enacted
First and Twelfth Congressional Districts.
Because the Plaintiffs' action “challeng[ed]
the constitutionality of the apportionment of
congressional districts” in North Carolina,
the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit granted the Plaintiffs'
request for a hearing by a three-judge court
on October 18, 2013.
A three-day bench trial began on October 13,
2015. After the bench trial, this Court ordered
the parties to file posttrial briefs. The case is
now ripe for consideration.
II.
“[A] State may not, absent extraordinary
justification, ... separate its citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race.”
A voting district is an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander when a redistricting plan
“cannot be understood as anything other than
an effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race, and that the
separation lacks sufficient justification.”
In a racial gerrymander case, the “plaintiff's
burden is to show, either through
circumstantial evidence of a district's shape
and demographics or more direct evidence
going to legislative purpose, that race was the
predominant
factor
motivating
the
legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a
particular district.” “To make this showing, a
plaintiff must prove that the legislature
subordinated
traditional
race-neutral
districting principles, including but not
limited to compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions or
communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.” Public
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statements,
submissions,
and sworn
testimony by the individuals involved in the
redistricting process are not only relevant but
often highly probative.
Once plaintiffs establish race as the
predominant factor, the Court applies strict
scrutiny, and “the State must demonstrate
that its districting legislation is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” If
race did not predominate, then only rationalbasis review applies.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds
that the plaintiffs have presented dispositive
direct and circumstantial evidence that the
legislature assigned race a priority over all
other districting factors in both CD 1 and CD
12. There is strong evidence that race was the
only nonnegotiable criterion and that
traditional redistricting principles were
subordinated to race. In fact, the
overwhelming evidence in this case shows
that a BVAP-percentage floor, or a racial
quota, was established in both CD 1 and CD
12. And, that floor could not be
compromised. A congressional district
necessarily is crafted because of race when a
racial quota is the single filter through which
all line-drawing decisions are made, and
traditional redistricting principles are
considered, if at all, solely insofar as they did
not interfere with this quota. Accordingly, the
Court holds that “race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to
place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district.”
Because race predominated, the state must
demonstrate that its districting decision is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest. Even if the Court assumes that
compliance with the VRA is a compelling
state interest, attempts at such compliance
“cannot justify race-based districting where
the challenged district was not reasonably

necessary under a constitutional reading and
application” of federal law. Thus, narrow
tailoring requires that the legislature have a
“strong basis in evidence” for its race-based
decision, that is, “good reasons to believe”
that the chosen racial classification was
required to comply with the VRA. Evidence
of narrow tailoring in this case is practically
nonexistent; the state does not even proffer
any evidence with respect to CD 12. Based
on this record, as explained below, the Court
concludes that North Carolina's 2011
Congressional Redistricting Plan was not
narrowly tailored to achieve compliance with
the VRA, and therefore fails strict scrutiny.
A.
As with any law that distinguishes among
individuals on the basis of race, “equal
protection principles govern a State's
drawing of congressional districts.” “Racial
classifications with respect to voting carry
particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering,
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to
carry us further from the goal of a political
system in which race no longer matters ....”
As such, “race-based districting by our state
legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.”
To trigger strict scrutiny, the plaintiffs first
bear the burden of proving that race was not
only one of several factors that the legislature
considered in drawing CD 1 and CD 12, but
that race “predominated.” Under this
predominance test, a plaintiff must show that
“the legislature subordinated traditional raceneutral districting principles ... to racial
considerations.” When a legislature has
“relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting
principles,” such traditional principles have
been subordinated to race.
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When analyzing the legislative intent
underlying a redistricting decision, there is a
“presumption of good faith that must be
accorded legislative enactments.” This
presumption “requires courts to exercise
extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims
that a State has drawn district lines on the
basis of race.” Such restraint is particularly
warranted given the “complex interplay of
forces that enter a legislature's redistricting
calculus,” making redistricting possibly “the
most difficult task a legislative body ever
undertakes.” This presumption must yield,
however, when the evidence shows that
citizens have been assigned to legislative
districts primarily based on their race.
1.
CD 1 presents a textbook example of racial
predominance. There is an extraordinary
amount of direct evidence – legislative
records, public statements, instructions to Dr.
Hofeller, the “principal architect” of the 2011
Congressional Redistricting Plan, and
testimony – that shows a racial quota, or
floor, of 50-percent-plus-one-person was
established for CD 1. Because traditional
districting criteria were considered, if at all,
solely insofar as they did not interfere with
this 50-percent-plus-one-person minimum
floor, the quota operated as a filter through
which all line-drawing decisions had to pass.
As Dr. Hofeller stated, “[S]ometimes it
wasn't possible to adhere to some of the
traditional redistricting criteria in the creation
of [CD 1]” because “the more important thing
was to ... follow the instructions that I ha[d]
been given by the two chairmen [to draw the
district as majority-BVAP].” Indeed. The
Court therefore finds that race necessarily
predominates when, as here, “the legislature
has subordinated traditional districting
criteria to racial goals, such as when race is
the single immutable criterion and other

factors are considered only when consistent
with the racial objective.”
a.
The legislative record is replete with
statements indicating that race was the
legislature's paramount concern in drawing
CD 1. During legislative sessions, Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis made clear
that CD 1 “[w]as required by Section 2” of
the VRA to have a BVAP of at least 50
percent plus one person.
b.
The public statements released by Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis also reflect
their legislative goal, stating that, to comply
with section 2 of the VRA, CD 1 must be
established with a BVAP of 50 percent plus
one person. Further, in its preclearance
submission to the DOJ, North Carolina
makes clear that it purposefully set out to add
“a sufficient number of African-American
voters in order to” draw CD 1 “at a majority
African-American level.”
c.
In light of this singular legislative goal,
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis,
unsurprisingly, instructed Dr. Hofeller to
treat CD 1 as a “voting rights district,”
meaning that he was to draw CD 1 to exceed
50-percent BVAP.
The Court is sensitive to the fact that CD 1
was underpopulated; it is not in dispute that
CD 1 was underpopulated by 97,500 people
and that there were efforts to create districts
with approximately equal population. While
equal population objectives “may often prove
‘predominant’ in the ordinary sense of that
word,” the question of whether race
predominated over traditional raced-neutral
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redistricting principles is a “special” inquiry:
“It is not about whether a legislature believes
that the need for equal population takes
ultimate priority,” but rather whether the
legislature placed race above nonracial
considerations in determining which voters to
allocate to certain districts in order to achieve
an equal population goal.
To accomplish equal population, Dr. Hofeller
intentionally included high concentrations of
African-American voters in CD 1 and
excluded less heavily African-American
areas from the district. During crossexamination, Dr. Hofeller, in response to why
he moved into CD 1 a part of Durham County
that was “the heavily African-American part”
of the county, stated, “Well, it had to be.” Dr.
Hofeller, after all, had to “make sure that in
the end it all adds up correctly”—that is, that
the “net result” was a majority-BVAP
district.
Dr. Hofeller certainly “ma[de] sure that in the
end it add[ed] up correctly.” The BVAP
substantially increased from 47.76 percent,
the BVAP in CD 1 when the benchmark plan
was enacted, to 52.65 percent, the BVAP
under the 2011 Congressional Plan—an
increase of nearly five percentage points. Pls.'
Ex. 69 at 111. And, while Dr. Hofeller had
discretion, conceivably, to increase the
BVAP to as high as he wanted, he had no
discretion to go below 50-percent-plus-oneperson BVAP. This is the very definition of a
racial quota.
d.
The Supreme Court's skepticism of racial
quotas is longstanding. The Court, however,
has yet to decide whether use of a racial quota
in a legislative redistricting plan or, in
particular, use of such a quota exceeding 50
percent, establishes predominance as a matter
of law under Miller. The Court recently has

cautioned against “prioritizing mechanical
racial targets above all other districting
criteria” in redistricting. Although the Court
in Alabama did not decide whether the use of
a racial quota exceeding 50 percent, standing
alone, can establish predominance as a matter
of law, the Court made clear that such
“mechanical racial targets” are highly
suspicious.
There is “strong, perhaps overwhelming”
direct evidence in this case that the general
assembly “prioritize[ed] [a] mechanical
racial target[ ] above all other districting
criteria” in redistricting. In order to achieve
the goal of drawing CD 1 as a majorityBVAP district, Dr. Hofeller not only
subordinated
traditional
race-neutral
principles but disregarded certain principles
such as respect for political subdivisions and
compactness.
Dr. Hofeller testified that he would split
counties and precincts when necessary to
achieve a 50-percent-plus-one-person BVAP
in CD 1. Dr. Hofeller further testified that he
did not use mathematical measures of
compactness in drawing CD 1. Had he done
so, Dr. Hofeller would have seen that the
2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan
reduced the compactness of CD 1
significantly.
Apparently seeing the writing on the wall, the
defendants make the passing argument that
the legislature configured CD 1 to protect the
incumbent and for partisan advantage. The
defendants, however, proffer no evidence to
support such a contention. There is nothing in
the record that remotely suggests CD 1 was a
political gerrymander, or that CD 1 was
drawn based on political data. It cannot
seriously be disputed that the predominant
focus of virtually every statement made,
instruction given, and action taken in
connection with the redistricting effort was to
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draw CD 1 with a BVAP of 50 percent plus
one person to comply with the VRA.
e.
Even if the Court assumes, arguendo, that this
is a “mixed-motive suit”—in which a state's
conceded goal of “produc[ing] majorityminority districts” is accompanied by “other
goals, particularly incumbency protection”—
race can be the predominant factor in the
drawing of a district without the districting
revisions being “purely race-based.” Indeed,
the Supreme Court has observed that
“partisan politicking” may often play a role
in a state's redistricting process, but the fact
“[t]hat the legislature addressed these
interests [need] not in any way refute the fact
that race was the legislature's predominant
consideration.”
As the Supreme Court has explained,
traditional factors have been subordinated to
race when “[r]ace was the criterion that, in
the State's view, could not be compromised,”
and when traditional, race-neutral criteria
were considered “only after the race-based
decision had been made.” When a legislature
has “relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting
practices,” such traditional principles have
been subordinated to race. Here, the record is
unequivocally clear: the general assembly
relied on race – the only criterion that could
not be compromised – in substantial
disregard of traditional districting principles.
Moreover, because traditional districting
criteria were considered, if at all, solely
insofar as they did not interfere with this 50percent-plus-one-person minimum floor, the
quota operated as a filter through which all
line-drawing decisions had to pass. Such a
racial filter had a discriminatory effect on the
configuration of CD 1 because it rendered all
traditional criteria that otherwise would have

been “race-neutral” tainted by and
subordinated to race. For these reasons, the
Court holds that the plaintiffs have
established that race predominated in the
legislative drawing of CD 1, and the Court
will apply strict scrutiny in examining the
constitutionality of CD 1.
2.
CD 12 presents a slightly more complex
analysis than CD 1 as to whether race
predominated in redistricting. Defendants
contend that CD 12 is a purely political
district and that race was not a factor even
considered in redistricting. Nevertheless,
direct
evidence
indicating
racial
predominance combined with the traditional
redistricting factors' complete inability to
explain the composition of the new district
rebut this contention and leads the Court to
conclude that race did indeed predominate in
CD 12.
a.
While not as robust as in CD 1, there is
nevertheless direct evidence supporting the
conclusion that race was the predominant
factor in drawing CD 12. Public statements
released
by
Senator
Rucho
and
Representative Lewis reflect this legislative
goal. In their June 17, 2011, statement, for
example, Senator Rucho and Representative
Lewis provide,
In creating new majority African
American districts, we are obligated
to follow ... the decisions by the North
Carolina Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court ....
Under the[se] decisions, districts
created to comply with section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, must be
created with a “Black Voting Age
Population” (“BVAP”), as reported
by the Census, at the level of at least
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50% plus one. Thus, in constructing
VRA majority black districts, the
Chairs recommend that, where
possible, these districts be drawn at a
level equal to at least 50% plus one
“BVAP.”

instead, reading the text in its ordinary
meaning, the statement evinces a level of
intentionality in the decisions regarding race.
The Court will again decline to conclude that
it was purely coincidental that the district was
now majority BVAP after it was drawn.

This statement describes not only the new CD
1, as explained above, but clearly refers to
multiple districts that are now majority
minority. This is consistent with the changes
to the congressional map following
redistricting: the number of majority-BVAP
districts in the 2011 plan, compared to the
benchmark 2001 plan, increased from zero to
two, namely CD 1 and CD 12. The Court
cannot conclude that this statement was the
result of happenstance, a mere slip of the pen.
Instead, this statement supports the
contention that race predominated.

Following the ratification of the revised
redistricting plan, the North Carolina General
Assembly and attorney general submitted the
plan to the DOJ for preclearance under
section 5. The submission explains,

The public statement issued July 1, 2011,
further supports this objective. There,
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis
stated, “Because of the presence of Guilford
County in the Twelfth District [which is
covered by section 5 of the VRA], we have
drawn our proposed Twelfth District at a
black voting age level that is above the
percentage of black voting age population
found in the current Twelfth District.” As
explained, section 5 was intended to prevent
retrogression; to ensure that such result was
achieved, any change was to be precleared so
that it did “not have the purpose and [would]
not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color.”
Despite the fact that nothing in section 5
required the creation of a majority-minority
district in CD 12,5 this statement indicates
that it was the intention in redistricting to
create such a district—it was drawn at a
higher BVAP than the previous version. This
statement does not simply “show[ ] that the
legislature considered race, along with other
partisan and geographic considerations,”;

One of the concerns of the
Redistricting Chairs was that in 1992,
the Justice Department had objected
to the 1991 Congressional Plan
because of a failure by the state to
create a second majority minority
district combining the AfricanAmerican
community
in
Mecklenburg County with AfricanAmerican and Native American
voters residing in south central and
southeastern North Carolina.
The submission further explains that
Congressman Watt did not believe that
African-American voters in Mecklenburg
County were politically cohesive with Native
American voters in southeastern North
Carolina. The redistricting committee
accordingly drew the new CD 12 based on
these considerations, including DOJ's 1992
concern that a new majority-minority district
be created—a concern that the U.S. Supreme
Court handily rejected in Miller, when it
repudiated the maximization policy. The
discussion of CD 12 in the DOJ submission
concludes, “Thus, the 2011 version
maintains, and in fact increases, the AfricanAmerican community's ability to elect their
candidate of choice in District 12.” Given the
express concerns of the redistricting
committee, the Court will not ascribe the
result to mere coincidence and instead finds
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that the submission supports race
predominance in the creation of CD 12.
b.
In addition to the public statements issued,
Congressman Watt testified at trial that
Senator Rucho himself told Congressman
Watt that the goal was to increase the BVAP
in CD 12 to over 50 percent. Congressman
Watt testified that Senator Rucho said “his
leadership had told him that he had to ramp
up the minority percentage in [the Twelfth]
Congressional District up to over 50 percent
to comply with the Voting Rights Law.”
Congressman Watt sensed that Senator
Rucho seemed uncomfortable discussing the
subject “because his leadership had told him
that he was going to have to go out and justify
that [redistricting goal] to the AfricanAmerican community.”
Defendants argue that Senator Rucho never
made such statements to Congressman Watt,
citing Senator Rucho and Congresswoman
Ruth Samuelson's testimony in the Dickson
trial.
Nevertheless,
after
submitting
Congressman Watt to thorough and probing
cross-examination about the specifics of the
content and location of this conversation, the
defendants declined to call Senator Rucho or
Congresswoman Samuelson to testify,
despite both being listed as defense witnesses
and being present throughout the trial. The
Court is thus somewhat crippled in its ability
to assess either Senator Rucho or
Congresswoman's Samuelson's credibility as
to their claim that Senator Rucho never made
such statements. Based on its ability to
observe firsthand Congressman Watt and his
consistent recollection of the conversation
between him and Senator Rucho, the Court
credits his testimony and finds that Senator
Rucho did indeed explain to Congressman
Watt that the legislature's goal was to “ramp
up” CD 12's BVAP.

And, make no mistake, the BVAP in CD 12
was ramped up: the BVAP increased from
43.77 percent to 50.66 percent. This
correlates closely to the increase in CD 1.
Such a consistent and whopping increase
makes it clear that the general assembly's
predominant intent regarding district 12 was
also race.
c.
The shape of a district is also relevant to the
inquiry, as it “may be persuasive
circumstantial evidence that race for its own
sake, and not other districting principles, was
the legislature's dominant and controlling
rationale in drawing its district lines.” CD 12
is a “serpentine district [that] has been
dubbed the least geographically compact
district in the Nation.”
Under the benchmark 2001 plan, CD 12 had
a Reock score6 of .116, the lowest in the state
by far. Under the new plan, the Reock score
of CD 12 decreased to .071, remaining the
lowest in the state by a good margin. A score
of .071 is low by any measure. At trial, Dr.
Ansolabehere testified that a score of .2 “is
one of the thresholds that [is] commonly
use[d] ... one of the rules of thumb” to say
that a district is noncompact.
Defendants do not disagree. At trial, Dr.
Hofeller testified that in redrawing CD 12, he
made the district even less compact. And
importantly, Dr. Hofeller did not “apply the
mathematical measures of compactness to
see how the districts were holding up” as he
was drawing them. Nevertheless, Dr.
Hofeller opined that “District 12's
compactness was in line with former versions
of District 12 and in line with compactness as
one would understand it in the context of
North Carolina redistricting ....” While he did
not recall any specific instructions as to
compactness, he was generally “to make
plans as compact as possible with the goals
458

and policies of the entire plan,”—that is, as
the defendants claim, to make the state more
favorable to Republican interests, a
contention to which the Court now turns.
d.
Defendants claim that politics, not race, was
the driving factor behind the redistricting in
CD 12. The goal, as the defendants portray it,
was to make CD 12 an even more heavily
Democratic district and make the
surrounding counties better for Republican
interests. This goal would not only enable
Republican control but also insulate the plan
from challenges such as the instant one.
Dr. Hofeller testified to this singular aim time
and again at trial: “My instructions from the
two chairman [Senator Rucho and
Congressman Lewis] were to treat District 12
as a political district and to draw it using
political data and to draw it in such a manner
that it favorably adjusted all of the
surrounding districts.”
Dr. Hofeller testified that he complied with
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis's
instructions and did not look at race at all
when creating the new districts. Using
Maptitude, Dr. Hofeller provided, “On the
screen when I was drawing the map was the
Obama/McCain race shaded in accordance
with the two-party vote, which excluded the
minor party candidates, and that was the sole
thematic display or numeric display on the
screen except for one other thing, and that
was the population of the precinct because of
one person, one vote,” Hofeller testified that
it was only after the fact that he considered
race and what impact it may or may not have
had.
Despite the defendants' protestations, the
Court is not persuaded that the redistricting
was purely a politically driven affair. Parts of

Dr. Hofeller's own testimony belie his
assertions that he did not consider race until
everything was said and done. At trial, he
testified that he was “aware of the fact that
Guilford County was a Section 5 county” and
that he “was instructed [not] to use race in
any form except perhaps with regard to
Guilford County.” Dr. Hofeller also testified
in his deposition that race was a more active
consideration: “[I]n order to be cautious and
draw a plan that would pass muster under the
Voting Rights Act, it was decided to reunite
the black community in Guilford County into
the Twelfth.”
Moreover, Senator Rucho and Representative
Lewis themselves attempted to downplay the
“claim[ ] that [they] have engaged in extreme
political gerrymandering.” In their joint
statement published July 19, 2011, they
assert that these claims are “overblown and
inconsistent with the facts.” The press release
continues to explain how Democrats
maintain a majority advantage in three
districts and a plurality advantage in the ten
remaining districts. This publication serves to
discredit their assertions that their sole focus
was to create a stronger field for Republicans
statewide.
That politics not race was more of a post-hoc
rationalization than an initial aim is also
supported by a series of emails presented at
trial. Written by counsel for Senator Rucho
and Representative Lewis during the
redistricting, the first email, dated June 30,
2011, was sent to Senator Rucho,
Representative Lewis, Dr. Hofeller, and
others involved in the redistricting effort,
providing counsel's thoughts on a draft public
statement “by Rucho and Lewis in support of
proposed 2011 Congressional Plan.” “Here is
my best efforts to reflect what I have been
told about legislative intent for the
congressional plans. Please send me your
suggestions and I will circulate a revised
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version for final approval by [Senator Rucho]
and [Representative Lewis] as soon as
possible tomorrow morning,” counsel wrote.
In response, Brent Woodcox, redistricting
counsel for the general assembly, wrote, “I do
think the registration advantage is the best
aspect to focus on to emphasize
competitiveness. It provides the best
evidence of pure partisan comparison and
serves in my estimation as a strong legal
argument and easily comprehensible political
talking point.” Id. Unlike the email at issue in
Cromartie II, which did not discuss “the point
of the reference” to race, this language
intimates that the politics rationale on which
the defendants so heavily rely was more of an
afterthought than a clear objective.
This conclusion is further supported
circumstantially by the findings of the
Plaintiffs' experts, Drs. Peterson and
Ansolabehere. At trial, Dr. Peterson opined
that race “better accord[ed] with” the
boundary of CD 12 than did politics, based
on his “segment analysis.” This analysis
looked at three different measures of AfricanAmerican racial representation inside and
outside of the boundary of CD 12, and four
different measures of representations of
Democrats for a total of twelve segment
analyses. Four of the twelve studies
supported the political hypothesis; two
support both hypotheses equally; while six
support the race hypothesis—“and in each of
these six, the imbalance is more pronounced
than in any of the four studies favoring the
Political Hypothesis.”
Using different methods of analysis, Dr.
Ansolabehere similarly concluded that the
new districts had the effect of sorting along
racial lines and that the changes to CD 12
from the benchmark plan to the Rucho-Lewis
plan “can be only explained by race and not
party.”

Defendants argue that these findings are
based on a theory the Supreme Court has
rejected—that is, Dr. Ansolabehere used only
party registration in his analysis, and the
Supreme Court has found that election results
are better predictors of future voting
behavior. But Dr. Ansolabehere stated that he
understood the Supreme Court's finding and
explained why in this situation he believed
that using registration data was nonetheless
preferable: registration data was a good
indicator of voting data and it “allowed [him]
to get down to [a deeper] level of analysis.”
Moreover, Defendants themselves appear to
have considered registration data at some
point in the redistricting process: in their July
19, 2011, statement, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis consider the numbers
of registered Democrats, Republicans, and
unaffiliated voters across all districts.
While both
studies produce only
circumstantial support for the conclusion that
race predominated, the plaintiffs were not
limited to direct evidence and were entitled to
use “direct or circumstantial evidence, or a
combination of both.” The defendants'
argument that Dr. Peterson's analysis is “of
little to no use” to the Court, as he “did not
and could not conclude” that race
predominated, is unavailing in this regard.
The defendants contend that, to show that
race predominated, the plaintiffs must show
“alternative ways” in which “the legislature
could have achieved its legitimate political
objectives” that were more consistent with
traditional districting principles and that
resulted in a greater racial balance. The
Supreme Court, however, limited this
requirement to “a case such as [the one at
issue in Cromartie II],”—that is, a case in
which “[t]he evidence taken together ... [did]
not show that racial considerations
predominated,” id. Here, the evidence makes
abundantly clear that race, although generally
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highly correlative with politics, did indeed
predominate in the redistricting process: “the
legislature drew District 12's boundaries
because of race rather than because of
political
behavior.”
Redistricting
is
inherently a political process; there will
always be tangential references to politics in
any redistricting—that is, after all, the nature
of the beast. Where, like here, at the outset
district lines were admittedly drawn to reach
a racial quota, even as political concerns may
have been noted at the end of the process, no
“alternative” plans are required.
e.
In light of all of the evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, the Court finds that race
predominated in the redistricting of CD 12.
Traditional redistricting principles such as
compactness
and
contiguity
were
subordinated to this goal. Moreover, the
Court does not find credible the defendants'
purported rationale that politics was the
ultimate goal. To find that otherwise would
create a “magic words” test that would put an
end to these types of challenges. To accept
the defendants' explanation would “create[ ]
an incentive for legislators to stay “on script”
and avoid mentioning race on the record.”
The Court's conclusion finds support in light
of the defendants' stated goal with respect to
CD 1 to increase the BVAP of the district to
50 percent plus one person, the result of
which is consistent with the changes to CD
12.
B.
The fact that race predominated when the
legislature devised CD 1 an CD 12, however,
does not automatically render the districts
constitutionally infirm. Rather, if race
predominates, strict scrutiny applies, but the
districting plan can still pass constitutional
muster if narrowly tailored to serve a

compelling governmental interest. While
such scrutiny is not necessarily “strict in
theory, but fatal in fact,” the state must
establish the “most exact connection between
justification and classification.”
The Court's strict-scrutiny analysis for CD 12
is
straightforward.
The
defendants
completely fail to provide this Court with a
compelling state interest for the general
assembly's use of race in drawing CD 12.
Accordingly, because the defendants bear the
burden of proof to show that CD 12 was
narrowly tailored to further a compelling
interest, and the defendants failed to carry
that burden, the Court concludes that CD 12
is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The defendants do, however, point to two
compelling interests for CD 1: the interest in
avoiding liability under the “results” test of
VRA section 2(b) and the “nonretrogression”
principle of VRA section 5. Although the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
VRA compliance is a compelling state
interest, it has assumed as much for the
purposes of subsequent analyses. The Court,
therefore, will assume, arguendo, that
compliance with the VRA is a compelling
state interest. Even with the benefit of that
assumption, the 2011 Congressional
Redistricting Plan does not survive strict
scrutiny because the defendants did not have
a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding
that creation of a majority-minority district—
CD 1—was reasonably necessary to comply
with the VRA. Accordingly, the Court holds
that CD 1 was not narrowly tailored to
achieve compliance with the VRA, and
therefore fails strict scrutiny.
1.
a.
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“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives.” Section 2 of the VRA
forbids state and local voting procedures that
“result[ ] in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race[.]” “Vote dilution
claims involve challenges to methods of
electing representatives—like redistricting or
at-large districts—as having the effect of
diminishing minorities' voting strength.”
The question of voting discrimination vel
non, including vote dilution, is determined by
the totality of the circumstances. Under
Gingles, however, the Court does not reach
the totality-of-the-circumstances test unless
the challenging party is able to establish three
preconditions.
Unlike cases such as Gingles, in which
minority groups use section 2 as a sword to
challenge districting legislation, here the
Court is considering the general assembly's
use of section 2 as a shield. The general
assembly, therefore, must have a “strong
basis in evidence” for finding that the
threshold conditions for section 2 liability are
present: “first, ‘that [the minority group] is
sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single
member district’; second, ‘that [the minority
group] is politically cohesive’; and third,
‘that the white majority votes sufficiently as
a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.’ ” A failure to
establish any one of the Gingles factors is
fatal to the defendants' claim. For the reasons
stated below, the Court finds that the
defendants fail to show the third Gingles
factor, that the legislature had a “strong basis
in evidence” of racially polarized voting in

CD 1 significant enough that the white
majority routinely votes as a bloc to defeat
the minority candidate of choice.
b.
“[R]acial bloc voting ... never can be
assumed, but specifically must be proved.”
Generalized
assumptions
about
the
“prevalence of racial bloc voting” do not
qualify as a “strong basis in evidence.”
Moreover, the analysis must be specific to
CD 1. Thus, evidence that racially polarized
voting occurs in pockets of other
congressional districts in North Carolina does
not suffice. The rationale behind this
principle is clear: simply because “a
legislature has strong basis in evidence for
concluding that a § 2 violation exists
[somewhere] in the State” does not permit it
to “draw a majority-minority district
anywhere [in the state].”
Strikingly, there is no evidence that the
general assembly conducted or considered
any sort of a particularized polarized-voting
analysis during the 2011 redistricting process
for CD 1. Dr. Hofeller testified that he did not
do a polarized voting analysis for CD 1 at the
time he prepared the map. Further, there is no
evidence “ ‘that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.’ ”
In fact, based on the defendants' own
admission, “African American voters have
been able to elect their candidates of choice
in the First District since the district was
established in 1992.” This admission, in the
Court's view, ends the inquiry. In the interest
of completeness, the Court will comment on
an argument the defendants' counsel made at
trial and in their posttrial brief.
The defendants contend that there is some
evidence that the general assembly
considered “two expert reports” that “found
the existence of racially polarized voting in”
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North Carolina. These generalized reports,
standing alone, do not constitute a “strong
basis in evidence” that the white majority
votes as a bloc to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate of choice in CD 1.
Moreover, it is not enough for the general
assembly to simply nod to the desired
conclusion by claiming racially polarized
voting showed that African-Americans
needed the ability to elect candidates of their
choice without asserting the existence of a
necessary premise: that the white majority
was actually voting as a bloc to defeat the
minority's preferred candidates. “Unless
[this] point[ ] [is] established, there neither
has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.”
Contrary to the defendants' unfounded
contentions, the composition and election
results under earlier versions of CD 1 vividly
demonstrate that, though not previously a
majority-BVAP district, the white majority
did not vote as a bloc to defeat AfricanAmericans' candidate of choice. In fact,
precisely the opposite occurred in these two
districts: significant crossover voting by
white voters supported the African-American
candidate. The suggestion that the VRA
would somehow require racial balkanization
where, as here, citizens have not voted as
racial blocs, where crossover voting has
naturally occurred, and where a majorityminority district is created in blatant
disregard for fundamental redistricting
principles is absurd and stands the VRA on
its head. As the defendants fail to meet the
third Gingles factor, the Court concludes that
section 2 did not require the defendants to
create a majority-minority district in CD 1.
2.
Turning to consider the defendants' section 5
defense, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
struck down redistricting plans that were not
narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding “ ‘a

retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.’ ” Indeed,
“the [VRA] and our case law make clear that
a reapportionment plan that satisfies § 5 still
may be enjoined as unconstitutional,” as
section 5 does not “give covered jurisdictions
carte blanche to engage in racial
gerrymandering
in
the
name
of
nonretrogression.” “A reapportionment plan
would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of
avoiding retrogression if the State went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to
avoid retrogression.” Id. Applying that
principle below, it is clear that CD 1 is not
narrowly tailored to the avoidance of section
5 liability.
a.
In Alabama, the Supreme Court made clear
that section 5 “does not require a covered
jurisdiction to maintain a particular
numerical minority percentage.” Rather,
section 5 requires legislatures to ask the
following question: “To what extent must we
preserve existing minority percentages in
order to maintain the minority's present
ability to elect its candidate of choice?” There
is no evidence that the general assembly
asked this question. Instead, the general
assembly directed Dr. Hofeller to create CD
1 as a majority-BVAP district; there was no
consideration of why the general assembly
should create such a district.
While the Court “do[es] not insist that a
legislature guess precisely what percentage
reduction a court or the Justice Department
might eventually find to be retrogressive,”
the legislature must have a “strong basis in
evidence” for its use of racial classifications.
Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that it
would be inappropriate for a legislature to
“rel[y] heavily upon a mechanically
numerical view as to what counts as
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forbidden retrogression.” That is precisely
what occurred here: the general assembly
established a mechanical BVAP target for
CD 1 of 50 percent plus one person, as
opposed to conducting a more sophisticated
analysis of racial voting patterns in CD 1 to
determine to what extent it must preserve
existing minority percentages to maintain the
minority's present ability to elect its
candidate of choice.
b.
Although CD 1 has been an extraordinarily
safe district for African-American preferred
candidates of choice for over twenty years,
the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan
increased CD 1's BVAP from 47.76 percent
to 52.65 percent. Despite the fact that
African-Americans did not make up a
majority of the voting-age population in CD
1, African-American preferred candidates
easily and repeatedly won reelection under
earlier congressional plans, including the
2001 benchmark plan. Representative Eva
Clayton prevailed in CD 1 in 1998 and 2000,
for instance, winning 62 percent and 66
percent of the vote, respectively. Indeed,
African-American preferred candidates
prevailed with remarkable consistency,
winning at least 59 percent of the vote under
each of the five general elections under the
benchmark version of CD 1. In 2010,
Congressman Butterfield won 59 percent of
the vote, while in 2012 – under the
redistricting plan at issue here – he won by an
even larger margin, receiving 75 percent of
the vote.
In this respect, the legislature's decision to
increase the BVAP of CD 1 is similar to the
redistricting plan invalidated by the Supreme
Court in Bush. In Bush, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that increasing the
BVAP from 35.1 percent to 50.9 percent was
not narrowly tailored because the state's

interest in avoiding retrogression in a district
where African–American voters had
successfully elected their representatives of
choice for two decades did not justify
“substantial augmentation” of the BVAP.
Such an augmentation could not be narrowly
tailored to the goal of complying with section
5 because there was “no basis for concluding
that the increase to a 50.9% African–
American population ... was necessary to
ensure nonretrogression.” “Nonretrogression
is not a license for the State to do whatever it
deems necessary to ensure continued
electoral success; it merely mandates that the
minority's
opportunity
to
elect
representatives of its choice not be
diminished, directly or indirectly, by the
State's actions.” While the BVAP increase
here is smaller than that in Bush, the principle
is the same. Defendants show no basis for
concluding that an augmentation of CD 1's
BVAP to 52.65 percent was narrowly tailored
when the district had been a safe district for
African-American preferred candidates of
choice for over two decades.
In sum, the legislators had no basis—let
alone a strong basis—to believe that an
inflexible racial floor of 50 percent plus one
person was necessary in CD 1. This quota
was used to assign voters to CD 1 based on
the color of their skin. “Racial classifications
of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too
many for too much of our history, that
individuals should be judged by the color of
their skin.”
For these reasons, the Court finds that CD 1
cannot survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly,
the Court is compelled to hold that CD 1
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
III.
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Having found that the 2011 Congressional
Redistricting Plan violates the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court now addresses
the appropriate remedy. Plaintiffs have
requested that we “determine and order a
valid plan for new congressional districts.”
Nevertheless, the Court is conscious of the
powerful concerns for comity involved in
interfering with the state's legislative
responsibilities. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized, “redistricting and
reapportioning legislative bodies is a
legislative task which the federal courts
should make every effort not to pre-empt.”
As such, it is “appropriate, whenever
practicable, to afford a reasonable
opportunity for the legislature to meet
constitutional requirements by adopting a
substitute measure rather than for the federal
court to devise ... its own plan.” Under North
Carolina law, courts must give legislatures at
least two weeks to remedy defects identified
in a redistricting plan.
The Court also recognizes that individuals in
CD 1 and CD 12 whose constitutional rights
have been injured by improper racial
gerrymandering have suffered significant
harm. “Those citizens ‘are entitled to vote as
soon as possible for their representatives
under a constitutional apportionment plan.’ ”
Therefore, the Court will require that new
districts be drawn within two weeks of the
entry of this opinion to remedy the
unconstitutional districts. In accordance with
well-established precedent that a state should
have the first opportunity to create a
constitutional redistricting plan, the Court
allows the legislature until February 19,
2016, to enact a remedial districting plan.
IV.
Because the plaintiffs have shown that race
predominated in CD 1 and CD 12 of North
Carolina's 2011 Congressional Redistricting

Plan, and because the defendants have failed
to establish that this race-based redistricting
satisfies strict scrutiny, the Court finds that
the 2011 Congressional Redistricting Plan is
unconstitutional, and will require the North
Carolina General Assembly to draw a new
congressional district plan. A final judgment
accompanies this opinion.
SO ORDERED.
…
COGBURN, District Judge, concurring:
I fully concur with Judge Gregory's majority
opinion. Since the issue before the court was
created by gerrymandering, and based on the
evidence received at trial, I write only to
express my concerns about how unfettered
gerrymandering is negatively impacting our
republican form of government.
Voters should choose their representatives.
This is the “core principle of republican
government.” To that end, the operative
clause of Article I, § 4 of the United States
Constitution, the Elections Clause, gives to
the states the power of determining how
congressional representatives are chosen:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections
for
Senators
and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the places of chusing Senators.
As
redistricting
through
political
gerrymander rather than reliance on natural
boundaries and communities has become the
tool of choice for state legislatures in drawing
congressional boundaries, the fundamental
principle of the voters choosing their
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representative has nearly vanished. Instead,
representatives choose their voters.
Indeed, we heard compelling testimony from
Congressman G. K. Butterfield (CD 1) and
former Congressman Mel Watt (CD 12) that
the configuration of CD 1 and CD 12 made it
nearly impossible for them to travel to all the
communities comprising their districts. Not
only has political gerrymandering interfered
with voters selecting their representatives, it
has interfered with the representatives
meeting with those voters. In at least one
state, Arizona, legislative overuse of political
gerrymandering in redistricting has caused
the people to take congressional redistricting
away from the legislature and place such
power in an independent congressional
redistricting commission, an action that
recently passed constitutional muster.
Redistricting
through
political
gerrymandering is nothing new. Starting in
the year the Constitution was ratified, 1788,
state legislatures have used the authority
under the Elections Clause to redraw
congressional boundaries in a manner that
favored the majority party. For example, in
1788, Patrick Henry persuaded the Virginia
legislature to remake its Fifth Congressional
District to force Henry's political foe James
Madison to run against James Monroe.
Madison won in spite of this, but the game
playing had begun. In 1812, Governor
Elbridge Gerry signed a bill redistricting
Massachusetts to benefit his party with one
district so contorted that it was said to
resemble a salamander, forever giving such
type of redistricting the name gerrymander.
Thus, for more than 200 years,
gerrymandering has been the default in
congressional redistricting.
Elections should be decided through a contest
of issues, not skillful mapmaking. Today,
modern computer mapping allows for

gerrymandering on steroids as political
mapmakers can easily identify individual
registrations on a house-by-house basis,
mapping their way to victory. As was seen in
Arizona State Legislature, supra, however,
gerrymandering may well have an expiration
date as the Supreme Court has found that the
term “legislature” in the Elections Clause is
broad enough to include independent
congressional redistricting commissions.
To be certain, gerrymandering is not
employed by just one of the major political
parties. Historically, the North Carolina
Legislature has been dominated by
Democrats who wielded the gerrymander
exceptionally well. Indeed, CD 12 runs its
circuitous route from Charlotte to
Greensboro and beyond—thanks in great part
to a state legislature then controlled by
Democrats. It is a district so contorted and
contrived that the United States Courthouse
in Charlotte, where this concurrence was
written, is five blocks within its boundary,
and the United States Courthouse in
Greensboro, where the trial was held, is five
blocks outside the same district, despite being
more than 90 miles apart and located in
separate federal judicial districts. How a
voter can know who their representative is or
how a representative can meet with those
pocketed voters is beyond comprehension.
While redistricting to protect the party that
controls
the
state
legislature
is
constitutionally permitted and lawful, it is in
disharmony with fundamental values upon
which this country was founded. “[T]he true
principle of a republic is, that the people
should choose whom they please to govern
them.” Beyond taking offense at the affront
to democracy caused by gerrymandering,
courts will not, however, interfere with
gerrymandering that is philosophically rather
than legally wrong. As has been seen in
Arizona, it is left to the people of the state to
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decide whether they wish to select their
representatives or have their representatives
select them.
…
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority in finding that
Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving
that race predominated in the drawing of
North Carolina's First Congressional District
(“CD 1”) and that Defendants have failed to
show that the legislature's use of race in the
drawing of that district was narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest.
I also concur with the majority with respect
to North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional
District (“CD 12”) in that, if race was a
predominant factor, Defendants did not meet
their burden to prove that CD 12 was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. However, I respectfully dissent from
the majority in that I find that Plaintiffs have
not met their burden of proving that race
predominated in the drawing of CD 12. As a
result, I conclude that the district is subject to
and passes the rational basis test and is
constitutional. I differ with the well-reasoned
opinion of my colleagues only as to the
degree to which race was a factor in the
drawing of CD 12.
I. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT I
With respect to my concurring opinion, I only
add that I do not find, as Plaintiffs have
contended, that this legislative effort
constitutes a “flagrant” violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority
opinion makes clear that bad faith is not
necessary in order to find a violation.
Although Plaintiffs argued that the actions of
the legislature stand in “flagrant” violation of
Fourteenth Amendment principles, Plaintiffs

also conceded at trial they did not seek to
prove any ill-intent. Nevertheless, I wish to
emphasize that the evidence does not suggest
a flagrant violation. Instead, the legislature's
redistricting efforts reflect the difficult
exercise in judgment necessary to comply
with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”) in 2010, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder.
Shelby struck down as unconstitutional the
formula created under section 4 of the VRA
and, resultingly, removed those covered
jurisdictions from section 5.
In Shelby, the Supreme Court recognized the
success of the VRA. However, the Court also
described its concern with an outdated
section 4 formula and the restrictions of
section 5:
Yet the Act has not eased the
restrictions in § 5 or narrowed the
scope of the coverage formula in §
4(b) along the way. Those
extraordinary and unprecedented
features were reauthorized—as if
nothing had changed. In fact, the
Act's unusual remedies have grown
even stronger. When Congress
reauthorized the Act in 2006, it did so
for another 25 years on top of the
previous 40—a far cry from the initial
five-year period. Congress also
expanded the prohibitions in § 5. We
had previously interpreted § 5 to
prohibit only those redistricting plans
that would have the purpose or effect
of worsening the position of minority
groups. In 2006, Congress amended §
5 to prohibit laws that could have
favored such groups but did not do so
because of a discriminatory purpose,
even though we had stated that such
broadening of § 5 coverage would
“exacerbate the substantial federalism
costs that the preclearance procedure
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already exacts, perhaps to the extent
of raising concerns about § 5's
constitutionality.”
In
addition,
Congress expanded § 5 to prohibit
any voting law “that has the purpose
of or will have the effect of
diminishing the ability of any citizens
of the United States,” on account of
race, color, or language minority
status, “to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.” In light of
those two amendments, the bar that
covered jurisdictions must clear has
been raised even as the conditions
justifying that requirement have
dramatically improved.
Although no court has held that compliance
with section 5 is a compelling state interest,
the Supreme Court has generally assumed
without deciding that is the case. Compliance
with section 5 was, in my opinion, at least a
substantial concern to the North Carolina
legislature in 2011, a concern made difficult
by the fact that, at least by 2013 and likely by
2010, coverage was “based on decades-old
data and eradicated practices” yet had
expanded prohibitions.
As a result, while I agree with my colleagues
that CD 1, as drawn, violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, I do not find that violation to be
flagrant, as argued by Plaintiffs. Instead, I
simply find the violation as to CD 1 to be the
result of an ultimately failed attempt at the
very
difficult
task
of
achieving
constitutionally compliant redistricting while
at the same time complying with section 5
and receiving preclearance from the
Department of Justice. In drawing legislative
districts, the Department of Justice and other
legislatures have historically made similar
mistakes in their attempts to apply the VRA.
Further, the difficult exercise of judgment
involved in the legislature's efforts to draw
these districts is reflected in the differing

conclusions reached by this court and the
North Carolina Supreme Court. Contrary to
Plaintiffs' suggestion, I find nothing flagrant
or nefarious as to the legislature's efforts
here, even though I agree that CD 1 was
improperly drawn using race as a
predominant factor without sufficient
justification.
II. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 12
Turning to my dissent regarding whether
Plaintiffs have carried their burden of
showing that race was the dominant and
controlling consideration in drawing CD 12,
a brief history of redistricting efforts in the
state will provide helpful context to the
current situation. In 1991, North Carolina
enacted a Congressional Districting Plan with
a single majority-black district—the 1991
version of CD 1. The 1991 version of CD 1
was a majority single-race-black district in
both total population and voting age
population (“VAP”). The State filed for
preclearance from the Department of Justice
for the 1991 plan under section 5 of the VRA,
and there was no objection to the 1991
version of CD 1 specifically. There was,
however, a preclearance objection to the
1991 Congressional Plan overall because of
the State's failure to create a second majorityminority district running from the
southcentral to southeastern region of the
State.
As a result of this objection, the General
Assembly drew a new Congressional Plan in
1992. The 1992 plan included a different
version of CD 1 that was majority minority
but did not include any portion of Durham
County. The General Assembly also created
a second majority-minority district (CD 12)
that stretched from Mecklenburg County to
Forsyth and Guilford Counties and then all
the way into Durham County. The Attorney
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General did not interpose an objection to the
1992 Congressional Plan.

race, was the predominant motive for the
district.

Under the 1992 Congressional Plan, CD 12
was drawn with a single-race total black
population of 56.63% and a single-race black
VAP (“BVAP”) of 53.34%. Under a
mathematical test for measuring the
compactness of districts called the “Reock”
test (also known as the dispersion test), the
1992 CD 12 had a compactness score of 0.05.

In 2001, the North Carolina General
Assembly enacted the Congress Zero
Deviation Plan for redistricting based upon
the 2000 Census.

The 1992 districts were subsequently
challenged under the VRA, and in Shaw I, the
Supreme Court found that the 1992 versions
of CD 1 and 12 were racial gerrymanders in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
case was remanded for further proceedings.
On appeal again after remand, in Shaw II, the
Supreme Court again found that the 1992
version of CD 12 constituted a racial
gerrymander.
Following the decision in Shaw II, in 1997
the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted new versions of CD 1 and CD 12.
The 1997 version of CD 12 was drawn with a
black total population of 46.67% and a black
VAP of 43.36%.
The plan was yet again challenged in court,
and in Cromartie v. Hunt, a three-judge panel
held on summary judgment that the 1997
version of CD 12 also constituted a racial
gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, although the decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal.
On remand, the district court again found the
1997 version of CD 12 to be an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Cromartie v. Hunt, a ruling that the State
again appealed. The Supreme Court reversed
the district court, finding that politics, not

Under the 2000 Census, the 2001 version of
CD 12 was drawn with a single-race black
total population of 45.02% and an any-part
black total population of 45.75%. Single-race
black VAP was 42.31% and any-part black
VAP was 42.81%.
In every election held in CD 12 between 1992
and 2010, without exception, the AfricanAmerican candidate of choice, Congressman
Mel Watt, prevailed with no less than 55.95%
of the vote, regardless of whether the black
VAP in CD 12 exceeded 50%, and regardless
of any other characteristic of any specific
election, demonstrating clearly that AfricanAmericans did not require a majority of the
VAP to elect their chosen candidate.
A. The 2011 Redistricting Process
Following the 2010 Census, Senator Robert
Rucho and Representative David Lewis were
appointed chairs of the Senate and House
Redistricting Committees, respectively, on
January 27, 2011, and February 15, 2011.
Jointly, Senator Rucho and Representative
Lewis were responsible for developing a
proposed congressional map based upon the
2010 Census. Under the 2010 Census, the
2001 version of CD 12 was overpopulated by
2,847 people, or 0.39%.
They hired Dr. Thomas Hofeller to be the
architect of the 2011 plan, and he began
working under the direction of Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis in
December 2010.2 Senator Rucho and
469

Representative Lewis were the sole source of
instructions for Dr. Hofeller regarding the
criteria for the design and construction of the
2011 congressional maps.
Throughout June and July of 2011, Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis released a
series of public statements describing, among
other things, the criteria that they had used to
draw the proposed congressional plan. As
Senator Rucho explained at the July 21, 2011
joint meeting of the Senate and House
Redistricting Committees, those public
statements “clearly delineated” the “entire
criteria” that were established and “what
areas [they] were looking at that were going
to be in compliance with what the Justice
Department expected [them] to do as part of
[their] submission.”
B. The Factors Used to Draw CD 123
On July 1, 2011, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis made public the first
version of their proposed congressional plan,
Rucho-Lewis Congress 1, along with a
statement explaining the rationale for the
map. Specifically with regard to CD 12,
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis
noted that although the 2001 benchmark
version of CD 12 was “not a Section 2
majority black district,” there “is one county
in the Twelfth District that is covered by
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
(Guilford).” Therefore, “[b]ecause of the
presence of Guilford County in CD 12, we
have drawn our proposed Twelfth District at
a black voting age level that is above the
percentage of black voting age population
found in the current Twelfth District.”
Although the proposed map went through
several iterations, CD 12 remained largely
unchanged from Rucho-Lewis 1 throughout
the redistricting process.

It is clear from both this statement and the
record that race was, at the very least, one
consideration in how CD 12 was drawn.
These instructions apparently came, at least
in part, from concerns about obtaining
preclearance from the DOJ. Testimony was
elicited at trial that Dr. Hofeller was in fact
told to consider placing the AfricanAmerican population of Guilford County into
CD 12 because Guilford County was a
covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the
VRA.
That race was at least present as a concern in
the General Assembly's mind is further
confirmed when looking to the General
Assembly's 2011 preclearance submission to
the Department of Justice. There it explained
that it drew “District 12 as an AfricanAmerican and very strong Democratic
district that has continually elected a
Democratic African American since 1992,”
and also noted that CD 12 had been drawn to
protect “African-American voters in Guilford
and Forsyth.”
The DOJ preclearance submission also
explained that the General Assembly had
drawn CD 12 in such a way to mitigate
concerns over the fact that “in 1992 the
Justice Department had objected to the 1991
Congressional Plan because of a failure by
the State to create a second majority-minority
district combining the African-American
community in Mecklenburg County with
African American and Native American
voters residing in south central and
southeastern
North
Carolina.”
The
preclearance submission further stated that
“the 2011 version [of CD 12] maintains and
in fact increases the African American
community's ability to elect their candidate of
choice.” I note that I interpret this statement
slightly differently from the majority. I
conclude that this statement describes one
result of how the new district was drawn,
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rather than the weight a particular factor was
given in how to draw the district in the first
place. Essentially, I would find this statement
is an explanation by legislature that because
they chose to add Guilford County back into
CD 12, the district ended up with an
increased ability to elect African-American
candidates, rather than the legislature
explaining that they chose to add Guilford
County back into CD 12 because of the
results that addition created.
However, while it is clear that race was a
concern, it is also clear that race was not the
only concern with CD 12. In their July 19,
2011 Joint Statement, Senator Rucho and
Representative Lewis stated that the version
of CD 12 in Rucho-Lewis Congress 2, the
second map that they put forward, was based
upon the 1997 and 2001 versions of that
district and that the 2011 version was again
drawn by the legislative leaders based upon
political considerations. According to them,
CD 12 was drawn to maintain that district as
a “very strong Democratic district ... based
upon whole precincts that voted heavily for
President Obama in the 2008 General
Election.” The co-chairs stated that by
making CD 12 a very strong Democratic
district, adjoining districts would be more
competitive for Republicans.
Further, Dr. Hofeller testified that he
constructed the 2011 version of CD 12 based
upon whole Voting Tabulation Districts
(“VTDs”) in which President Obama
received the highest vote totals during the
2008 Presidential Election, indicating that
political lean was a primary factor. The only
information on the computer screen used by
Dr. Hofeller in selecting VTDs for inclusion
in the CD 12 was the percentage by which
President Obama won or lost a particular
VTD. Dr. Hofeller has also stated that there
was no racial data on the screen when he
constructed the district, providing some

support for the conclusion that racial
concerns did not predominate over politics.
Although Plaintiffs argue that the primary
difference between the 2001 and 2011
versions of CD 12 is the increase in black
VAP, allegedly due to the predominance of
race as a factor, Defendants contend that by
increasing the number of Democratic voters
in the 2011 version of CD 12 located in
Mecklenburg and Guilford Counties, the
2011 Congressional Plan created districts that
were more competitive for Republican
candidates as compared to the 2001 versions
of these districts, including Congressional
Districts 6, 8, 9, and 13, a stated goal of the
redistricting chairs. Defendants argue that the
principal differences between the 2001 and
2011 versions of CD 12 are that the 2011
version: (1) adds more strong Democratic
voters located in Mecklenburg and Guilford
Counties; (2) adds more Democratic voters to
the 2011 version of CD 5 because it was able
to accept additional Democrats while
remaining a strong Republican district; (3)
removes Democratic voters from the 2011
CD 6 in Guilford County and places them in
the 2001 CD 12; and (4) removes Republican
voters who had formerly been assigned to the
2001 CD 12 from the corridor counties of
Cabarrus, Rowan, Davidson and other
locations.
Defendants also contend, or at least intimate,
that the final black VAP of the 2011 version
of CD 12 resulted in part from the high
percentage of African-Americans who vote
strongly Democrat. They note that, both in
previous versions of CD 12 and in alternative
proposals that were before the General
Assembly in 2010, African-Americans
constituted a super-majority of registered
Democrats in the district, citing the 2001
Twelfth Congressional Plan (71.44%); the
Southern Coalition for Social Justice Twelfth
Congressional Plan (71.53%); and the “Fair
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and Legal” Twelfth Congressional Plan
(69.14%). Defendants are apparently making
the same argument the State has made several
times previously: the percentage of AfricanAmericans added to the district is
coincidental and the result of moving
Democrats who happen to be AfricanAmerican into the district.
C. Racial Concerns did not Predominate
Equal protection principles deriving from the
Fourteenth Amendment govern a state's
drawing of electoral districts. The use of race
in drawing a district is a concern because
“[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial
purposes, may balkanize us into competing
racial factions; it threatens to carry us further
from the goal of a political system in which
race no longer matters.” To prove a claim of
racial gerrymandering, Plaintiffs first have
the burden to prove that race was the
predominant factor in the drawing of the
allegedly
gerrymandered
districts.
Predominance can be shown by proving that
a district “is so extremely irregular on its face
that it rationally can be viewed only as an
effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting, without regard for traditional
districting principles,” (i.e., proving
predominance circumstantially), or by
proving that “race for its own sake, and not
other districting principles, was the
legislature's dominant and controlling
rationale in drawing its district lines. ... [and]
that the legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles ... to racial
considerations.”
Plaintiffs can meet this burden through direct
evidence of legislative purpose, showing that
race was the predominant factor in the
decision on how to draw a district. Such
evidence can include statements by
legislative officials involved in drawing the
redistricting
plan
and
preclearance

submissions submitted by the state to the
Department of Justice. Plaintiffs can also
meet this burden through circumstantial
evidence such as the district's shape,
compactness, or demographic statistics.
Circumstantial evidence can show that
traditional redistricting criteria were
subordinated and that a challenged district is
unexplainable on grounds other than race.
Plaintiffs do not need to show that race was
the only factor that the legislature considered,
just that it predominated over other factors.
If race is established as the predominant
motive for CD 12, then the district will be
subject to strict scrutiny, necessitating an
inquiry into whether the use of race to draw
the district was narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest. The Supreme Court
has assumed without deciding that
compliance with sections 2 and 5 of the VRA
is a compelling state interest. Defendants in
this case contend that, if the court finds that
either district was drawn predominantly
based on race, their maps are narrowly
tailored to avoid liability under these sections
in satisfaction of strict scrutiny.
Just as with CD 1, the first hurdle Plaintiffs
must overcome is to show that racial
concerns predominated over traditional
criteria in the drawing of CD 12. As stated
above, it is in this finding that I dissent from
the majority.
Most importantly, as compared to CD 1, I
find that Plaintiffs have put forth less, and
weaker, direct evidence showing that race
was the primary motivating factor in the
creation of CD 12, and none that shows that
it predominated over other factors. Plaintiffs
first point to several public statements that
they argue demonstrate the State's intent to
draw CD 12 at a majority black level and
argue that this stated goal demonstrates that
race predominated. However, I find that the
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statements issued by the redistricting chairs
show only a “consciousness” of race, rather
than a predominance, and by themselves do
not show an improperly predominant racial
motive.
First, Plaintiffs cite to the July 1, 2011 press
release where the redistricting chairs
explained that:
Because of the presence of Guilford
County [a section 5 jurisdiction under
the VRA] in the Twelfth District, we
have drawn our proposed Twelfth
District at a black voting age level
that is above the percentage of black
voting age population found in the
current Twelfth District. We believe
this measure will ensure preclearance
of the plan.
This statement seems similar to, and perhaps
slightly more persuasive than, the statements
that the Supreme Court found unpersuasive
in Cromartie II. In Cromartie II, the Supreme
Court considered a statement by the
mapmaker that he had “moved [the]
Greensboro Black Community into the 12th,
and now need to take about 60,000 out of the
12th.” The Court in that case noted that while
the statement did reference race, it did not
discuss the political consequences or
motivation for placing the population of
Guilford County in the 12th district. Here,
while the statement by the co-chairs does
reference political consequences (ensuring
preclearance), it still does not rise to the level
of evidence that the Supreme Court has found
significant in other redistricting cases. While
this statement, like the statement in
Cromartie II, provides some support for
Plaintiffs' contention, it does not rise to the
level of showing predominance. It does not
indicate that other concerns were
subordinated to this goal, merely, that it was
a factor.

The co-chairs' later statement that this result
would help to ensure preclearance under the
VRA similarly falls short of explaining that
such actions were taken in order to ensure
preclearance, or that a majority BVAP (or
even an increase in BVAP) was a nonnegotiable requirement. In fact, the co-chairs
explicitly state in the same release that CD 12
was created with “the intention of making it
a very strong Democratic district” and that
that it was not a majority black district that
was required by section two (insinuating that
it became so as a result of the addition of
Guilford County, rather than Guilford being
added in order to achieve that goal), belying
that there was any mechanical racial
threshold of the sort that would lend itself to
a finding of predominance.
Further, regarding the placement of Guilford
County into CD 12, Dr. Hofeller testified as
follows:
My instructions in drawing the 12th
District were to draw it as it were a
political district, as a whole. We were
aware of the fact that Guilford County
was a Section 5 county. We were also
aware of the fact that the black
community in Greensboro had been
fractured by the Democrats in the
2001 map to add Democratic
strengths to two Democratic districts.
During the process, it was my
understanding that we had had a
comment made that we might have a
liability for fracturing the AfricanAmerican community in Guilford
County between a Democratic district
and a Republican district. When the
plan was drawn, I knew where the old
97th, 12th District had been drawn,
and I used that as a guide because one
of the things we needed to do
politically was to reconstruct
generally the 97th district; and when
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we checked it, we found out that we
did not have an issue in Guilford
County with fracturing the black
community.
Dr. Hofeller's testimony shows that, while the
map drawers were aware that Guilford
County was a VRA county and that there
were possibly some VRA concerns
surrounding it, the choice to place Guilford
County in CD 12 was at least in part also
based on a desire to reconstruct the 1997
version of CD 12 for political reasons and
doing so also happened to eliminate any
possible fracturing complaint. This is
furthered by Dr. Hofeller's deposition
testimony, in which he explained that while
the redistricting chairs were certainly
concerned about a fracturing complaint over
Guilford County, “[his] instruction was not to
increase [the black] population. [His]
instruction was to try and take care of [the
VRA] problem, but the primary instructions
and overriding instruction in District 12 was
to accomplish the political goal.”
Compare these statements with those made
about CD 1, where Dr. Hofeller repeatedly
testified that he was told “to draw that 1st
District with a black voting-age population in
excess of 50 percent because of the
Strickland case.” He also testified that this
goal for CD 1 could not be compromised,
explaining that while he had some leeway in
how high he could take the BVAP of the
district, he could not go lower than 50% plus
1. These are the sorts of statements that show
predominance, rather than consciousness, of
race and are clearly distinguishable from
those made about CD 12, where there is only
evidence that race was one among several
factors.
Based upon this direct evidence, I conclude
that race was a factor in how CD 12 was
drawn, although not a predominant one. A

comparison of the legislative statements as to
CD 12 with those made with respect to CD 1
is illustrative, given that the legislature
clearly stated its intention to create a
majority-minority district within CD 1.
Compared with such open expressions of
intent, the statements made with respect to
CD 12 seem to be more a description of the
resulting characteristics of CD 12 rather than
evidence about the weight that the legislature
gave various factors used to draw CD 12. For
example, as the majority points out, in the
public statement issued July 1, 2011, Senator
Rucho and Representative Lewis stated,
“[b]ecause of the presence of Guilford
County in the Twelfth District [which is
covered by section 5 of the VRA], we have
drawn our proposed Twelfth District at a
black voting age level that is above the
percentage of black voting age population
found in the current Twelfth District.” While
the majority reaches an imminently
reasonable conclusion that this is evidence of
an intention to create a majority-minority
district, I, on the other hand, conclude that the
statement reflects a recognition of the fact the
black VAP voting age was higher in the new
district because of the inclusion of a section 5
county, not necessarily that race was the
predominant factor or that Guilford County
was included in order to bring about that
result. It seems clear to me that some
recognition of the character of the completed
CD 12 to the Department of Justice
addressing the preclearance issue was
necessary. However, that recognition does
not necessarily reflect predominant, as
opposed to merely significant, factors in
drawing the district.
Plaintiffs also point to circumstantial
evidence, including the shape of the district,
the low compactness scores, and testimony
from two experts who contend that race, and
not politics, better explains the choices made
in drawing CD 12.
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As regards the district's shape and
compactness, as Defendants point out, the
redistricting co-chairs were not working from
a blank slate when they drew the 2011
version of CD 12. CD 12 has been subject to
litigation almost every single time it has been
redrawn since 1991, and, although Plaintiffs
are correct that it has a bizarre shape and low
compactness scores, it has always had a
bizarre shape and low compactness scores.
As such, pointing out that these traditional
criteria were not observed by the co-chairs in
drawing CD 12 is less persuasive evidence of
racial predominance than it might otherwise
be, given that to create a district with a more
natural shape and compactness score, the
surrounding districts (and likely the entire
map) would have to be redrawn. It is hard to
conclude that a district that is as non-compact
as CD 12 was in 2010 was revised with some
specific motivation when it retains a similar
shape as before and becomes slightly less
compact than the geographic oddity it already
was.
As for Plaintiffs' expert testimony, I first note
that Dr. David Peterson's testimony neither
establishes that race was the predominant
motive for the drawing of CD 12 nor does it
even purport to. As Dr. Peterson himself
stated, his opinion was simply that race
“better accounts for” the boundaries of CD 12
than does politics, but he did not have an
opinion on the legislature's actual motivation,
on whether political concerns predominated
over other criteria, or if the planners had
nonnegotiable racial goals.
Further, when controlling for the results of
the 2008 presidential election, the only data
used by the map's architect in drawing CD 12,
Dr. Peterson's analysis actually finds that
politics is a better explanation for CD 12 than
race. As such, even crediting his analysis, Dr.
Peterson's report and testimony are of little
use in examining the intent behind CD 12 in

that they, much like Plaintiffs' direct
evidence, show at most that race may have
been one among several concerns and that
politics was an equal, if not more significant,
factor.
As for Dr. Ansolabehere, his testimony may
provide some insight into the demographics
that resulted from how CD 12 was drawn.
However, even assuming that his testimony
is to be credited in its entirety, I do not find
that it establishes that race predominated as a
factor in how CD 12 was drawn.
First, as Defendants point out, Dr.
Ansolabehere relied on voter registration
data, rather than actual election results, in his
analysis. Even without assuming the
Supreme Court's admonishment about the
use of registration data as less correlative of
voting behavior than actual election results
remains accurate, Dr. Ansolabehere's
analysis suffers from a separate flaw. Dr.
Ansolabehere's analysis says that race better
explains the way CD 12 was drawn than does
political party registration. However, this is a
criterion that the state did not actually use
when drawing the map. Dr. Hofeller testified
that when drawing the districts, he examined
only the 2008 presidential election results
when deciding which precincts to move in
and out of a district. This fact is critical to the
usefulness of Dr. Ansolabehere's analysis
because, absent some further analysis stating
that race better explains the boundaries of CD
12 than the election results from the 2008
presidential election, his testimony simply
does not address the criteria that Dr. Hofeller
actually used. Plaintiffs contend that the
legislature's
explanation of political
motivation is not persuasive because, if it
were
the
actual
motivation,
Dr.
Ansolabehere's analysis would show that the
boundaries were better explained by voter
registration than by race. However, because
Defendants have explained that they based
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their political goals on the results of the 2008
presidential election, rather than voter
registration, Dr. Ansolabehere's analysis is
simply not enough to prove a predominant
racial motive.
This is particularly true when the other
evidence
that
might
confirm
Dr.
Ansolabehere's analysis is less than clear, and
in fact provides some hesitation as to the
analysis, rather than corroborating it.
Specifically, Dr. Ansolabehere applied his
envelope analysis to CD 12, a district that
was originally drawn in order to create a
majority-minority district, has retained a
substantial minority population in the twenty
years since its creation, and was extremely
non-compact when originally drawn.
Therefore, absent some consideration of
other factors—the competitiveness of
surrounding, contiguous districts and the
compactness of those districts—it is difficult
to place great weight on Dr. Ansolabehere's
analysis. In other words, if a district starts out
as an extremely gerrymandered district,
drawn with race as a predominant factor, I do
not find compelling a subsequent study
concluding that race, and not politics, may be
a better predictor of the likelihood of voter
inclusion in a modification of the original
district.
As the Supreme Court has explained,
Plaintiffs' burden of proving that racial
considerations
were
“dominant
and
controlling” is a demanding one. In my
opinion, Plaintiffs have not met that burden
here as to CD 12. Plaintiffs' direct evidence
shows only that race was a factor in how CD
12 was drawn, not the “dominant and
controlling”
factor.
As
for
their
circumstantial evidence, Plaintiffs must show
that the district is unexplainable on grounds
other than race. Here, Defendants explain CD
12 based on the use of political data that
Plaintiffs' experts do not even specifically

address. As the Court in Cromartie II
explained, in cases where racial identification
correlates highly with political affiliation,
Plaintiffs attacking a district must show “at
the least that the legislature could have
achieved its legitimate political objectives in
alternative ways that are comparably
consistent with traditional districting
principles [and] that those districting
alternatives would have brought about
significantly greater racial balance.”
Plaintiffs have not done so here. In
essentially alleging that political goals were
pretext, they have put forth no alternative
plan that would have made CD 12 a strong
Democratic district while simultaneously
strengthening the surrounding Republican
districts and not increasing the black VAP.
As such, they have not proven that politics
was mere pretext in this case.
Finally, mindful of the fact that the burden is
on Plaintiffs to prove “that the legislature
subordinated
traditional
race-neutral
districting
principles
...
to
racial
considerations” (i.e., proving predominance
directly), it is not clear whether compliance
with section 5, although it necessarily
involved consideration of race, should be
considered a “neutral” redistricting principle
or a purely racial consideration. Although I
reach the same decision regardless, I
conclude that actions taken in compliance
with section 5 and preclearance should not be
a factor that elevates race to a “predominant
factor” when other traditional districting
principles exist, as here, supporting a finding
otherwise. As a result, the fact that certain
voters in Guilford County were included in
CD 12 in an effort to comply with section 5,
avoid retrogression, and receive preclearance
does not persuade me that race was a
predominant factor in light of the other facts
of this case.
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As Plaintiffs have failed to show that race
was the predominant factor in the drawing of
CD 12, it is subject to a rational basis test

rather than strict scrutiny. Because I find that
CD 12 passes the rational basis test, I would
uphold that district as constitutional.
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“Supreme Court to review whether North Carolina relied too heavily on
race in redistricting”
PBS Newshour
Jonathan Drew
June 27, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether Republican lawmakers relied
too heavily on race when they redrew North
Carolina’s congressional districts to give the
GOP a powerful advantage in the swing state.
The justices added the case to their fall
calendar — almost certainly too late to affect
2016’s remaining races. But in the years
ahead, it could impact partisan efforts to
create electoral districts aimed at swaying the
balance of power in Congress and in state
legislatures.
It could be heard in conjunction with a
separate case challenging voting districts in
Virginia, an election law expert said.
North Carolina’s GOP leaders deny factoring
in race to an illegal extent, saying their 2011
map was designed primarily to give
Republicans an edge and to comply with the
federal Voting Rights Act.
Opponents argue that they unfairly stacked
minorities into fewer districts after the 2010
Census in ways that diluted their influence.
A federal court ruled in February that race
was the predominant factor in drawing two
congressional districts, and ordered the state
to quickly produce a new map for North

Carolina’s 13 members of Congress. That
map was used in an unusual, separate, June 7
congressional primary.
The Supreme Court denied the state GOP’s
emergency request to intervene ahead of that
primary, but key issues remain unresolved.
A ruling by the high court also should
influence the outcome of a separate federal
case challenging the districts used to elect
North Carolina’s state legislators.
North Carolina’s status as a swing state belies
the uneven split favoring Republicans in the
state’s legislature and congressional
delegation. Narrowly contested presidential
races in 2008 and 2012 show that voter
preferences are split fairly evenly statewide.
But the GOP used redistricting in 2011 to
create veto-proof majorities of more than
two-thirds of the seats in the state legislature,
and the state’s congressional delegation now
has 3 Democrats to 10 Republicans.
The case is McCrory v. Harris, 15-1262.
Several weeks ago, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear a similar case, in which
challengers argue that a 2011 districting plan
for Virginia’s House of Delegates packed
black voters into a dozen legislative districts,
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strengthening Republican
neighboring territories.

control

of

The justices didn’t immediately set a date for
hearing the two cases, which will likely be
heard together or consolidated by the high
court, according to Rick Hasen, a professor
who studies election law at University of
California at Irvine.

In the most closely watched of North
Carolina’s June congressional primaries,
Republican U.S. Rep. George Holding
defeated fellow incumbent Renee Ellmers
after outside groups poured in money for ads
questioning her conservative credentials.
Holding is expected to have a wide advantage
over his Democratic challenger in November.

Hasen wrote on his blog that five of the eight
justices appear sympathetic to such claims
brought by minority voters against
Republicans, based on a 2015 ruling in an
Alabama case.
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“North Carolina redistricting delay denied”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
February 20, 2016

Without an explanation, the Supreme Court
on Friday night left intact a lower court
decision that had forced the North Carolina
legislature to draw up a new election district
map for congressional seats, to cure “racial
gerrymandering” in two of its districts. There
were no noted dissents from the order.
The Court acted within hours after it had been
told that the legislature in a special session in
Raleigh had approved a new plan for the two
districts — 1 and 12 — that a three-judge
district court had ruled unconstitutional as a
result of “packing” more minority voters into
those areas.
The Justices’ order was one of the first
significant actions the Court had taken since
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. An eightmember Court can deal effectively with such
matters, at least when the Justices are not split
four to four.
The new North Carolina districting plan
enacted Friday specified that it would not go
into effect if the Supreme Court had granted
the request of the governor and state board of
elections to postpone the district court’s order
mandating a new map. With the Justices’
denial of the state’s challenge, the new map
will be in effect for the primary election in the
state — now set for June 7 under a separate
law, also passed by the legislature Friday,

setting aside an earlier plan for the primary
on March 15.
The approaching date of the March primary
was one factor that had led state officials to
ask the Supreme Court to delay the district
court ruling. The panel had given the
lawmakers just two weeks — that is, until
Friday — to come up with a remedy for the
constitutional violation in the two districts.
For years, those two districts have been
electing
African-American
candidates.
District 1 is represented in the current
Congress by Rep. George K. Butterfield, Jr.,
and District 12 by Rep. Alma S. Adams, both
African-American Democrats.
At a time when District 1 had a population of
voting-age African Americans of 47.76%,
Rep. Butterfield won election in 2010 under
a prior map with somewhat more than fiftynine percent of the vote. Under the 2011
plan, however, with more minorities in his
district (now at 52.65%), he won with more
than seventy percent in both 2012 and 2014.
In District 12, another African-American,
Mel Watt, who preceded Adams, won the
2010 election under a prior plan with 63.9%
of the vote when African-Americans of
voting age totaled 43.77%. Under the 2011
plan, with more minorities in the district
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(then, 50.66), he won reelection with 79.6%
in 2012. In the 2014 election, Rep. Adams
won election in that district with more than
seventy-five percent of the vote.
Even though the results under the prior plan
had indicated to the supporters of those
candidates that their districts were already
drawn in a way that assured that AfricanAmerican voters could choose candidates of
their preference, the 2011 plan that the
district court struck down significantly
increased the numbers of African-American
voters in the two districts.
Legislative sponsors of the plan sought to
justify the increased population of minorities
in those areas by arguing that they needed to
push up representation of minorities in those
districts above fifty percent, to satisfy the
federal Voting Rights Act. The district court,
however, ruled earlier this month that this
would not justify lines for those two districts
when race was the predominant factor in
dictating the boundaries of the new, oddly
shaped districts.
Although prior Supreme Court precedents
allow some use of racial factors in
redistricting election boundaries, the Court
has barred the use of race as the predominant
factor, outranking any other political or
practical considerations.

before had moved up the primary date from
May 2016 to March 15. Opponents of that
plan argued that the governor and legislature
were seeking to lock in the 2011 plan for this
year’s congressional elections.
The district court, after a trial, struck down
the boundary lines of Districts 1 and 12 on
February 5, leading state officials to ask the
Supreme Court to postpone that decision,
arguing that the process for holding the
primary in March had already begun, and the
state faced a chaotic situation if the 2011 plan
were not allowed to remain in effect.
The Court got a reply from the challengers to
the 2011 plan on three days ago, opposing
delay of the lower court mandate for a new
map. Then, earlier Friday, each side notified
the Justices of the legislature’s new actions,
leading to the release of the denial of the stay
in late evening.
The Supreme Court’s action did not judge the
constitutionality of the 2011 plan, or of the
new replacement for it, focusing only on
whether the Justices thought the state
officials might win if they went forward with
a formal appeal of the lower court decision.

A voter from each of the North Carolina
districts had challenged the increases in
minority voters in a lawsuit filed in 2013, but
the case did not move rapidly, and the 2011
plan was used in both the 2012 and 2014
elections.
With a trial set to begin in October of last year
on the challenge, the legislature a month
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“North Carolina's Congressional Primaries Are A Mess Because Of
These Maps”
NPR
Tom Bullock
March 10, 2016

North Carolina voters are likely to be
confused when they arrive at their polling
places on March 15. In addition to
presidential candidates, voters will see
congressional primary candidates on the
ballot.

If you're not familiar with North Carolina's
congressional map, here's where the animal
shapes come into play.

But thanks to a federal court decision, the
districts those candidates represent no longer
exist and any votes in those races won't count.
Thanks to three judges, two animal shapes
and one hastily redrawn map of U.S. House
seats, North Carolina politics have been
thrown into chaos.
It started to go off the rails Feb. 5 when a
panel of three federal judges determined that
the boundaries of the state's 1st and 12th
congressional districts were drawn in such a
way as to concentrate African-American
voters and dilute their overall influence.

Credit: Alyson Hurt/NPR
The 1st District looks kind of like an octopus
whose body hugs the Virginia border and
whose tentacles stretch east and west and
halfway down the state.
The 12th congressional district is more
snakelike — sometimes no wider than an
interstate — and extends more than 80 miles
from Charlotte to Winston-Salem.

Coming just five weeks ahead of voting,
there was no choice but to "stop the current
election, go back, redraw the lines," said Josh
Lawson, general counsel for the North
Carolina State Board of Elections.

The federal court decision surprised many in
the state, especially because the U.S.
Department of Justice approved the maps
five years ago.

Redrawing The Animal Shapes

Faced with the court order, the state's
Republican Legislature opted for a drastic
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redrawing of North Carolina's entire
congressional map, finishing the job in just
two weeks.
"Eleven out of the 13 districts saw major
changes," said Michael Bitzer, a political
scientist at Catawba College. "Some sitting
members of Congress woke up the next
morning after these maps had been released
and went, 'Oh, boy, I don't even live in the
district now.' "
In fact, the home of Democratic U.S. Rep.
Alma Adams in the old, snaking 12th District
is two hours away from the borders of the
newly redrawn, short and squat 12th District.
Most of the other districts were also stretched
or shifted, which means that "lots of folks
now have different representation than they
did before," said Lawson.
Primary Chaos
The process has created a host of logistical
hurdles for elections officials in North
Carolina, starting with a process known as
geocoding to determine who represents every
voter in the state. Next, officials need to
reprint more than 4,500 different types of
ballots. And then there's the question of who's
on the ballot.

"Under the current map, 46 people are
currently running for Congress, but that
number would be expected to grow
substantially," said Lawson, because the state
has reopened the filing period to allow more
candidates to run in the newly drawn
districts.
All of this takes time. So, state lawmakers
moved the primaries for U.S. House races
from March 15 to June 7.
However, the March 15 ballots have already
been printed and they include congressional
candidates. So election officials have urged
North Carolina voters to fill out the entire
ballot — even though votes for U.S. House
candidates won't be counted.
It's an effort to avoid confusion, although
telling voters to cast votes in a race that isn't
happening yet is a situation that Lawson
admits he did not foresee.
The federal judges who threw out the original
congressional map still have to approve the
one drawn by the state lawmakers. If the
judges reject it, they can tell the Legislature
to redraw the map, or the judges will
redistrict the state themselves.
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Looking Ahead: Voter Identification
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“Supreme Court Blocks North Carolina from Restoring Strict Voting
Law”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
August 31, 2016
A deadlocked Supreme Court on Wednesday
refused to revive parts of a restrictive North
Carolina voting law that a federal appeals
court had struck down as an unconstitutional
effort to “target African Americans with
almost surgical precision.”
The court was divided 4 to 4, with the court’s
more conservative members voting to revive
parts of the law. The court’s brief order
included no reasoning.
North Carolina’s law, which imposed an
array of voting restrictions, including new
voter identification requirements, was
enacted by the state’s Republican-controlled
legislature in 2013. It was part of a wave of
voting restrictions enacted after a 5-to-4
Supreme Court decision that effectively
struck down a central part of the federal
Voting Rights Act, weakening federal
oversight of voting rights.
Challenges to the laws have met with
considerable success in recent months, and
Wednesday’s development suggested that the
current eight-member Supreme Court is not
likely to undo those victories.
Gov. Pat McCrory, a Republican who is
seeking re-election this fall, asserted that
North Carolina had “been denied basic voting
rights already granted to more than 30
states.” He noted that four justices had
supported the state’s position and that “four

liberal justices blocked North Carolina
protections afforded by our sensible voter
laws.”
The law’s critics welcomed the order.
“This decision opens the door for fair and full
access to the democratic process for all
voters,” said Allison Riggs, a lawyer for the
Southern Coalition for Social Justice.
“Hundreds of thousands of North Carolinians
will now be able to vote without barriers. The
voting booth is the one place where everyone
is equal and where we all have the same say.”
Civil rights groups joined with the Obama
administration in filing suit against the law,
arguing that, several parts of the law violated
the Constitution and what remained of the
Voting Rights Act. A trial judge rejected
those claims in April, but in July a threejudge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond,
Va., disagreed.
The appeals court ruling struck down five
parts of the law: its voter ID requirements, a
rollback of early voting to 10 days from 17,
an elimination of same-day registration and
of preregistration of some teenagers, and its
ban on counting votes cast in the wrong
precinct.
The court found that all five restrictions
“disproportionately
affected
African
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Americans.” The law’s voter identification
provision, for instance, “retained only those
types of photo ID disproportionately held by
whites and excluded those disproportionately
held by African Americans.”
This was so, the court said, even though the
state had “failed to identify even a single
individual who has ever been charged with
committing in-person voter fraud in North
Carolina.” But it did find that there is
evidence of fraud in absentee voting by mail,
a method used disproportionately by white
voters. But the Legislature exempted
absentee voting from the photo ID
requirement.
The court also found that the early voting
restrictions had a much larger effect on black
voters, who “disproportionately used the first
seven days of early voting.”
The law, the court said, eliminated one of two
“souls-to-the-polls” Sundays when black
churches provided rides to polling places.
In an emergency application filed 17 days
after the appeals court ruling, state officials
asked the Supreme Court to step in.
Represented by Paul D. Clement, a former
United States solicitor general in the George
W. Bush administration, the officials
challenged only the parts of the appeals
court’s ruling that they said would create
confusion in the coming election.
The state officials asked the justices to
temporarily restore three parts of the law: its
voter-ID requirements, the reduction of early
voting days and preregistration of some
teenagers.
In response, the Obama administration and
civil rights groups said the state had moved
too slowly to challenge the appeals court’s

ruling and that undoing it would lead to
mistakes and confusion.
They added that the state’s lawyers had
earlier told the appeals court that the state
could comply with a ruling so long as it was
issued by late July. The appeals court ruled
on July 29.
Changing course now, the administration
said, “would inflict irreparable injury on
minority voters.”
The state asked the justices to act because it
said the appeals court’s approach would
“threaten voter ID laws throughout the
nation.”
The Obama administration responded that the
appeal’s court’s ruling rested on “a careful
appraisal of overwhelming evidence specific
to North Carolina.”
“The only voter ID laws that the decision
endangers are those proven through
overwhelming evidence to have been adopted
with racially discriminatory intent,” the brief
said.
“This is a case about the use of race to
achieve partisan ends.”
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan
voted to reject the state’s arguments. Justice
Clarence Thomas would have revived all of
the contested provisions, while Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito Jr. would have
reinstated the voter ID and early voting
provisions.
“This ruling means that thousands of voters
who would have been disenfranchised will
now be able to participate in the presidential
election,” said Dale Ho, director of the
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American Civil Liberties Union’s Voting
Rights Project, which represented several
plaintiffs in the case.
Republican supporters of the tightened
standards, who had suggested that the appeals
court’s judges might have been intending “to
reopen the door for voter fraud,” took a
measured tone on Wednesday.

“We respect the court, but are disappointed
North Carolina will not be among the more
than 30 other states with commonsense voter
ID in place for the upcoming election,”
House Speaker Tim Moore and Phil Berger,
the president pro tempore of the North
Carolina Senate, said in a joint statement.
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“Election Litigation 2016: Where Things Stand”
Election Law Blog
Rick Hasen
August 22, 2016
With 77 days to go until Election Day, and
early voting starting much sooner in some
places, here is the major litigation affecting
election procedures and voting that I’m
watching the most closely:
Wisconsin: One trial judge required
Wisconsin officials to accept an affidavit
instead of one of the strict voter ids for
voting. A 7th Circuit panel reversed that
holding, and we are awaiting the entire 7th
Circuit en banc to rule on this question. A
second trial judge struck a number of election
rollbacks in Wisconsin, including those
limited to early voting. The state has
petitioned the 7th Circuit to stay that judge’s
order pending appeal. I expect we will hear
something on this case this week.
North Carolina: The 4th Circuit struck a
number of challenged election rollbacks
based upon a finding that North Carolina
passed the law with racially discriminatory
intent. The state will file a cert. petition in the
Supreme Court, and in the meantime it has
asked the Supreme Court to reinstate some of
the laws that the 4th Circuit blocked. Chief
Justice Roberts has asked the plaintiffs to file
a reply by this Thursday, the 25th. Expect a
ruling the following week (and given the
slow pace set by the Chief, I do not expect the
stay to be granted so close to the election).
Texas: We thought things were done in
Texas for the time being, after the 5th Circuit
found that Texas’s strict voter id law violated
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and

ordered a softening by the trial judge (as well
as a remand after the election to consider
whether Texas acted with racially
discriminatory intent). Texas and the
plaintiffs agreed in the trial court on an
affidavit requirement for softening to apply
in this election only, which seemed to settle
things for November. But last week the Texas
AG left open the possibility of seeking
emergency relief with the Supreme Court to
get the full voter id requirement reinstated for
November. Nothing’s been filed yet, and
given the lengthy delay and timing such a
request would almost certainly be denied.
Ohio: We are waiting on a couple of cases
out of the 6th Circuit over whether the Ohio
legislature’s rollback of early voting was
permissible. Two lower courts said it was not.
Frankly, I’m quite surprised these rulings are
not out yet as time is tight—and the theories
of the plaintiffs here seem the shakiest in
terms of proving a violation. [Update: Only
one of these two pending cases is about the
early voting aspect of this law. The other
deals with other aspects.] We are also
awaiting a 6th Circuit ruling on a so-farunsuccessful challenge to its voter purge
procedures, for removing people from the
ballot who have not been active voters.
Arizona: Democrats are looking for a court
order to make sure that the long lines that
materialized in the primary will not reappear
on election day. Awaiting a district court
ruling.
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Kansas/EAC: The D.C. Circuit is
considering an appeal over the issue of
whether an EAC bureaucrat exceeded his
authority when he allowed Kansas and
Arizona to require documentary proof of
citizenship for voters who register to vote in

federal elections using the federal form.
There is also litigation over the “dual” voting
system that SOS Kobach has put in place over
the objections of voting rights activists.
[Update: There’s another one of these Kansas
cases pending before the 10th Circuit.]
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“As November Approaches, Courts Deal Series of Blows to Voter ID
Laws”
National Public Radio
Camila Domonoske
August 2, 2016

All summer long, the clock has been ticking
on voting rights cases. Judges don't like to
change voting rules too near an election, and
November iscreeping ever closer.
And the past two weeks, in particular, have
been eventful: Five courts in five states ruled
against voter ID and proof-of-citizenship
laws.
There's still time for appeals and stays. But
for now, advocates for voting access are
celebrating.
"It's been like Christmas Day," one activist
told CNN on Monday.
Supporters of voter ID laws have argued they
are necessary to prevent voter fraud. But in
their
responses,
judges
consistently
highlighted the rarity of voter fraud —
particularly through in-person voting.
A federal judge in North Dakota went further:
"The undisputed evidence before the Court
reveals that voter fraud in North Dakota has
been virtually non-existent," he wrote, as he
rejected a voter ID law justified by fears of
such fraud.
Here's a look at the recent rulings:

Texas

On July 20, a federal appeals court ruled that
Texas' voter ID law had a discriminatory
impact on voters, and ordered a lower court
to come up with a fix before elections in
November.
It's "probably the strictest voter identification
law in the country," as NPR's Pam Fessler
puts it, and activists say it disproportionately
impacts black and Hispanic voters.
The court agreed, although it stopped short of
concluding that Texas purposefully set out to
disenfranchise minority voters, as the TwoWay reported at the time:
"A district court had found not only
that the law discriminated, but that it
was intentionally designed to do so.
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
saw some flaws in that conclusion
and instructed the lower court to
reconsider that element of the case
and rule again — preferably after
Election Day."
So this case — which has been ricocheting
through the court system for years now — is
far from over.

North Carolina

490

On July 29, a three-judge panel of the 4th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
North Carolina's sweeping voter ID law
(which included a host of other voting
restrictions, including shortening the early
voting period and banning same-day
registration).
And — unlike in Texas — the appeals court
ruled that North Carolina legislators had
actually passed the law with discriminatory
intent.
As the Two-Way reported then, "The appeals
court noted that the North Carolina
Legislature 'requested data on the use, by
race, of a number of voting practices' — then,
data in hand, 'enacted legislation that
restricted voting and registration in five
different
ways,
all
of
which
disproportionately
affected
African
Americans.' "

passed by Republican state lawmakers, the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reports.
Among the provisions he overturned: limits
on early voting, a requirement that people
must live in a ward for 28 days before voting,
a prohibition on expired student IDs and a
ban on emailing absentee ballots to voters.
The judge also required that anyone with
difficulty getting an ID must be granted a
voting ID within 30 days, the Journal
Sentinel reports.
In his decision, U.S. District Judge James
Peterson wrote:

The court wrote that the changes to the voting
process "target African Americans with
almost surgical precision," and "impose cures
for problems that did not exist."

"The evidence in this case casts doubt on the
notion that voter ID laws foster integrity and
confidence. The Wisconsin experience
demonstrates that a preoccupation with
mostly phantom election fraud leads to real
incidents of disenfranchisement, which
undermine rather than enhance confidence in
elections,
particularly
in
minority
communities. To put it bluntly, Wisconsin's
strict version of voter ID law is a cure worse
than the disease."

Wisconsin

Kansas

"Wisconsin's ID law has been the subject of
litigation ever since it was passed by the
state's Republican-controlled Legislature in
2011. Proponents said the law was needed to
prevent voter fraud, although there has been
little evidence of voter impersonation at the
polls," NPR's Pam Fessler reported in 2015.

On Friday, a judge ruled that Kansas citizens
must be allowed to vote in state and local
elections, even if they didn't show proof of
citizenship when they registered.

The Supreme Court declined to get involved,
and voters had to show ID in this year's
primaries.

"Since 2013, Kansas has required
residents
to
show
proof-ofcitizenship when they register to vote.
But a number of courts have blocked
that requirement when it comes to
federal elections — for president or
members of Congress. In response,
the state set up a two-tiered system

But on Friday, a U.S. district judge struck
down several parts of the state's strict voter
ID law — as well as other election laws

This one's complicated. We'll let Pam
explain:
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where those who don't show proof-ofcitizenship can vote in federal
elections, but not state or local ones.
But that arrangement was struck
down earlier this year by a state
judge, for those who used a national
voter
registration
form.
Still
following? There's more. In May, a
federal judge ordered the state to start
registering approximately 18,000
voters whose registrations had been
held in suspension because they didn't
show proof of citizenship. Kansas
Secretary of State Kris Kobach has
appealed. He argues that the law is
needed to stop immigrants in the
country illegally from voting ...
Kobach has ordered that the
suspended voters be registered, but
only for federal races."
On Friday, just days before the primaries in
Kansas' state elections, a county judge
overturned Kobach's order. In his oral ruling,
he said votes from people who didn't show
proof-of-citizenship must be counted — even
in local and state elections.
If the same policy holds in November's
elections, 50,000 people could be affected,
the Wichita Eagle reports.

North Dakota
On Monday, a federal judge blocked a law
requiring photo ID to vote in North Dakota,
ruling that the law unfairly burdens Native
Americans in the state.
As The Associated Press reports, North
Dakota doesn't require voters to register, but
starting in 2004 it has required identity cards.
There was an exception allowing people
without an ID to vote, as long as a poll worker
could sign an affidavit vouching for them —
but in 2013, the exception was overturned.

"The public interest in protecting the most
cherished right to vote for thousands of
Native Americans who currently lack a
qualifying ID and cannot obtain one,
outweighs the purported interest and
arguments of the State," U.S. District Judge
Daniel Hovland wrote. "No eligible voter,
regardless of their station in life, should be
denied the opportunity to vote."
Almost a quarter of Native Americans in the
state, otherwise eligible to vote, don't have
proper ID; that's only true for 12 percent of
non-Indians, the AP reports.

A question of timing
Voter ID laws aren't the only voting-rights
cases that have landed in the courts this
summer. Earlier in July, the Virginia
Supreme Court ruled that Gov. Terry
McAuliffe didn't have the authority to restore
voting rights to hundreds of thousands of
felons at once; McAuliffe has pledged to
restore those rights individually.
In Ohio, judges ruled earlier this summer that
the state couldn't eliminate a week of early
voting or change laws governing how
absentee and provisional ballots are counted.
Those cases are currently being appealed.
The spate of high-profile voting-rights cases
isn't just a coincidence. For several of these
cases, the current legal battles can be traced
back to one Supreme Court decision.
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down a
key provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
The act said the federal government had to
approve any changes to the voting process in
certain states — ones with a history of
discrimination.
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme
Court said the formula used to determine
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which states qualify was outdated, and the
requirement couldn't be enforced until
Congress comes up with a new standard.
Since then, a "blizzard" of changes have been
carried out by state and local authorities, as
the New York Times reported over the
weekend.
And more conspicuously, states that would
have needed pre-approval — including Texas

and North Carolina — passed voter ID laws
after that decision, as Frontline has reported.
One result: More voting-rights lawsuits than
usual.
"We have to go out and sue rather than
blocking bad laws before they go into effect,"
the head of the voting rights unit of the
Justice Department told NPR's Carrie
Johnson this spring. "And that's been a big
change for us."
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“Appeals Court Strikes Down Texas Voter ID Law”
USA Today
Richard WolfJuly 20, 2016

A federal appeals court struck down Texas'
tough
voter
identification
law
as
discriminatory Wednesday, giving civil
rights advocates a crucial victory in advance
of the 2016 election.
The 9-6 ruling from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 5th Circuit, a generally
conservative court, represents the third
consecutive decision against the Texas law
and sets up a potential Supreme Court
showdown over the contentious issue of state
photo ID rules.
The law could have left up to 600,000 voters
without the proper identification in this fall's
elections, opponents claimed. Because of
that, the Supreme Court had invited voting
rights advocates to seek a delay in the photo
ID requirement if the appeals court had not
ruled by Wednesday.
The appeals court majority said the law was
not intended to discriminate but had that
effect on minority voters.
"The district court must ensure that any
remedy enacted ameliorates (the law's)
discriminatory effect, while respecting the
legislature's stated objective to safeguard the
integrity of elections by requiring more
secure forms of voter identification," the
court said.
Dissenting judges said the law
reasonable in both purpose and effect.

was

"Requiring a voter to verify her identity with
a photo ID at the polling place is a reasonable
requirement widely supported by Texans of
all races and members of the public
belonging to both political parties," they said.
The majority ruling "fans the flames of
perniciously irresponsible racial namecalling."
The law was enacted in 2011, blocked by a
federal district judge in 2012 and then put
into effect in 2013, when the Supreme Court
struck down a key part of the Voting Rights
Act that had required Texas and some other
states to get federal approval for voting
changes. Challengers have won every court
case since, but the law had remained in effect.
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton
criticized the court ruling. "Preventing voter
fraud is essential to accurately reflecting the
will of Texas voters during elections," he
said, "and it is unfortunate that this commonsense law, providing protections against
fraud, was not upheld in its entirety.”
Gerry Hebert, executive director of the
Campaign
Legal
Center
— which
represented some Texas challengers
— said "this law will no longer prevent
eligible voters from casting a ballot this
November.”
Other civil rights groups applauded the ruling
bur wished for more -- a ruling that Texas
lawmakers passed the law with a purpose to
discriminate.
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“We believe that the evidence is clear that
(the law) was passed by a legislature that
intended to discriminate and that the law
must be invalidated in its entirety," said
Sherrilyn Ifill, president of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund.

Act in 2013. Those laws impose new rules for
registering and voting that could limit access
to the polls for minorities and young people
in particular — the coalition that
propelled Barack Obama to the White House
in 2008 and 2012.

The Texas case and another challenge to
North
Carolina's
array
of
voting
restrictions are the leading contenders among
many voting rights cases to get to the
Supreme Court as early as next year, when
the justices could define what types of voting
changes are allowed and prohibited under
the Voting Rights Act.

Seventeen states have new voting procedures
in place for the November election, more than
half of which are being challenged in
court. Many require voters to show photo
identification, such as the Texas law. Others
target rules for registering, early voting and
provisional voting, such as the wide-ranging
North Carolina law that caused confusion and
long lines in March's primary.

"There is not a lot of guidance from the
Supreme Court on these vote dilution cases,"
Thomas Farr, a lawyer representing North
Carolina before the 4th Circuit appeals court,
said last month. That court's decision is
expected soon.
The Supreme Court has itself to thank for
some of the laws enacted after the justices
struck down a key part of the Voting Rights

Those wide-ranging restrictions came under
attack as racially discriminatory before a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit in June. One judge
said the legislature's rush to impose
limits after getting a green light from the
Supreme Court in 2013 "looks pretty bad to
me."
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“Appeals Court Upholds Wisconsin Voter ID Rulings”
Associated Press
August 29, 2016
A federal appeals court has refused to
reconsider a pair of rulings affecting
Wisconsin's voter ID law, meaning no more
changes to the requirement are likely before
the November election.
The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on
Friday unanimously declined to have a full
panel of judges hear appeals of two recent
rulings affecting the voter ID requirement
and a host of other election-related laws.

The U.S. Supreme Court would have to
intervene for any changes to happen before
the Nov. 8 election.
The appeals court's upholding the earlier
rulings means that Wisconsin voters will
have to show an acceptable ID to vote, but
those having trouble getting it can get a
temporary ID from the Division of Motor
Vehicles.
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“Appeals Court Strikes Down North Carolina’s Voter-ID Law”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes and Ann E. Marimow
July 29, 2016
Voting rights activists scored legal victories
in key presidential election states Friday, the
most important being a federal appeals court
ruling that North Carolina’s epublican-led
legislature enacted new voting restrictions in
2013 to intentionally blunt the growing clout
of African American voters.
The unanimous decision by a three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th
Circuit was an overwhelming victory for the
Justice Department and civil rights groups.
Election law experts consider North
Carolina’s voter law one of the nation’s most
far-reaching.
In Wisconsin, where one federal judge
already had eased restrictions on voter-ID
requirements, a second judge found that
additional elements of the law passed by the
legislature and signed by Gov. Scott Walker
(R-Wis.) were unconstitutional.
U.S. District Judge James D. Peterson
suggested he would strike the entire law if he
were not bound by the Supreme Court’s
decision that states may use properly written
voter-ID laws to guard against voter fraud.
“The evidence in this case casts doubt on the
notion that voter ID laws foster integrity and
confidence,”
Peterson
wrote.
“The
Wisconsin experience demonstrates that a
preoccupation with mostly phantom election
fraud leads to real incidents of
disenfranchisement, which undermine rather
than enhance confidence in elections,

particularly in minority communities. To put
it bluntly, Wisconsin’s strict version of voter
ID law is a cure worse than the disease.” The
state will appeal both rulings.
In the North Carolina case, the 4th Circuit
panel agreed with allegations that North
Carolina’s omnibus bill selectively chose
voter-ID requirements, reduced the number
of early-voting days and changed registration
procedures in ways meant to harm blacks,
who overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic
Party.
“The new provisions target African
Americans with almost surgical precision”
and “impose cures for problems that did not
exist,” Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for
the panel. “Thus the asserted justifications
cannot and do not conceal the State’s true
motivation.”
The rulings — along with that of a state court
that halted an attempt in Kansas to require
proof of citizenship to register — marked
important wins for opponents of restrictive
voting laws that are being challenged
throughout the country ahead of November’s
presidential election. Put together, the
decisions suggest a growing judicial
suspicion of the wave of voting-restriction
legislation passed in recent years by Republican-led legislatures that said it was
necessary to combat voter fraud.
The decisions are likely to prompt the states
to ask the Supreme Court for emergency
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action. But it is far from clear whether the
eight justices, evenly divided between
conservative and liberal, would get involved.
The proximity of an election is often reason
for justices to let an appeals court ruling
stand.
Federal courts have been examining what are
popular and, to some, seemingly commonsense laws — requiring photo ID, for
instance — to see whether they favor one
group over another.
In North Carolina, for instance, the judges at
oral arguments noted that government-issued
driver’s licenses are an acceptable form of
identification but that government-issued
public
assistance
cards
—
used
disproportionately by minorities in the state
— are not.
Republican leaders in North Carolina vowed
an appeal to the high court. They issued a
fiery statement denouncing the ruling “by
three partisan Democrats” and suggested it
was intended to help the Democratic
candidates for president and governor.
North Carolina is considered a key swing
state, and African American voters have
played an increasing role in making it
competitive.
“We can only wonder if the intent is to reopen
the door for voter fraud, potentially allowing
fellow Democrat politicians like Hillary
Clinton and Roy Cooper to steal the
election,” said Senate Leader Phil Berger and
House Speaker Tim Moore.
Motz, 73, was nominated by President Bill
Clinton. The other judges on the panel were
Henry Floyd, nominated to the federal bench
by President George W. Bush and elevated to
the 4th Circuit by President Obama, and
James A. Wynn Jr., a former North Carolina

Supreme Court justice nominated to the
federal circuit by Obama.
Election law experts are skeptical there is
evidence of widespread cheating at the polls
in this country. In particular, they find that
voting fraud is most often associated with
absentee balloting, rather than the kind of
impersonation voting that ID laws are meant
to combat.
Speaking to reporters in Baton Rouge on
Friday, U.S. Attorney General Loretta E.
Lynch praised the court’s ruling and said the
Justice Department will continue to challenge
restrictive voting laws. “The ability of
Americans to have a voice in the direction of
their country — to have a fair and free
opportunity to help write the story of this
nation — is fundamental to who we are and
who we aspire to be,” Lynch said.
Democrats and civil rights groups have also
filed suits in Ohio and Arizona.
The North Carolina decision by the
Richmond-based court on Friday reverses a
485-page ruling by District Judge Thomas D.
Schroeder that upheld the voting measures
passed in 2013.
North Carolina lawmakers overhauled the
state’s election law soon after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder,
which freed certain states with a history of
discrimination from a Voting Rights Act
requirement that they receive federal
approval before changing voting rules. North
Carolina was one of the states.
Legislators quickly eliminated same-day
voter registration, rolled back of a week of
early voting and put an end to out-of-precinct
voting. The appeals court’s ruling reinstates
those provisions that civil rights groups, led
by the state NAACP, said were used
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disproportionately by African American
voters.
Motz wrote that Schroeder’s comprehensive
examination of the legislature’s action
“seems to have missed the forest in carefully
surveying the many trees. This failure of
perspective led the court to ignore critical
facts bearing on legislative intent, including
the inextricable link between race and
politics in North Carolina.”
The panel seemed to say it found the
equivalent of a smoking gun. “Before
enacting that law, the legislature requested
data on the use, by race, of a number of voting
practices,” Motz wrote. “Upon receipt of the
race data, the General Assembly enacted
legislation that restricted voting and
registration in five different ways, all of
which disproportionately affected African
Americans.”
The panel found the law was passed with
racially discriminatory intent, violating the
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. It
said that “intentionally targeting a particular
race’s access to the franchise because its
members vote for a particular party, in a
predictable
manner,
constitutes
discriminatory purpose.”
Motz added: “Our conclusion does not mean,
and we do not suggest, that any member of
the General Assembly harbored racial hatred
or animosity toward any minority group.”
But she said the “totality of the circumstances
— North Carolina’s history of voting
discrimination; the surge in African
American
voting;
the
legislature’s
knowledge that African Americans voting
translated into support for one party; and the
swift elimination of the tools African
Americans had used to vote and imposition
of a new barrier at the first opportunity to do

so — cumulatively and unmistakably reveal
that the General Assembly used [the law] to
entrench itself.”
“Even if done for partisan ends, that
constituted racial discrimination,” Motz
wrote.
Such a finding could have meant that the
judges could order North Carolina back
under federal supervision. But the panel
declined to take that step, saying it was
enough to block the parts of the law it found
offensive.
North Carolina Gov. Pat McCrory (R) issue a
short statement that, like that of the
legislative leaders, said the decision would be
appealed, and he repeated claims about the
partisan cast of the panel. “Three Democratic
judges are undermining the integrity of our
elections while also maligning our state,”
said McCrory, who is in a tight reelection
battle with Cooper, the state’s Democratic
attorney general.
Voting rights advocates applauded the ruling
and said it sent a strong message to
legislatures throughout the country.
North Carolina was one of 17 states set to
have more-restrictive voting laws in place for
this presidential election than in 2012. Laws
in several states, including Wisconsin, Texas
and Virginia, also are being challenged in
court.
In Wisconsin, a federal judge previously
ruled that voters who lack the specific kind of
identification the state requires be allowed to
vote in November by signing an affidavit as
to their identity. In a separate lawsuit, groups
asked Peterson to rule on other aspects of the
law.
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He struck part of the law restricting hours for
in-person voting before the election, saying it
intentionally
discriminates.
“The
legislature’s immediate goal was to achieve a
partisan objective, but the means of achieving
that objective was to suppress the reliably
Democratic vote of Milwaukee’s African
Americans,” Peterson concluded.
In Texas, the entire U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 5th Circuit ruled that Texas’s strict voterID law discriminates against minority voters,
and it ordered a lower court to come up with

a fix for the law in time for the November
elections.
The appeals court, one of the most
conservative in the country, declined to strike
down the law completely but said provisions
must be made to allow those who lack the
specific ID the law requires to be able to cast
a vote. The state has decided not to appeal
that ruling to the Supreme Court, and a
district judge is to rule soon on what
accommodations must be made.
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“Texas to Appeal Voter ID Ruling to Supreme Court”
The Hill
Reid Wilson
August 16, 2016

Texas will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to
keep the state’s controversial voter
identification law in place, three weeks after
an appeals court found that the law violated
the Voting Rights Act.
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s office
said on Tuesday that it would appeal the July
20 ruling by the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals.
“To protect the integrity of voting in the state
of Texas, our office will appeal the Voter ID
ruling of the Fifth Circuit to the United States
Supreme Court,” Paxton’s communications
director, Marc Rylander, said in a statement.
The appeals court ruling that put Texas’s
voter identification law on ice directed the
state and voting-rights advocates who
challenged the law to come up with a
compromise. A U.S. District Court judge
approved an agreement last week that would
allow voters without identifications to cast
ballots if they signed a declaration of
citizenship and provided proof that they lived
in Texas.

The negotiations between the state and
voting-rights groups seemed to hint that
Texas would live with the deal and not appeal
to the highest court. Voting-rights groups
criticized Texas for reversing course on
Tuesday.
“[Gov.] Greg Abbott, Ken Paxton and other
Texas Republicans are terrified by the
prospect that every Texan who can vote
might vote, so it’s no surprise that they will
spend more Texans’ tax dollars to defend a
discriminatory law,” said Matt Angle, who
runs the Democrat-backing Lone Star
Project.
The Texas appeal comes just hours after
North Carolina Gov. Pat McCrory (R) said he
would appeal a 4th Circuit Court decision
overturning major parts of his state’s
landmark 2013 election reform law.
McCrory’s office said Monday that he would
ask the Supreme Court for a temporary stay
and allow the law to remain in place as North
Carolina mounts its appeal.
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“North Carolina Asks Supreme Court to Reinstate Voter ID Law”
Politico
Josh Gerstein
August 16, 2016
North Carolina officials are asking the U.S.
Supreme Court to reinstate key parts of the
state's voter ID law blocked last month after
a federal appeals court found that the measure
intentionally targeted African-Americans.
Lawyers for the state filed an emergency
application with Chief Justice John Roberts
on Monday in an attempt to allow officials to
conduct this November's election using the
law's the photo ID requirement and reduce
the number of early voting days from 17 to
10.
The motion, prepared by former George W.
Bush administration Solicitor General Paul
Clement, paints the 4th Circuit ruling as a
deliberate and insubordinate assault on the
Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby
County v. Holder, freeing North Carolina and
areas in 14 other states from having to
"preclear" changes to voting rules under the
Voting Rights Act.
"The ... fundamental problem with the Fourth
Circuit’s decision is its complete
misapprehension of the legal principles that
govern an intentional discrimination
inquiry,” the state's application says. “Left
standing, its decision not only will threaten
voter-ID laws throughout the country despite
this Court’s decision in Crawford, but also
will gut this Court’s decision in Shelby
County.”

The motion filed by the state and Republican
Gov. Pat McCrory also says: “If a voter-ID
law can still be invalidated as intentionally
discriminatory even when, as here, a State
has done everything possible to avoid
discriminatory impact, then no voter-ID law
is safe. Under the Fourth Circuit’s
unprecedented analysis, by contrast, the mere
potential for retrogressive impact suffices to
give rise to an inference of discriminatory
intent—even if, as the District Court found
here, retrogressive impact will not actually
result.”
Roberts is likely to refer the application to the
full court, which is operating shorthanded
with just eight justices. The votes of five
justices will be needed to put the 4th Circuit
ruling on hold. That seems to be an uphill
fight, since granting the application will
require the vote of at least one of the four
Democratic-appointed justices, all of whom
dissented in Shelby County.
While the state is seeking to restore the photo
ID rules, early voting days reduction and a
ban on pre-registration of 16-year-olds, the
application does not attempt to reinstate a ban
on same-day registration and out-of-precinct
voting.
North Carolina’s Democratic Attorney
General Roy Cooper, whose office
participated in the defense of the law at the
4th Circuit, is not listed as counsel on the
application filed Monday. A spokeswoman
said his office is no longer involved in the
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cases, which were brought by civil rights
groups and the Obama administration.
They're expected to oppose the application.
The request for an emergency stay came 17
days after the 4th Circuit ruling — a longer

delay than many observers expected and
McCrory indicated after the loss at the 4th
Circuit. The delay could make it less likely
that the Supreme Court will step in by putting
any action even closer to this fall's election.
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